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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
VOL. 90

JANUARY 1990

NO. 1

OUR LOCALISM: PART I-THE STRUCTURE OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Richard Briffault*
INTRODUCTION

Two themes dominate thejurisprudence of American local government law: the descriptive assertion that American localities lack power
and the normative call for greater local autonomy. The positive claim
of local legal powerlessness dates back to the middle of the nineteenth
century and continues to be affirmed by treatises and commentators as
a central element of state-local relations. The argument for local selfdetermination has a comparably historic pedigree and broad contemporary support. The scholarly proponents of greater local powerwhat I will call "localism"-make their case in terms of economic efficiency, education for public life and popular political empowerment-a
striking harmonization of the otherwise divergent values of the free
market, civic republicanism and critical legal studies.
The law of state-local relations, however, is more complex than the
dominant account suggests. The insistence on local legal powerlessness reflects a lack of understanding of the scope of local legal authority. Most local governments in this country are far from legally
powerless. Many enjoy considerable autonomy over matters of local
concern. State legislatures, often criticized for excessive interference in
local matters, have frequently conferred significant political, economic
and regulatory authority on many localities. State courts, usually characterized as hostile to localities and condemned for failing to vindicate
local rights against the states, have repeatedly embraced the concept of
strong local government and have affirmed local regulatory power and
local control of basic services. Localism as a value is deeply embedded
in the American legal and political culture.
Much as the extent of local legal power is usually understated, the
virtues of enhancing local autonomy tend to be greatly exaggerated.
Localism reflects territorial economic and social inequalities and reinforces them with political power. Its benefits accrue primarily to a minority of affluent localities, to the detriment of other communities and
to the system of local government as a whole. Moreover, localism is
primarily centered on the affirmation of private values. Localist ideology and local political action tend not to build up public life, but rather
* Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. B.A., Columbia, 1974; J.D.,
Harvard, 1977.
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contribute to the pervasive privatism that is the hallmark of contemporary American politics. Localism may be more of an obstacle to achieving social justice and the development of public life than a prescription
for their attainment.
The flaws in the dominant positive and normative critiques of
American local government law are interconnected and proceed from a
common methodology. Local governments and their powers are considered in relatively abstract, ideal terms. Legal analysis tends to focus
on the formal legal category of local government. As a result, the enormous variety of local governments- their differences in size, wealth
and function; the degree to which economic considerations enable
them to benefit fully from the legal powers they enjoy; the intense political and economic conflicts among them-is often missed. So, too, the
issue of local power is usually conceived of as the abstract question of
who wins-state or locality-in a head-to-head conflict. Such an approach commonly fails to consider how infrequently such conflicts actually occur, where the balance of power lies in the absence of conflict
and the importance of interlocal, as distinguished from state-local, conflicts. The values of local autonomy are ascribed to a thinly described
set of idealized local units, while the policies and programs of actual
local governments and the impacts localities have on each other are
seldom examined. Localism in practice is significantly different from
localism in theory.
This Article presents a study of "Our Localism"'-of the legal
powers of contemporary American local governments, the practical social and political ramifications of local legal power in a system characterized by wide divergences in local fiscal capabilities and needs and the
ideological commitment to localism that sustains and legitimates local
autonomy. It does so by pursuing a middle path, attempting neither a
ground-level account of the law or politics of individual states or local
governments nor a high theory examination of local autonomy as a
matter of general political philosophy. Instead, it seeks, through a focus on a handful of selected legal issues, to provide a general treatment
of the law of state-local relations with particular attention to the question of local power, and to make an argument concerning the proper
scope of local autonomy within the specific setting of contemporary
metropolitan America.
Part I presents a critical reading of the law of state-local relations.
After a review of the traditional account of local legal powerlessness, it
turns to two major local government law reform initiatives pursued
1. The reference to "Our Federalism" is intended. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Federalism and localism are both a part of the American constitutional order. "Our Localism," like "Our Federalism," emphasizes that local autonomy
is not simply a question of the structure of intergovernmental relations but also includes
the ideology that structure has generated-an ideology which continues to provide support for the devolution of power to local governments.
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during the last two decades: the challenges to the local property taxbased system of funding public elementary and secondary education
and to exclusionary land use regulation. These cases and their legislative settings are important for several reasons.
First, education and zoning are the principal operations of local
governments. School finance affects both the primary source of local
revenue and the leading object of local expenditure. Land use control
is the most important local regulatory power. Understanding the
school finance and exclusionary zoning cases and the legislative framework out of which they arose is thus essential to an informed appraisal
2
of local power.
Second, school finance and exclusionary zoning illustrate deepseated ambiguities in the concept of local power. In these two areas,
state-delegated power, supported by judicial attitudes sympathetic to
local control, has resulted in real local legal authority, notwithstanding
the nominal rules of state supremacy. But local power is not just a matter of formal legal authority. State legislation and case law may create
the legal structure for substantial local autonomy, but without local
wealth adequate to local needs, formal authority is of limited usefulness, and the structure of local power may prove to be an empty shell.
Third, although the standard critique gives the impression that the
principal conflict in local government law is that between states and
localities, the school finance and exclusionary zoning cases demonstrate the salience of interlocal conflict in appraising the scope of local
power. When, as in these cases and the accompanying legislative battles, the central issues concern state and local resources and the external effects of local actions, local governments are often at war with one
another rather than with the states.
Fourth, the school finance and exclusionary zoning debates underscore the close connection between local legal and political autonomy
and issues of distributive justice. The delegation of fiscal responsibility
for schools and of zoning power to local governments serves to
heighten the significance of interlocal wealth differences and to perpetuate inequalities in education, housing and employment opportunities.
State legislatures and state courts are often reluctant to displace localities in just those situations that have the greatest implications for the
class composition of localities and for the distribution of goods and
2. Although school finance and exclusionary zoning have been the subjects of extensive commentary, much of that discussion has focused on whether and how to reform
these practices. See, e.g., J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, Private Wealth, Public
Schools (1970); Inman & Rubinfeld, TheJudicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 Harv.
L. Rev. 1662 (1979); Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of
Eastlakev. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1373 (1978); Future Directions for
School Finance Reform, 38 Law & Contemp. Probs. 293 (1974). My concern is with the
light school finance and exclusionary zoning shed on the legal structure of state-local
relations.
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services among economic and social groups. The allocation of power
and responsibility between states and localities has direct consequences
for public policy, and in these cases local power tends to be associated
with the preservation and reinforcement of existing economic
inequalities.
Two further analyses are necessary to delineate the scope of local
legal power. A pervasive theme of this Article is the importance of interlocal differences in evaluating, both descriptively and normatively,
the scope of that power. These differences in local size, wealth, demographic composition and function cannot be assessed fully without
some understanding of how they came into existence; this understanding requires an analysis of the laws governing municipal incorporation
and annexation. The changing laws of local government formation and
expansion serve to illustrate that the very idea of "local" is contestable
and contingent, with the legal definition of local units often the result
of political, economic and social conflicts among differing local interests. In addition, recent developments in federal constitutional law addressing local legal power and the relationship among states and
localities must be considered. Federal constitutional law, like the blackletter law of state-local relations, is generally assumed to be committed
to traditional notions of plenary state power and local powerlessness.
But a powerful current in federal doctrine reflects the localism in our
political culture. Thus, the Supreme Court has tended to validate the
states' delegation of regulatory power and fiscal responsibility to local
governments despite the inequalities and externalities localism creates.
Part II builds on the critical description of the structure of local
government law in Part I to elaborate two central and interrelated issues: interlocal differences and the normative account of local power.
At the heart of our localism are the differences among local governments, which I organize around the models of cities and suburbs.
The role of the suburbs is central to contemporary local government
jurisprudence. Failure to appreciate the importance of the suburbs and
how city-suburb differences affect the meaning of local power has obscured our awareness of the extent of local power, contributed to the
ready assumption of local powerlessness that characterizes much of the
legal commentary and enhanced our susceptibility to arguments advocating greater local power.
The first half of Part II addresses city-suburb differences and examines the role of local government law in the rise of the suburb as a
distinctive and increasingly dominant form of urban community. Much
of the localism that informs contemporary local government law is attributable to the tendency of courts and legislators to conceptualize local governments in terms of small size, relatively homogenenous
populations and residential nature-features characteristic of the sub3. Part II will appear in the March 1990 issue of the Columbia Law Review.
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urbs but atypical of big cities. Questions of local power often are resolved by an implicit reliance on the suburb, and its association with the
values of home and family, as the paradigmatic locality. This
"suburbanization" of the law contributes to the deference to local control found in the school finance and exclusionary zoning litigation surveyed in Part I and to the effects of local school finance and zoning on
the political economy of metropolitan areas.
The second half of Part II takes a more normative approach. It
reviews the case for localism and the scholarly models of local government that case entails. It then considers the social costs of local autonomy and how well the values of localism are advanced by localism in
practice. Contemporary normative advocacy of localism proceeds from
two different models, one linking local autonomy with the greater opportunities for popular participation in public life said to exist in
smaller units of government, the other claiming that decentralization of
power, by enabling large numbers of government units in the same region to make decisions concerning spending, taxing and regulation, increases efficiency in the provision of public sector goods and services.
Although these associations of local autonomy with participation and
efficiency are persuasive in theory, both models ignore central attributes of existing localities, the effects of local actions on people outside
local boundaries or on a region as a whole, and the implications of significant interpersonal and interlocal wealth inequalities for the distribution of power between higher and lower units of governments. Today,
most local governments do not govern discrete communities as the
models of localism presuppose. Rather, most local governments are
fragments of larger, economically interdependent regions.
Moreover, race, class and income tend to go together in local settlement patterns as they do in so much of American life. The fragmentation of heterogeneous metropolitan areas into a multiplicity of
independent residential localities converts social and economic segregation into political separation. Given the nature of local fiscal autonomy, this promotes the separation of taxable wealth from public service
needs and constrains the potential range of local public sectors in less
affluent localities. Indeed, as the school finance and exclusionary zoning cases illustrate, local fiscal autonomy may fuel further class segregation, as residents of more affluent communities seek to escape sharing
in the tax burdens of the poor and utilize their local government formation and land use regulatory powers to do so. In a setting of interlocal
and interpersonal wealth inequalities, not only does the value of local
autonomy turn on the wealth of the locality, but such autonomy often
tends to exacerbate the disparities between rich and poor.
Indeed, the rise of fragmentary suburban localities-the separation
of residence and commerce and of ethnic and income groups into separate municipalities-calls into question basic assumptions about the
"public" nature of local political activity. The political economy of
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metropolitan areas effects a structural narrowing of the scope of local
politics, leading it to focus tightly, and often defensively, on the private
economic and social concerns of local residents. Local residents seek
to use local powers to insulate their parochial interests from broader
regional concerns. Given the private focus of local politics, local autonomy may erode rather than enhance the possibility of creating a vigorous public life.
Rather than join in the general call for greater local self-determination, I urge scholars to give greater attention to the state as a political
and legal focal point in the system of local governments. New legal
doctrines and governmental structures are needed to encourage state
governments to take a state-wide perspective on local problems, to
strengthen the states' role in overseeing local power and overriding parochial actions and to increase state accountability for local functions
and for ameliorating interlocal wealth differences. Integrating a state
focus, state regulation and state financial support with a proper attention to local particularities and with the opportunities for popular political participation that local governments provide are far more desirable
than any undifferentiated ideological affirmation of localism.
I.

THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

A. The Black Letter Principles and TraditionalAssumptions
The most emphatic recent presentation of the claim that local gov4
ernments lack legal power is Gerald Frug's The City as a Legal Concept.
Professor Frug's assertion that the law of state-local relations renders
4. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev 1057 (1980) [hereinafter
"City as Legal Concept"]. Frug subsequently elaborated on the theme of "city
powerlessness" in Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 Urb. Law. 553
(1987) [hereinafter "Empowering Cities"]; Frug, Property and Power: Hartog on the
Legal History of New York City, 1984 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 673, 678-91 [hereinafter
"Property and Power"].
Frug's work has been repeatedly cited by courts and commentators as authoritative
on the limited scope of local government authority and on the role of changes in legal
doctrine in effectuating the powerlessness of cities. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley,
37 Cal. 3d 644, 664, 693 P.2d 261, 278 (1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 260 (1986); Matter of
Marcus v. Baron, 84 A.D.2d 118, 134, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (1981), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d
862, 442 N.E.2d 437, 456 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1982) (Hopkins,J., dissenting) (opinion adopted
by majority of the Court of Appeals on appeal); State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116,
1120 (Utah 1980); H. Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of
the City of New York in American Law, 1730-1870, at 3 n.4 (1983); Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1030, 1058 n.105
(1983); Payne, Intergovernmental Condemnation as a Problem in Public Finance, 61
Tex. L. Rev. 949, 954-55 & n.22 (1983); Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land
Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 837, 853 n.54 (1983);
Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A
Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, 510 n.4
(1984); Zacharias, Local Power and Local Knowledge, 30 Am.J. Legal Hist. 122 (1986).
Joan Williams has been far more critical, although she, too, notes that Frug's article has
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cities powerless is not unique, however; the claim is widely reflected in
the literature. 5 According to Professor Frug, the limited nature of local
power derives from, first, the principles of nineteenth-century legal theory that established cities as decidedly inferior political institutions and,
second, the failure of state constitutional reforms, most notably home
rule, to change that.6 Although this critique captures some of the
black-letter principles of local government law, it ignores much of the
formal legal power local governments possess as well as all of their legally significant informal authority.
As a matter of conventional legal theory, the states enjoy complete
hegemony over local governments. Under both federal and state constitutional law, local governments have no rights against their states.
Localities may not assert the contracts clause, the equal protection
clause or the privileges and immunities clause against their state governments. 7 Nor do the residents of local governments have any inherent right to local self-government: 8 local residents may not assert a
constitutional claim to belong to a particular local government or to
have any local government at all. 9
The formal legal status of a local government in relation to its state
is summarized by the three concepts of "creature," "delegate" and
"agent." The local government is a creature of the state. It exists only
by an act of the state, and the state, as creator, has plenary power to
alter, expand, contract or abolish at will any or all local units. The local
government is a delegate of the state, possessing only those powers the
state has chosen to confer upon it. Absent any specific limitation in the
state constitution, the state can amend, abridge or retract any power it
has delegated, much as it can impose new duties or take away old privileges. The local government is an agent of the state, exercising limited
been "extremely influential." Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 477-79 (1987).

5. See, e.g., I C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 2.00 (1985); G. Clark,
Judges and the Cities: Interpreting Local Autonomy 70 (1985); H. Hartog, supra note 4,
at 2; 2 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §§ 4.03, 4.05 (3d ed. 1988); C.

Sands & M. Libonati, Local Government Law § 3.01 (1981); W. Sayre & H. Kaufman,
Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis 559 (1960); Williams, The Inven-

tion of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 Am. U.L. Rev.
369, 370 (1985).

6. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 4, at 1062-63, 1105-13, 1116-17.
7. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (privileges and immuni-

ties); City of Trenton v. NewJersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923) (contracts clause); City of
Newark v. NewJersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923) (equal protection).
8. See City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 187; 1 C. Antieau, supra note 5, §§ 2.00, 2.06; 1 E.
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 1.19 (3d ed. 1987); C. Sands & M.
Libonati, supra note 5, §§ 3.01, 4.01.

9. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68-70 (1978); Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). But cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.

339 (1960) (holding unconstitutional Alabama statute that redrew boundaries of city of
Tuskegee to remove most black residents).
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powers at the local level on behalf of the state. A local government is
like a state administrative agency, serving the state in its narrow area of
expertise, but instead of being functional specialists, localities are given
jurisdictions primarily by territory, although certain local units are specialized by function as well as territory.
The scope of local power is further affected by Dillon's Rule, the
traditional measure for determining the scope of local power under
state enabling legislation. Under Dillon's Rule, local governments may
exercise only those powers "granted in express words," or "those necessarily orfairly implied in or incident to, the powers expressly granted," or
"those essential to the declared objects and purpose of the [municipal]
corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable."' 0 Dillon's
Rule operates as a standard of delegation, a canon of construction and
a rule of limited power. It reflects the view of local governments as
agents of the state by requiring that all local powers be traced back to a
specific delegation: whenever it is uncertain whether a locality possesses a particular power, a court should assume that the locality lacks
that power. By denying localities broad authority, Dillon's Rule limits
the number of entities that may regulate private activity. Only through
a clear and express state delegation may a locality obtain power to govern. 11 Generally followed from the late nineteenth century through the
middle of this century, 12 the Rule has been formally abandoned by
many states.1 3 However, Professor Frug and others contend that the
Dillon's Rule tradition still leads state courts to construe local govern14
ment powers narrowly.
10. D. Mandelker, D. Netsch & P. Salsich, State and Local Government in a Federal
System: Cases and Materials 83 (2d ed. 1983).
11. Dillon's Rule also serves to hold down local spending and, thus, to control the
costs of government for local taxpayers. See Williams, supra note 5, at 437. According
to one study, Dillon's "strict construction doctrine ...sends local governments to State
legislatures seeking grants of additional power; it causes local officials to doubt their
power, and it stops local governmental programs from developing fully." Advisory
Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions Upon the Structural, Functional, and Personnel Powers of Local Government 24
(1962).
12. See F. Michelman & T. Sandalow, Materials on Government in Urban Areas
'252-55 (1970); D. Mandelker, D. Netsch & P. Salsich, supra note 10, at 83-85.
13. See, e.g., Liberati v. Bristol Bay Borough, 584 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1978); State v.
Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126-27 (Utah 1980); W. Valente, Local Government Law
66-67 (3d ed. 1987). As early as 1918, Professor McBain found that "important inroads" had been made "upon the rigidity with which the rule of strict construction" was
applied. H. McBain, American City Progress and the Law 57 (1918).
14. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 4, at 1112-13. According to Gere,
"the courts continue to construe the fundamental state-local relationship in the narrow,
inflexible fashion in which it was defined by John Dillon more than one hundred years
ago." Gere, Dillon's Rule and the Cooley Doctrine: Reflections of the Political Culture,
8 J. Urb. Hist. 271, 296 (1982). Indeed, Clark asserts that Dillon's Rule is still "the
major judicial model of local government powers and dominates American debates of
the proper role of localities with respect to state governments." G. Clark, supra note 5,
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Dillon's Rule and the notion of plenary state power are the formal
background norms for state-local relationships. 15 But even as these
doctrines crystallized in the nineteenth century, states were amending
their constitutions in order to strengthen local self-government. 16 After
the Civil War a wave of state constitutional revision took place. State
constitutions were amended to prohibit legislatures from delegating
17
the performance of municipal functions to "special commissions"
and to bar the enactment of "special or local acts" applicable to particular localities.' 8 The special commission ban was intended to protect
the structural integrity of municipalities by barring the transfer of municipal services or activities to agencies not a part of the local governat 77; see also Elkin, State and Market in City Politics: Or, The "Real" Dallas, in The
Politics of Urban Development 25, 26 (C. Stone & H. Sanders eds. 1987) (arguing that
Dillon's Rule, with its surrounding legal-constitutional interpretation, continues to give
meaning to the relationship between cities and states).
15. See, e.g., H. Hartog, supra note 4, at 2; Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986
Wis. L. Rev. 83, 99.
16. As early as 1850, some states began to adopt constitutional provisions providing for local selection of local officers and prohibiting state interference with local control of city streets and roads. See H. McBain, The Law and the Practice of Municipal
Home Rule 29-45, 59-63 (1916).
17. See, e.g., Utah Const. art. VI, § 29. For instances of the types of state laws that
gave rise to the ban on special commissions, see People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871)
(state law transferring control over Detroit's water works and sewers from city to state
board); People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857) (state law transferring control over New York City and Brooklyn police forces to metropolitan police district run
by commissioners appointed by governor). See generally H. McBain, supra note 16, at
45-48 (reviewing late nineteenth century amendments to state constitutions prohibiting
the appointments of special commissions with authority over municipal affairs).
18. See H. McBain, supra note 16, at 64-106. McBain points out that since the
initial adoptions of bans on special legislation predated the Civil War and occurred in
states like Ohio, Iowa and Kansas that had no large cities, they probably were not responses to state antilocal abuses. Id. at 68, 81, 85, 91-92. These measures appear to
have been modeled upon contemporary general corporation laws for business corporations and were not directed at state-local relationships. According to Hartog, Dillon's
Rule also grew out of the traditional rule of construction for corporate charters. H.
Hartog, supra note 4, at 183-84 n.14. Starting with Illinois' ban on special acts in 1870,
the prohibitions on special legislation appear to have been aimed at restricting state
power over localities.
Special act bans take three main forms: the proscription of special legislation with
respect to certain specified subjects; a declaration that all general laws shall have uniform application throughout the state and that no special law shall be passed where a
general law could be made applicable; and a requirement that special legislation undergo a more exacting procedure, perhaps requiring a supermajority vote, before it may
be adopted. Some states have two or all three of these restrictions in their state constitutions. See 0. Reynolds, Handbook of Local Government Law 86-88 (1982). For examples of each category of special act restriction, see IIl. Const. art. 4, § 13 (prohibition
of special law where general law may be made applicable); N.Y. Const. art. 9, § 2(b)(2)
(special procedure); Pa. Const. art. 3, § 32 (restricting special acts concerning specified
areas).
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ment, while the special act prohibition was intended to prevent the
singling out of specific localities for state interference.
The special commission and special act restrictions, which did not
in themselves contain any affirmative grants of local power, were followed by a second wave of pro-local state constitutional revision, which
did: home rule. Starting with Missouri in 1875' 9 and California in
187920 and accelerating in the Progressive Era, 2 1 states adopted constitutional amendments giving localities the power to adopt their own
charters and to legislate with respect to local matters. The home rule
movement had two goals: to undo Dillon's Rule by giving localities
broad lawmaking authority and to provide local governments freedom
from state interference in areas of local concern.
State home rule provisions generally follow two models. The original form of home rule amendment treated the home rule municipality
as an imperium in imperio, a state within a state, possessed of the full police power with respect to municipal affairs and also enjoying a correlative degree of immunity from state legislative interference.2 2 When
courts encountered difficulties distinguishing "municipal affairs" from
matters of state concern, a second model was developed that sought
simply to broaden local lawmaking authority without attempting to
erect a wall against state laws on local matters.2 3 This form of home
rule grants affected local governments all the powers the legislature
could grant, subject to the legislature's authority to restrict or deny localities a particular power or function. In a sense, it reverses Dillon's
Rule-all powers are granted until retracted. Most of the states that
have adopted home rule since World War II use some version of this
more modest "legislative" model.2 4 Today, forty-one states provide
19. Mo. Const. of 1875, art. IX, §§ 20-25. The 1875 Missouri home rule provision
applied only to a single named city, St. Louis. See H. McBain, supra note 16, at 118-20.
For an interesting recent discussion, see Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism,
64 Wash. L. Rev. 51, 65-67 (1989).
20. Calif. Const. of 1879, art. XI, § 8. As in Missouri, the power to frame a charter
of local self-government was initially limited to the largest city in the state, San Francisco. In 1887, the home rule provision was amended to apply to all cities with a population of 10,000 or more, and in 1892 home rule was further extended to cities of more
than 3,500 inhabitants. Additional Progressive Era amendments to the home rule provision were adopted in 1902, 1906, 1911 and 1914. See H. McBain, supra note 16, at
200-03, 223-28.
21. See H. McBain, supra note 16, at 223-28.
22. A good example of an imperio provision is Cal. Const. art. XI, § 6. See generally
Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 Win. & Mary L. Rev.
269, 284-90 (1968) (reviewing state constitution imperio home rule provisions).
23. See, e.g., Mont. Const. art XI, § 6; Vanlandingham, Constitutional Home Rule
Since the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 2-5 (1975).
24. See J. Fordham, Local Government Law 86 (2d rev. ed. 1986); Macchiarola,
Local Government Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 335, 339-40
(1971) (citing New York in 1963; Alaska in 1959; Massachusetts in 1966; Iowa in 1968;
Pennsylvania in 1969); Vanlandingham, supra note 22, at 289. Other commentators
often refer to this as home rule on the National League of Cities (formerly the American
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some form of home rule to at least some of their local governments. 2 5
According to Professor Frug and other scholars, these state constitutional measures have failed to protect or empower localities. These
commentators assert that state legislatures have continued to legislate
concerning local matters, often displacing local decision makers in the
process. State courts, they say, have failed to vindicate local autonomy
and, instead, have generally upheld legislative interventions in local areas. Professor Libonati contends that home rule has failed to provide a
shield against state raids on local power because of the state courts'
"progressively constricted view of what is a purely local matter."' 2 6 Another commentator has argued that the "narrow and restrictive judicial
interpretation" given to local autonomy has stunted local initiative and
discouraged local governments from utilizing the powers that home
rule gives them. 27 The shift to "legislative" home rule has been treated
as indicative of the failure of local autonomy to take root in state jurisprudence, since legislative home rule provides localities with no immunity from state legislation, and the scope it affords local initiative turns
entirely on the willingness of the legislature to exercise self-restraint.
As one scholar has commented, "[t]he experience in some states makes
' 28
this condition perhaps too much to expect."
Professor Frug concludes that "[r]estrictions on special legislation,
then, have become merely weak equal protection clauses.... They are
ineffective because there is nothing 'suspect' about state restrictions
Municipal Association) model, see supra note 23, and reserve the term "legislative"
home rule for home rule that is the product of state legislation, in contrast to "constitutional" home rule, which is the result of state constitutional amendment. In this Article
I shall not be concerned with the textual source-legislative or constitutional-of local
home rule and will use the term "legislative" home rule to refer to the form of home

rule that grants localities all the powers of the state legislature, subject to legislative
restriction.
25. M. Hill, State Laws Governing Local Government Structure and Administration
43 (1978) (home rule authority granted to cities in 41 states and to counties in 27

states). Many state constitutions combine both imperlo and "legislative" grants. See,.
e.g., N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b)-(c).
26. M. Libonati, Reconstructing Local Government, 19 Urb. Law. 645, 646 (1987);

see G. Clark, supra note 5, at 113 ("[T]he class of problems considered local has become
progressively narrower over time ....
").
27. Vanlandingham, supra note 23, at 30. According to Elkin, "it may, in fact, be
the case that cities, in effect, already have expansive powers. But it would be more accu-

rate to say that, because of the ongoing judicial interpretation, no one really knows." S.
Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic 176 (1987); see also C. Antieau, supra

note 5, § 3.08 (criticizingjudicial failure to provide a "clear and workable test separating
'local' from 'general' concerns"); Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York,

54 Colum. L. Rev. 311, 313, 315 (1954) (contending that in New York, "as almost uni-

versally throughout the country, the results of judicial interpretation of constitutional

provisions in regard to home rule have been a source of bitter frustration to the sponsors of these measures").
28. Vanlandingham, supra note 23, at 21. According to Professor Libonati, legislative home rule "firmly establishes local subordination to the center." Libonati, supra
note 19, at 51, 67.
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and nothing 'fundamental' about the invasion of local autonomy. '29
He adds that home rule "has not successfully created an area of local
autonomy protected from state control."3 0 As a result, "state control
of cities has not been affected significantly by state constitutional protection for home rule."'3 1 According to Professor Clark, "[e]verywhere,
local autonomy is compromised by centralized authority.... Practically,
the rhetoric of local autonomy is difficult to take seriously given overwhelming evidence of the fiscal, political, and judicial domination of
32
local governments by the higher tiers of the state."
This wholesale dismissal of the state constitutional protections of
local government is unwarranted. State-local relations do not consist
simply of "unremitting" 3 3 raids by hostile antiurban or centralizing
state legislatures on vulnerable local governments. Moreover, treating
state court decisions upholding state laws affecting local governments

as manifestations of an obdurate hostility to localism 3 4 ignores the seri-

ous conceptual difficulties state courts have faced in defining and enforcing the notion of local autonomy.
The power of state legislatures to make laws with respect to local
matters cannot be treated simply as an ongoing affront to local autonomy. Many state laws dealing with local matters are not antilocal, but
respond to requests advanced by local interests or address matters affecting more than one locality. 3 5 Nineteenth-century special legisla-

tion, usually presented as the epitome of antagonistic state interference
with localities, often served to confer necessary powers requested by
local governments in the absence of a general extension of home rule.
29. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 4, at 1116.
30. Id. at 1117.
31. Id.
32. G. Clark, supra note 5, at 113-14.
33. W. Munro, The Government of American Cities 60 (1912).
34. See, e.g., Bruff, Judicial Review in Local Government Law: A Reappraisal, 60
Minn. L. Rev. 669, 671 (1976); Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 Harv, L.
Rev. 1596 (1965).
35. State action displacing local authority often involves the siting of public utilities
that serve large regions. A locality may adopt zoning requirements that would exclude
the utility, but the cost of the reduced power-generation capacity would be felt regionally or state-wide. Thus, states often pass statutes that preempt local authority to affect
the siting of such utilities. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. v. Town of Hampton, 120 N.H. 68,
71, 411 A.2d 164, 166 (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Town of Red Hook, 60
N.Y.2d 99, 105, 456 N.E.2d 487, 490, 468 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (1983); see also Long
Island Lighting Co. v. County of Suffolk, 119 A.D.2d 128, 132-33, 505 N.Y.S.2d 956,
959 (1986) (state enactment creating a power authority to acquire lighting company preempted similar county resolution).
As will become clear in the discussions of land use regulation and school finance,
see infra notes 255-304 and accompanying text, states are far more likely to act with
respect to infrastructure issues and other matters affecting economic development and
growth of the state generally, or affecting all localities equally, than they are to act on
matters entailing redistribution from affluent localities to poorer ones or on issues affecting the economic and social composition of localities.
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Contemporary critics of special legislation like Lord Bryce condemned
such measures not because they were centralizing or reflected external
interferences with local '3matters, but because they were pervaded by
"the spirit of localism." 6 Special laws were usually drafted by local
interests, handled at the state level by legislators from the locality affected and enacted by the legislature unamended. 37 Deference to local
opinion was basic to the process-a part of the etiquette of state legislatures. If a state legislature interfered with the decisions of city governments, it was usually in response to the requests of other local officials
or groups, not a product of rural antagonism or centralizing tendencies. 38 So, too, in the twentieth century, "special commissions" and
state laws concerning localities have provided localities with new revenues and authority,3 9 dealt with problems spanning the boundaries of
4
multiple localities 40 and regulated the interactions of localities. '
As for the attitudes of state courts, some of the factors explaining
state legislation concerning localities are also at work when the courts
sustain measures that interfere with local autonomy. The bans on spe36. 1 Bryce, The American Commonwealth 549-50 (rev. ed. 1911).
37. See J. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America,
1870-1900, at 84-85 (1984).
38. Id.; Teaford, Special Legislation and the Cities, 1865-1900, 23 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 189, 207 (1979). A twentieth century example of this phenomenon is the Illinois
statute requiring the city of Chicago to indemnify its police officers for tort judgments
obtained against them for actions taken in the course of employment, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.
24, 1-15 (1949) (current version at Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 24, 1-4-5 (Smith-Hurd 1961)),
146, 148,
sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court in Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 Ill.
103 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1952). The statute was, of course, a direct and costly mandate on
the city, but it did not entail a transfer of power to a central state bureaucracy, the exploitation of Chicago's resources for the state's purposes or the imposition of alien and
hostile downstate values on Chicago residents. Rather, the principal beneficiaries appear to have been the Chicago police, who, as a result of the statute, were protected
from personal tort liability in all cases except willful misconduct, and their tort victims,
who were guaranteed a deep pocket payor in lieu of a potentially judgment-proof police
officer. The Chicago police and their tort victims often, though certainly not always, will
be Chicagoans.
39. See, e.g., Atlantic City Parking Auth. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 180 N.J.
Super. 282, 287, 434 A.2d 676, 679 (Law Div. 1981) (authorizing parking authority to
handle transportation problems created by legalization of casino gambling); Hotel
Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources, 46 N.Y.2d 358, 364-65, 385 N.E.2d 1284,
1286, 413 N.Y.S.2d 357, 359 (1978) (authorizing New York City to create trust to finance improvements to Museum of Modern Art); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d
499, 502 (Utah 1975) (authorizing urban renewal program); N.Y. Gen. City Law § 25-m
(McKinney 1989) (authorizing New York City to impose income tax on commuters).
40. See, e.g., Four-County Metro. Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 296-97, 369 P.2d 67, 73 (1962) (invalidating metropolitan
district); City of West Allis v. County of Milwaukee, 39 Wis. 2d 356, 362-64, 159
N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (1968) (solid waste disposal facility), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1064
(1969).
41. For a discussion of state land-use law requiring local zoning decisions approving developments with regional impacts to undergo some form of state or regional review, see infra text accompanying notes 275-304.
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cial commissions and special laws, and imperio home rule's protection of
local control over local matters require a sharp demarcation between
local matters and matters of state concern-a line that is inherently difficult to draw. Local spillovers are endemic to metropolitan areas containing hundreds of local governments; the resulting interlocal conflicts
may require state action. Some problems may arise in many localities
concurrently. Even if these do not have cross-border effects, state-wide
42
treatment of a problem that exists state-wide may be appropriate.
But the heart of the problem derives from the conundrum of a multitier
government system in which a higher level government and its concerns subsume the lower and its concerns. Every locality is a part of a
state, and all local residents are state residents. State measures displacing local government actions are often taken on behalf of interests
within that locality.4 3 The ability of losers in local politics to refight
their battles by taking an appeal to the state legislature, or even to
Congress, may be endemic to our multilevel system of government, but
that hardly seems evidence of a pervasive judicial commitment to centralization. 44 That localism, like federalism, needs political safeguards
does not mean it is without powerful legal significance.
42. See, e.g., Tribe, 540 P.2d at 502 (urban blight treated as state-wide problem
even though particular blighted areas may be within individual localities with no spill.
over effects).
43. This is particularly true of state laws dealing with the municipal governmentmunicipal employee relationship. State laws may require more generous compensation
packages, restrict residency requirements or impose binding arbitration mechanisms
that result in increases in employee salaries. See, e.g., Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v.
City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 85, 90, 405 N.E.2d 679, 680, 428 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198-99
(1980); City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations B3d., 39 Ohio St. 3d 196,
200-01, 530 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1988); City of La Grande v. Public Employees Retirement Bd.,
281 Or. 137, 149-53, 576 P.2d 1204, 1212-13 (1978). Despite the burden on local taxpayers, the beneficiaries are also a local interest group, although municipal employees
will not always be residents of the locality in which they are employed.
44. The multiarena nature of a multitiered system of governments works in both
directions. National losers can refight their battles at the state level, and state-level
losers can bring their concerns to the local level. Certainly, in the 1980s advocates for a
broad range of economic, social and environmental initiatives that were rejected at the
national level brought their concerns to the states and were often more successful. See,
e.g., R. Nathan, F. Doolittle & Associates, Reagan and the States 355-57 (1987); D.
Osborne, Laboratories of Democracy 283-87 (1988).
One example of a state-local shift in the locus of battle is the public financing of
election campaigns. In New York State, advocates tried unsuccessfully for years to get
the state legislature to enact a public financing program. In 1987, they turned their
attention to New York City, which in 1988 adopted a public campaign finance law for
city elections. New York City, N.Y., Admin. Code §§ 3-701 to -714 (1989).
State courts facilitate refighting state issues at the local level through doctrines that
limit the preemptive effect of state laws on local action. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. For an analysis of how state preemption doctrines attentive to local
autonomy concerns apply to the New York City campaign finance law, see Briffault, Taking Home Rule Seriously: The Case of Campaign Finance Reform, 37 Proc. Acad. Pol.
Sci. 35 (1989).
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Certainly, whatever the technically limited status of local units and
their formal subservience to the state, local governments have wielded
substantial lawmaking power and undertaken important public initiatives. Even during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuriesthe heyday of Dillon's Rule, the era of plenary state power and the unsteady beginnings of home rule-American city governments pioneered in public health, education, parks, libraries, water supply,
sanitation and sewage removal, street paving and lighting and mass
transit, building the infrastructure that still serves modern urban centers. 4 5 City governments owned and operated public utilities, regulated private utilities, professionalized their administrations and
employment structures and experimented with a broad range of political and governmental innovations, including the council-manager and
commission forms of government, competitive bidding on public
works, planning and zoning, and nonpartisan elections. 46 This could
not have been accomplished without significant legal power.
Despite the standard contention that a crabbed judicial interpretation of the "municipal affairs" language in home rule provisions has
limited local power to initiate measures, the most comprehensive study
of the first decades of home rule found that the courts generally permitted "a fairly wide latitude of action on the part of the city in its so-called
capacity as an organization for the satisfaction of local needs," and that
under home rule the courts "extended the concept of the city's local
capacity far beyond its limits" under Dillon's Rule.4 7 A more recent

analysis agrees, finding that "[]udicially imposed limitations on the initiative power ... in the absence of conflicting state legislations have
been relatively infrequent and of minor importance in undermining local autonomy."'48 Indeed, the postwar era has witnessed a steady
broadening of the discretionary authority of local governments. 49 To45. By 1900 American city governments provided the most extensive, most techno-

logically advanced public services in the world. J. Teaford, supra note 37, at 217; see
also M. Edel, E. Sclar &D. Luria, Shaky Palaces: Homeownership and Social Mobility in
Boston's Suburbanization 295-96 (1984) (greater percentage of United States gross national product devoted to building transportation lines, housing and other structures
between 1890 and 1910 than at any other time in United States history; most of this
work was done by city governments).
46. See E. Griffith, A History of American City Government: The Progressive
Years and Their Aftermath, 1900-1920, at 34-99 (1974); H. McBain, American City
Progress and the Law 30-173 (1918); W. Munro, supra note 33, at 80-101.

47. H. McBain, supra note 16, at 671; see H. McBain, supra note 46, at 30-123
(noting willingness of state courts to sustain municipal power to own and operate public
utilities, and to sanction wide discretion to regulate height and bulk of buildings under
police power before states authorized zoning).
48. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 652 (1964).
49. J. Zimmerman, State-Local Relations: A Partnership Approach 160 (1983); see,
e.g., State ex rel. Swart v. Molitor, 621 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Mont. 1981) (Montana's 1972
constitution, by allowing localities to adopt self-government charters, "opened to local
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day, most home rule governments possess broad regulatory and spending powers. 50
The heart of the case for the failure of home rule remains the judicial resolution of state-local conflicts. In cases of conflict between state
statutes and local ordinances even a home rule government will usually
lose. That, by definition, must be the result in "legislative" home rule
states. Moreover, even in imperio states, where local ordinances are supposed to govern in municipal matters, the difficulties state courts experience in defining exclusive areas of local interest erode the legal
protection of local autonomy. 5 1 According to Dean Sandalow, "It is
the doctrines developed in resolving this problem which have caused
home rule to be a disappointment to advocates of substantial local
52
autonomy."
The significance of cases of head-to-head conflict in the overall picture of state-local relations and in determining the scope of local autonomy is overestimated. Localities do not always lose, 53 and although
governmental units new vistas of shared sovereignty with the state"). For an important
case in a state whose constitution does not provide for home rule, see Inganamort v.
Borough of Fort Lee, 62 NJ. 521, 536-38, 303 A.2d 298, 306-07 (1973) (sustaining
municipal rent control as matter of local power even though state had repealed statute
authorizing municipal rent control).
50. The public purpose doctrine has ceased to be much of a restriction on either
state or local spending or regulatory authority. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 69-73, 646 P.2d 835, 840-43, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 678-81
(1982); Wilson v. Connecticut Prod. Dev. Corp., 167 Conn. 111, 114-19, 355 A.2d 72,
75-77 (1974); Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 23-26 (Me. 1983); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 629-35, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457-60
(1981); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 287 Minn. 357, 365-73, 178 N.W.2d 594, 599-604
(1970); Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources, 46 N.Y.2d 358, 368-72, 385
N.E.2d 1284, 1288-91, 413 N.Y.S.2d 357, 361-64 (1978).
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. Sandalow, supra note 48, at 652.
53. The core of home rule is the creation and preservation of governmental structures for independent local decision making and political participation. In many states
that core is protected. See, e.g., Sonoma County Org. Pub. Employees v. County of
Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 314-18, 591 P.2d 1, 11-13, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 913-16 (1979)
(local control over wages of municipal employees); Smith v. City of Riverside, 34 Cal.
App. 3d 529, 535-38, 110 Cal. Rptr. 67, 71-73 (1973) (local control over employment
on public works projects); Resnick v. County of Ulster, 44 N.Y.2d 279, 285-89, 376
N.E.2d 1271, 1273-75, 405 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627-29 (1978) (local power to choose means
of selecting local officials); Bareham v. City of Rochester, 246 N.Y. 140, 158 N.E. 51
(1927) (same); Baranello v. Suffolk County Legislature, 126 A.D.2d 296, 300-04, 513
N.Y.S.2d 444, 446-49 (1987) (same); City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., 39 Ohio St. 3d 196, 200-08, 530 N.E.2d 1, 5-11 (1988) (local control over
municipal public employee labor relations); United States Elevator Corp. v. City of
Tulsa, 619 P.2d 791 (Okla. 1980) (local control over terms of bidding on local public
works); see also Macchiarola, supra note 24, at 350-59 (New York state cases show that
Court of Appeals has allowed powers of local government to expand under home rule).
The problem in the law of state-local relations of the power of local governments to
control the local public sector and repel state laws affecting the operations of local government is analogous to the problem presented in federal constitutional law by the ap-
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localities usually do lose, surprisingly few head-to-head legal battles
with the states occur. First, state courts may preserve local autonomy
by avoiding the finding of a state-local conflict. These courts may determine that differing state and local regulations of the same subject are
not inconsistent or that the state did not intend to preempt local lawmaking. 54 Courts may treat the adoption of home rule as grounds for
either narrowing the field occupied by a state law or creating a presumption against preemption. 5 5 Some courts have relied on other provisions of state constitutions to invalidate state laws that intrude on
local autonomy, particularly in areas of traditional local control such as
land use. 56 Second, and far more important, state legislatures avoid
plication to the states of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982). As
the Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) line of
cases-and especially the narrow 5-4 divisions that marked the latter two cases-indicates, the United States Supreme Court has not yet developed a stable analysis that
avoids excessive judicial intrusion in the political process while protecting the interests
of lower-level governments from higher-level intervention. This tension between confining the judicial role and defending lower-level government rights also marks state
court decisions addressing the power of state legislatures to regulate municipal labor
relations, and state courts, also by narrow margins, have embraced both a National
League- and a Garcia-style of analysis. Compare City of Rocky River v. State Employment
Relations Bd., supra, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 200-01, 530 N.E.2d at 4-5 (invalidating state law
mandating binding arbitration for collective bargaining disputes between municipalities
and employees as unconstitutional violation of power of local self-government) with City
of La Grande v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 281 Or. 137, 147-57, 576 P.2d 1204,
1210-15 (1978) (sustaining state legislation concerning municipal employee retirement
and insurance on analysis foreshadowing Garcia).
54. See, e.g., Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill. 2d 142, 145-49, 311 N.E.2d 107,
109-11 (1974) (upholding local ordinance setting lower mandatory retirement age for
municipal firefighters and police than state municipal code); Miller v. Fabius Township
Bd., 366 Mich. 250, 257-58, 114 N.W.2d 205, 208-09 (1962) (township's ban on
powerboat racing and waterskiing after four p.m. not inconsistent with state law prohibiting such activities starting one hour after sunset); State ex rel. Swart v. Molitor, 621
P.2d 1100, 1104 (Mont. 1981) (state planning and zoning code did not preclude local
government from assessing fee for review of certificates of survey); New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 217-22, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917-20, 513
N.Y.S.2d 349, 351-54 (1987) (city's application of antidiscrimination ordinance to private clubs not in conflict with state human rights law's exemption for "distinctly private"
clubs).
55. See, e.g., People v. Judiz, 38 N.Y.2d 529, 531-32, 344 N.E.2d 399, 401, 381
N.Y.S.2d 467, 469 (1976) ("'The mere fact that a local law may deal with some of the
same matters touched upon by State law does not render the local law invalid .... "
(quoting People v. Webb, 78 Misc. 2d 253, 256, 356 N.Y.S.2d 494, 498 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1974)); People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 109, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259,
266 (1974) (regulations modifying State Cigarette Tax Law permissible absent express
preemption by legislature).
56. See, e.g., Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1063-64 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (delegation of regulatory authority over land development to state administrative agency held unconstitutional due to inadequate standards governing agency
exercise of power), aff'd, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978); Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n,
63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 270-74, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1377-79 (1980) (state statute overriding
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conflicts by devolving broad authority to localities and then declining
to pass laws displacing the operations or policies of their local governments in critical areas of local decision making. 57 The scope and significance of the state delegation of power to local governments will be
elaborated more fully in the next section.
B. School Finance and Exclusionary Zoning: Local Autonomy Challenged and
Sustained
The scope of local authority is inherently indeterminate, reflecting
an ever-shifting mix of state delegation and oversight, the vagaries of
judicial interpretation, fluctuations in the local capacity to initiate measures, the strains of interlocal conflict and the changing economic, social
and technological dimensions of the problems local governments are
called upon to address. Yet a useful understanding of the dimensions
of local legal power and of the legal structure. of state-local relations
may be obtained through close attention to the outcomes of the school
finance and exclusionary zoning litigations of the last two decades.
These cases highlight the intersection of local government law with local political economy and underscore the general pattern of state delegation of substantial fiscal responsibility and administrative and
regulatory authority to local governments. Moreover, school finance
reform and anti-exclusionary zoning movements have been pursued
primarily in state courts and have turned primarily on the state judicial
construction of state constitutions and statutes. 58 Thus, the inquiry
here appropriately focuses on state jurisprudence, which is the principal source of the law of state-local relations.
Most importantly, these litigations have addressed two of the weak
links in the state-local system of decentralized power and responsibility:
the pronounced interlocal inequalities in public service spending that
result from interlocal differences in wealth and the external costs that
result from parochial local land use regulation. These cases involve
local zoning ordinance invalid as a violation of State constitutional provision requiring
laws of a general nature to have a uniform operation throughout the state).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 255-304.
58. During the early 1970s the United States Supreme Court essentially rejected all
federal constitutional challenges to local school finance and exclusionary zoning. See,
e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (sustaining traditional school finance system in Texas); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1974) (holding that local governments' broad zoning authority includes power to zone
to maintain a community's character); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (nonresidents seeking to challenge local exclusionary zoning generally lack standing to do so);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S 252, 263-71
(1977) (upholding village's power to prohibit multifamily housing); see also Sager,
supra note 2, at 1375 ("Warth and Eastlake seem to constitute a tacit but broad disavowal
of federal judicial qualification for review of local land use practices."). The Court's
resolution of the federal claims in the school finance and exclusionary zoning cases,
together with other recent Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutional status
of local autonomy, are discussed more fully at infra text accompanying notes 426-83.
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areas in which equity and efficiency concerns counsel a greater role for
the states and greater state supervision of and accountability for local
government performances. Under the standard interpretation of statelocal legal relationships, local autonomy should have been of little moment to the state courts that considered the quality of the local performance of these delegated education and land use functions. In fact,
these litigations have had only a limited effect in displacing the structure of decentralized responsibility for education finance and unfettered local control over land use. Indeed, they demonstrate the extent
of the state commitment to preserving a strong local role in these areas.
1. The Setting. - The patterns of local school finance and local zoning autonomy, and the litigative and legislative challenges to them,
grow out of the basic, structure of state-local and interlocal relations.
Central to state-local relations is the broad delegation of power
and responsibility by the states to localities with relatively little state
oversight of or accountability for local actions. States generally have
entrusted to local governments the authority to provide basic public
services. 5 9 To fund these services and carry on the functions of local
government, the states have authorized localities to raise their own revenues through a tax on real property situated inside local boundaries. 60
Similarly, state governments, through general enabling legislation,
have authorized localities to regulate the use of land, including the
61
power to zone.
Central to interlocal relations are the significant differences in
property wealth and public service needs among localities-with a particular locality's wealth having little or no connection to the extent of its
financial needs. These differences arise out of the uneven distribution
of industrial and commercial facilities and of rich and poor people, and
gut of the freedom of investors, businesses and people to migrate between localities.
Interlocal differences in wealth are often enormous. Within a par59. See, e.g., R. Lineberry, Equality and Urban Policy: The Distribution of Municipal Public Services 10 (1977) ("The services performed by municipalities are those most
vital to the preservation of life (police, fire, sanitation, public health), liberty (police,
courts, prosecutors), property (zoning, planning, taxing), and public enlightenment

(schools, libraries).").
60. See J. Aronson & J. Hilley, Financing State and Local Governments 120-23
(4th ed. 1986) ("Not only has the general property tax become local [as opposed to
state-based], but in terms of revenue productivity it is the dominant local tax.").
61. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 2; see also IA C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 7.01 (1987);J. Fordham, supra note 24, at 719. The major exception to the
general pattern of state devolution of power and responsibility to local governments is
the state of Hawaii. In Hawaii, more than 90% of the funds for public schools in the
1984-1985 school year came from the state, with almost all of the rest coming from
federal sources. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism 1987 Edition 36 [hereinafter "Fiscal Federalism"]. Similarly,
most land use regulation in Hawaii occurs at the state level. See D. Callies, Regulating
Paradise: Land Use Controls in Hawaii 6-12 app. II, at 13-14, 16 (1984).
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ticular state the disparity in assessed valuation per capita between the
wealthiest and poorest school district may be on the order of 100 to 1;
even if the extremes are ignored, and the school districts at the 90th
and 10th percentiles of taxable wealth per capita are compared, the differences are still often as much as 3 or 4 to 1. These wealth differences
regularly occur in districts located only a few miles apart in the same
metropolitan area.62 Moreover, differences in local service needs are
substantial. Some localities, especially larger cities, have far higher
crime rates, much greater congestion and housing decay and other
public safety, public health and public assistance needs that require
them to spend a much higher fraction of their budgets on noneducational expenditures, leaving them significantly less for schools. 63 Typi62. In 1986, in New York's Suffolk County, the average school district property
wealth per pupil was $285,000. However, in three school districts the tax base was
greater than $1.5 million per child, while in eight other school districts the tax base was
less than $50,000 per child. In Westchester County, the county average was $221,000
per pupil; three districts had less than $100,000 per pupil, while four districts had more
than $300,000 per child, including Pocantico Hills, which had $979,000 per pupil. See
New York State School Bds. Ass'n, Overview of 1986 Legislative Action on State Aid to
Schools (1986) [hereinafter "Overview of N.Y. State Aid"].
In 1985-86, the wealthiest school district in Texas had over $14 million of property
wealth per student, while the poorest district had approximately $20,000 of property
wealth per student. Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867-68
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (Gammage, J., dissenting), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
The one million students in school districts at the upper range of property
wealth have more than two and one-half times as much taxable property wealth
to support their schools than do the one million students in the poorer districts. The 300,000 students in the lowest-wealth schools have less than three
percent of State property wealth to support their education, while the 300,000
students in the highest wealth schools have over twenty-five percent of State
property wealth to support their education.
Id. at 867-68.
See also Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 500 n.15, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252 n.15, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601, 612 n.15 (1971) [hereinafter Serrano 1] (in metropolitan Los Angeles
assessed valuation per pupil in 1968-69 ranged from $50,885 in Beverly Hills to $3,706
in Baldwin Park); Hain, Milliken v. Green: Breaking the Legislative Deadlock, 38 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 350, 350-51 (1974) (in Michigan in 1971, assessed valuation per pupil
ranged from $405,747 to $2,165);Johnson, State Court Intervention in School Finance
Reform, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. 325, 365 (1979) (in Ohio in 1975-76, wealth per pupil
ranged from approximately $283,000 to approximately $4,300); Schwartz, Illinois
School Finance-A Primer, 56 Chi.[-]Kent L. Rev. 831, 835 n.24 (1980) (in Illinois in
1971, local assessed valuation per pupil ranged from $355,386 to $4,917 for elementary
school districts and from $231,331 to $24,219 for secondary school districts); Comment,
A "Uniform" Education: Reform of Local Property Tax School Finance Systems
Through State Constitutions, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 565, 567 (1979) (in 1977-78 school district tax bases in metropolitan Milwaukee ranged from $361,812 per pupil to $51,042
per pupil); Note, Equality in Public School Financing: Missouri's Need for Reform, 19
Urb. L. Ann. 133, 134 n.6 (1980) (in school districts of metropolitan St. Louis in
1977-78, assessed valuation per pupil ranged from $90,119 to $6,728).
63. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 613-14,
458 A.2d 758, 767 (1983) (Baltimore City imposed property tax rate nearly twice as high
as surrounding Baltimore County, but 69.5% of city revenues went for noneducation
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cally, the magnitude of local needs is totally unrelated to the extent of
local resources.6 4
These interlocal wealth differences have obvious implications for
the relative abilities of different localities to finance public educationthe principal state-delegated and locally funded service. Although all
states provide some fiscal assistance to their school districts, this aid is
often insufficient to offset the differences in tax bases. Wealthier districts remain able to spend far more on schools and provide better services and more extensive programs than can poorer districts, 65 and
usually they may do so while imposing much lower tax rates than their
poorer neighbors. 6 6 The local property tax system of school finance
thus leads to interlocal inequalities in both the quality of local schools
and property taxation.
Interlocal wealth differences may be reinforced and extended by
local power over zoning. Because, for any given level of service, tax
rates will be lowest when per capita property values are highest, local
governments have "natural economic interests" 67 in excluding potential new residents who would bring down the local wealth average.
Thus, the preservation of local wealth differences provides the motive
for exclusionary actions; local zoning power provides the means. Ordipurposes while only 47% of suburban revenues went for purposes other than schools so
that, despite tax rate disparity, suburbs had almost twice as much in revenues available
per pupil for educational purposes). This is one element of the problem of municipal
overburden. Similarly, due to their greater numbers of poor, non-English speaking and
handicapped children, the central cities usually need to spend more per pupil to bring
their children up to the same level of educational attainment as in suburban districts.
See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 494-505, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606,
619-26 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (discussing municipal overburden and the higher costs associated with urban educational programs); W. Colman, Cities, Suburbs, and States: Governing and Financing Urban America 51-52, 129 (1975).
64. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 501, 303 A.2d 273, 287 (1973) [hereinafter Robinson I]("Statewide there is no correlation between the local tax base and the
number of pupils to be educated, or the number of the poor to be housed and clothed
and fed, or the incidence of crime and juvenile delinquency, or the cost of police or fire
protection, or the demands of the judicial process.").
65. For example, in 1986 in Suffolk County the Fishers Island district spent
$17,141 per pupil and three other school districts spent more than $8,000 per pupil
while six districts spent less than $4,000 per pupil; in Westchester County, four districts
spent less than $5,000 per pupil while Pocantico Hills spent $15,355 per pupil and three
other districts spent more than $7,000 per pupil. Overivew of New York State Aid,
supra note 62; cf. Kirby, 761 S.W.2d at 868 (GammageJ., dissenting) ("In the 1985-86
school year... spending per student varied between districts from $2,112 to $19,333.").
66. See, e.g., Note, supra note 62, at 134 n.6 (in metropolitan St. Louis in 1977-78,
Clayton taxed at a rate of 3.97% and produced $3,441 per pupil while Normandy taxed
at a rate of 5.19% and produced $1,475 and University City taxed at 6.47% and produced $1,666); Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 600 n.15, 487 P.2d at 1252 n.15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
612 n.15 (in 1968-69, Beverly Hills taxed at 2.38% and produced $1,232 per pupil
while Baldwin Park taxed at 5.48% but produced only $577).
67. Hirsch & Hirsch, Exclusionary Zoning: Local Property Taxation and the
Unique-Ubiquitous Resource Distinction, 52 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1671, 1724 (1979).
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nances requiring that homes be of large size or built on large lots are
widespread. 68 Many localities exclude multi-family housing, 69 mobile
homes 70 and all forms of subsidized housing.7 1 These devices tend to
assure that newcomers have wealth as great or greater than current residents. Moreover, by enabling localities to maintain and expand high
quality education programs while keeping down tax rates and protecting property values, exclusionary zoning may provide an inducement to
upper income families to settle in these communities.
The effects of exclusionary zoning go beyond these pervasive inequalities in the quality and availability of local public services. People
who cannot afford more expensive suburban homes are effectively denied access to suburbanjobs at a time when the suburbs are the principal area of job growth. 72 Would-be emigrants from the central cities
are forced to search farther afield for homes, thereby lengthening commutes and contributing to urban sprawl. 73 There may be an increase in
the cost of housing and in the general economic segmentation of the
metropolitan area. 74
68. See M. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion 59-62 (1976).
69. See id. at 52-59; see also C. Perin, Everything In Its Place: Social Order and
Land Use in America 32-80 (1977) (linking hostility to apartments to reluctance to permit renters into community of home owners).
70. See M. Danielson, supra note 68, at 62-64.
71. See id. at 79-106.
72. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 NJ. 151, 172-73, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (1975).
73. M. Danielson & J. Doig, New York: The Politics of Urban Regional Development 96-98 (1982).
74. See, e.g., id. at 100-05; D. Harvey, SocialJustice and the City 136 (1973). Several scholars have argued that exclusionary zoning has no external effects since a particular suburb provides a "ubiquitous resource" and that, given the large number of
suburbs in metropolitan areas, there is likely to be "perfect competition among uncongested suburbs." Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 67, at 1679; see Ellickson, Suburban
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale LJ. 385, 425-30 (1977).
But see Burnell & Burnell, Community Interaction and Suburban Zoning Policies, 24
Urb. Aff. Q. 470 (1989) (hypothesizing that one locality's decision to exclude multifamily housing may lead neighboring localities to adopt the same exclusionary measures in
order to prevent an influx of residents from the initial excluding community).
Studies have shown that in some areas many suburbs adopt exclusionary ordinances, especially large lot requirements and the exclusion of multifamily housing, so
that the aggregate effect of local exclusionary zoning is often county-wide or regionwide. See, e.g., R. Babcock & F. Bosselman, Exclusionary Zoning 10-11 (1973) (detailing widespread adoption of density controls and minimum floor area requirements
throughout selected metropolitan areas around the country); C. Perin, supra note 69, at
181-82 (only one-half of one percent of developable land in northeast New Jersey is
zoned for multifamily housing; even within that category many apartments are limited to
one or two bedrooms); M. Danielson, supra note 68, at 50-78 (reviewing county-wide
restrictions on small buildings and lots, multifamily housing and mobile homes in various states including NewJersey, New York, Minnesota, Virginia and California); id. at 77
(estimating that for the New York metropolitan area 80% of households whose heads
are 30-34 years old are priced out of new housing market); id. at 79-106 (noting general
suburban practice of excluding subsidized housing); McDougal, Contemporary Author-
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Starting in the late 1960s, serious legal challenges to the local
property tax system of funding public education and to local exclusionary zoning practices were mounted. These two reform campaigns were
pursued in the name of equality and their goals were interrelated.
School finance reform would sever the link between local wealth and
the quality of local education by having the states assume a greater degree of financial responsibility for public schools. Reducing the local
role in school financing would ease local tax burdens and reduce the
fiscal incentive to zone out lower-income residents. The attack on exclusionary zoning was aimed at opening the suburbs to less expensive
housing and thus to less affluent people. The economic integration of
the suburbs would mitigate interlocal disparities in taxable wealth and
public services.
These cases posed significant questions about local autonomy and
the balance of state-local power. To promote interlocal and interpersonal equality, the reform movements relied upon the continuing validity of the traditional notion of a state-centered local government
system, with states responsible for interlocal differences and local governments accountable to the states for the uses of their power. Interlocal wealth and spending disparities are more vulnerable to legal attack
if the state is considered the basic unit of government, with local governments treated as creatures of the states and local public service responsibilities traced back to state delegations. Similarly, local
exclusionary zoning and the injuries it imposes on state residents
outside a locality are problematic only if local governments are viewed
as agents of the state, required to serve state interests rather than parochial local interests. Thus, in the school finance and exclusionary zoning litigation, a progressive late twentieth-century concern for
economic and social equality was joined to the nineteenth-century notion of local governments as state creatures, delegates and agents.
By the same token, the value of local autonomy was central to the
defense against the demand for greater equality. State and local governments justified the existing school finance system and local land use
decision making as essential to local autonomy. For the defendants,
local governments, not the states, were the pivots of the local government system. Local governments were seen not merely as creatures of
the state, but as representatives of local residents, making local public
policy on behalf of local constituents. Local control, including fiscal
responsibility for local schools and regulation of local land use, was
treated as a vital local interest that state legislatures could legitimately
itative Conceptions of Federalism and Exclusionary Land Use Planning: A Critique, 21
B.G.L. Rev. 301, 319-23 (1980) (detailing extent of exclusionary local regulation in

Connecticut, Georgia and Illinois). In Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Auth., 500
F.2d 1087, 1089 n.2 (6th Cir. 1974), the court found that only 4 of 56 municipalities in

metropolitan Cleveland had established agreements with the metropolitan housing authority to accept subsidized housing.
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promote and that the courts ought to preserve. Interlocal inequality
and local exclusion were not justified per se, but were excused as inevitable costs of a strong local government system-the price that must be
75
paid to protect local autonomy.
The principal forum for the school finance reform and exclusionary zoning cases has been the state courts, and the cases have turned on
state constitutional provisions and state law doctrines. If the conventional assumptions about state power and local powerlessness were correct, this combination of powerful equality claims and the formal legal
status of local governments as little more than administrative arms of
their states would have boded well for the two law reform efforts.
Plaintiffs, in fact, have scored some notable successes in state courts,
and those cases quickly have become a part of the contemporary canon
that won praise as representative of a renewed state judicial activism
and state constitutional law in an era of more conservative federal
courts. 76 But these victories were not typical. Despite the evidence of

profound interlocal inequalities and the asserted tradition of legal
powerlessness, state judges were often moved to vindicate local autonomy and were frequently unwilling to disturb the education funding
77
and zoning responsibilities of local governments.
The next two subsections analyze the case law that emerged out of
nearly two decades of school finance and exclusionary zoning litigation
in the state courts. A third subsection provides a brief critical consideration of state legislative developments in these areas. Although the
general evolution of the legal structure has been in the direction of
greater state power and responsibility, with some restrictions on local
autonomy, the pace of change has been slow, the effects limited and the
systemic commitment to localism only modestly modified and on occasion reaffirmed. Taken together, the litigation and legislative records
demonstrate the continuing grip of localism on the legal system's approach to state-local and interlocal relations.
2. The School Finance Cases in the State Courts: Local Autonomy and Interlocal Inequality. - Courts in twenty-four states have considered state
constitutional challenges to the local property tax system of financing
public schools. The school finance reform plaintiffs78 usually based
75. See Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73
Colum. L. Rev. 1227, 1248-50 (1973); Carrington, On Egalitarian Overzeal: A Polemic
Against the Local School Property Tax Cases, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 232.
76. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324, 1444-49 (1982).
77. The only way to preserve local fiscal autonomy and local zoning while eliminating interlocal fiscal differences and reducing the incentive to zone out lower-income

residents would be to redraw local boundaries to create local governments of comparable size and wealth. Interestingly, there has not been any litigation effort to redraw local
boundary lines, perhaps because such a challenge would have been too great an attack
on the independent existence of localities. See infra text accompanying notes 305-57.

78. Plaintiffs were either poorer school districts or the residents of such districts.

1990]

OUR LOCALISM

their claims on two state constitutional provisions-state equal protection clauses, and state constitutional articles directing legislatures to
provide for free public school systems. 79 In fourteen states, the courts
sustained the traditional school financing system, rejecting both state
equal protection and education article claims. 80 In six states, the courts
found the existing school finance systems invalid under the state education articles, although they rejected or declined to reach equal protection claims. 8 1 In four states, the courts determined that the traditional
finance system violates state equal protection clauses. 82 An underlying
concern in most of the school finance cases was the impact on local
See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 607-12, 458 A.2d
758, 764-67 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 36-37, 439 N.E.2d 359,
362, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646-47 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368,
368-69, 390 N.E.2d 813, 815 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
79. Thirty-five state constitutions contain an express provision guaranteeing a free
public education. See Levin, Reform Through the State Courts: Strategies for Reform
in Selected States, 38 Law & Contemp. Probs. 309, 310-11 (1974). Seven of these states
mandate a "thorough and efficient" system of free public schools; another nine use
either "thorough" or "efficient," nine mandate a "general and uniform" public school
system and another ten guarantee either a "general" or a "uniform" system. Id. at 310.
The state educational articles performed two functions for the plaintiffs. One of the
reasons the United States Supreme Court, in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), had rejected a challenge to a traditional school finance
system under the federal equal protection clause was that education could not be determined to be a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes-and, therefore,
school finance systems would be subject only to rational basis review-because education is not afforded explicit or implicit protection by the federal constitution. Id. at
33-35. A state constitution's education article arguably supplied the textual reference
sufficient to require state courts to treat education as a fundamental interest. Moreover,
the education article could be said to provide the basis for the imposition of a separate
duty on the state to guarantee the quality of the education provided in all local school
districts.
80. Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Lujan v. Colorado State
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d
156 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); People ex rel.
Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App. 3d 189, 350 N.E.2d 767 (1976); Hornbeck, 295 Md. 597, 458
A.2d 758; Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d
27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643; Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813; Fair
School Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v.
State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979);
Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E.2d 470 (1988); Kukor v. Grover,
148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d
141 (1976).
81. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, 1989 W.L. 60207
(Ky.); Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Robinson I, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585
P.2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
82. DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983);
Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976); Horton v. Meskill,
172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Washakie County School Dist. No. I v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
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autonomy of a legal requirement that would force interlocal equalization of school spending. Even in the decisions invalidating the traditional school finance systems local control was an important concern, as
courts troubled by the consequences of limited local tax bases for educational quality in poorer districts sought to reconcile a greater fiscal
role for the state with the preservation of local school autonomy.
For many of the state courts upholding the existing local property
tax-based system of financing public schools, 83 their decisions reflected
a background assumption of local self-government which implicitly requires local control of the funding and provision of basic government
services. 8 4 They treated local control of education, in particular, as essential to the existence of effective local self-government. The local
public school was proclaimed "the center of community life, and a pillar in the American conception of freedom in education and in local
control of institutions of local concern." 8 5 Schools were seen as the
focal points of local communities, and local control of education
deemed critical to local autonomy. The state constitutional provisions
directing the state legislatures to provide for the "maintenance and
83. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland,
Michigan, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and
Wisconsin. See supra note 80.
84. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the courts in these states usually denied
that the textual reference to education in their state constitutions made education "fundamental" for state equal protection purposes. As a result, interdistrict spending disparities remained subject to the rational basis test. The value of local control supplied
the rational basis. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1014-24; McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga.
632, 644, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1981); Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 645-57,458 A.2d at 784-90;
Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 42-47, 439 N.E.2d 359, 365-68, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650-52
(1982); Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 373-82, 390 N.E.2d at 817-22; Fair School Fin.
Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State,
276 Or. 9, 12, 19-21, 554 P.2d 139, 141, 144-45 (1976).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that education is a "fundamental right" for
purposes of state equal protection analysis, but found that fundamental right status did
not require equal expenditures per pupil, so that strict scrutiny would apply to state
legislation effecting a complete denial of educational opportunity but not to spending
disparities. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d at 495-99, 436 N.W.2d at 579-80; accord,
Shofstall, 110 Ariz. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592. The Wisconsin court also indicated that even
if strict scrutiny were the appropriate standard to be applied, "[t]he requirement that
local control of schools be retained is of constitutional magnitude and necessarily compelling." Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 504 n.13, 436 N.W.2d at 582 n.13.
The courts rejecting school finance reform claims also determined that the mandates of the education articles of the state constitutions did not require interdistrict
equality, but could be satisfied by the provision of a minimally adequate education in
each district. They found as a factual matter that a basic education was generally provided. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1024-25; Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 619-39, 458 A.2d at
770-80; Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 47-49, 439 N.E.2d at 368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53;
Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 382-88, 390 N.E.2d at 822-26; see also Richland County v.
Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 349, 364 S.E.2d 470,471-72 (1988) (South Carolina education
article leaves "legislature free to choose the means of funding the schools of this state to
meet modem needs").
85. Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 803, 537 P.2d 635, 645 (1975).
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support" of public schools did not bar the delegation of the administration and funding of education to localities. Rather, many courts read
their constitutional traditions to mandate the preservation of local
86
control.
Most of these courts candidly acknowledged the existence of substantial spending differences among school districts, which they recognized were largely attributable to differences in local taxable wealth.8 7
But they held that interlocal wealth and spending differences did not
undermine the legitimacy of the state delegation of responsibility for
the provision and funding of basic public services to local governments.
Instead, unequal levels of local services and taxation were deemed
characteristic of the American system of local government. "We are all
aware," observed the Arizona Supreme Court, "that the citizens of one
county shoulder a different tax burden than the citizens of another and
also receive varying degrees of governmental service."18 8 Differences in
the cost and quality of services were seen as inherent in the structure of
the local government system.8 9
Plaintiffs did not challenge the value of local control, but rather
contended that true local control for all districts required reformation
of the finance system and a greater fiscal role for the state, since poorer
districts lacked the taxable wealth to support the educational progriams
their residents desired. They asserted that local administrative authority could be preserved even if fiscal responsibility were shifted to the
state. Typically, plaintiffs did not call for full state funding of education, centralized state determination of educational needs and allocation of resources or the interdistrict equalization of spending. Instead,
plaintiffs usually sought only to equalize local fiscal capacity.
To combine the benefits of local administrative authority with state
fiscal support for poorer districts, school finance reformers advanced
the "district power equalization" concept. 9 0 Under district power
equalization, local school districts would continue to set the local tax
86. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1021-24 ("IT]he historical development of public
education in Colorado has been centered on the philosophy of local control."); Hornbeck,

295 Md. at 621-31, 654-56, 458 A.2d at 771-76, 788-89; Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d
550, 570-72, 247 N.W.2d 141, 150-52 (1976).
87. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1023 (poorer districts have "less fiscal control than
wealthier districts"); Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 658, 458 A.2d at 790 ("[T]here are great disparities in educational opportunities among the State's school districts .... ); Nyquist,
57 N.Y.2d at 38, 439 N.E.2d at 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 647 (noting "significant inequalities
in the availability of financial support for local school districts"); Olsen, 276 Or. at 24,

554 P.2d at 147 ("[S]ome districts have less local control than others because of the
disparity in the value of the property in the district ... .
88. Shofstall, 110 Ariz. at 91, 515 P.2d at 593.
89. Notwithstanding the disparity in cost and quality, "this tradition of local government providing services paid for by local taxes," the Oregon Supreme Court wrote,
"continues to be a basic accepted principle of Oregon government." Olsen, 276 Or. at
25, 554 P.2d at 147.
90. See generallyJ. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 200-43.
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rate, determine the portion of local revenues allocated to education
and, within the school budget, fix local spending priorities. However,
the states would have to guarantee all districts an equal fiscal capacity
for school programs. Spending differences could still result, but they
would be due to local decisions concerning the level of taxation and the
share of local budgets to be devoted to schools, not to differences in tax
base. 9 1
The state courts that sustained the traditional school finance system generally rejected the idea that local control could be separated
from local fiscal responsibility. The New York Court of Appeals, for
example, concluded that there was "a direct correlation" between the
92
implementation of local interests and local control of school budgets.
Only through control of the school budget could local residents "exercise a substantial control over the educational opportunities made
available in their districts." 9 3 Local fiscal responsibility was an incentive to community involvement, and it enabled district residents to decide the size of the school budget and the allocation of funds among
fiscal control was deemed essential for
school programs. Thus, local
94
local administrative control.
91. One problem with district power equalization is that it assumes the same
measure of local taxable wealth will buy the same measure of education in all districts in
the state. Representatives of large city school districts have contended that the usual
measure of district power-assessable property per pupil-unfairly overstates their
power to commit resources to schools. These districts argue that the presence of commercial and industrial property in the cities means that, under most legislative measures
of local property wealth, they will appear relatively affluent, but that due to municipal
overburden, see supra note 63, they actually need to spend more per pupil to bring their
children up to the same level of educational attainment as in nonurban districts. Thus,
the large cities have argued that mere district power equalization without some special
attention to urban problems will not provide true equalization for them. See, e.g.,
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 494-519, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 619-40 (Sup.
Ct. 1978). Indeed, there is some evidence that equalization without a municipal overburden factor will actually reduce the revenues available for schools in large cities. See,
e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 618-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
The municipal overburden argument has fared even less well in court than school
finance reform gencrally. See, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 481-84, 436
N.W.2d 568, 573-74 (1989); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 41-42, 439
N.E.2d 359, 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649-50 (1982); Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449,
466-67, 355 A.2d 129, 138 (1976) [hereinafter Robinson 1 (sustaining New Jersey's
Public School Education Act of 1975 notwithstanding the Act's failure to make provision
for municipal overburden). J. Coons, W. Clune and S. Sugarman have contended that
school finance reform need not deal with municipal overburden. J. Coons, W. Clune &
S. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 232-38.
92. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 46, 439 N.E.2d at 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
93. Nyquist, id. at 45, 439 N.E.2d at 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
94. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1021-24; Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 654-57, 458 A.2d at
788-90; Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 45-46, 439 N.E.2d at 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52; Board
of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 377-80, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820-21 (1979); Fair
School Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1146-47 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 276
Or. 9, 23, 554 P.2d 139, 146-47 (1976).
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These courts considered district power equalization to be inconsistent with local control. Given the enormous interlocal wealth differences, guaranteeing the poorest school district the same fiscal capacity
as the richest would be prohibitively expensive for the states. The only
way to make district power equalizing fiscally feasible would be to limit
spending by the richer districts. 95 The richer districts strenuously opposed any such limitation on the use of their tax bases for their
schools. 96 Many state courts agreed. The New York Court of Appeals

indicated that a basic element of local autonomy was the right of individual school districts to spend more than the state requires or more
than their neighbors can afford: "Any legislative attempt to make uniform and undeviating the educational opportunities offered by the several hundred local school districts... would inevitably work the demise
of the local control of education available to students in the individual
97
districts."
Indeed, judicial commitment to local control led the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Buse v. Smith 98 to invalidate state legislation that
would have equalized interdistrict spending in part by limiting the
power of wealthier communities to outspend poorer ones. 99 The
Wisconsin plan provided a guaranteed tax base for poorer districts and
required that districts with spending or assessed valuation per capita
above a certain level make payments, euphemistically styled "negative
aid," into a state fund.10 0 The "negative aid" payments would supple95. A bare half-dozen states have sought to limit the funds available to more affluent districts by providing for the "recapture" of revenues raised above some ceiling and
the transfer of the excess moneys to poorer districts. In one state, Wisconsin, the state
supreme court invalidated recapture as inconsistent with the local autonomy of the more
affluent districts. See Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976). The
provision in Maine was repealed soon after adoption, and the recapture provision in
Minnesota was really little more than a reduction in state aid. The recapture measures
in Montana and Wyoming were largely limited to the redistribution of revenues derived
from state-mandated taxes. See Education Commission of the States, School Finance
Reform in the States: 1981 (discussing recapture provisions in Utah, Montana and
Minnesota); Meyer & Young, School Finance Reform in Wyoming, 19 Land & Water L.
Rev. 135, 152-56 (1984) (describing three methods of implementing recapture and the
system adopted by Wyoming in 1983); Grubb, The First Round of Legislative Reforms
in the Post-Serrano World, 38 Law & Contemp. Probs. 459, 467, 481 (1974) (describing
Maine's state aid program as the only one providing for full recapture of excess revenue); Comment, supra note 62, at 582-83 (Wisconsin and Maine).
96. See, e.g., Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 557, 247 N.W.2d at 144; Brief for 85 Public School
Districts as Amici Curiae, Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 32-33, 439 N.E.2d
359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982) (brief filed by affluent suburban school districts in appeal
of lower court determination that New York school financing system was
unconstitutional).
97. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 45-46, 439 N.E.2d at 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652; accord
Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1023; Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 377-81, 390 N.E.2d at 820-22; Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 427-28, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (1979).
98. 74 Wis. 2d 550, 554-62, 247 N.W.2d 141, 143-46 (1976).
99. Id. at 579, 247 N.W.2d at 155.
100. Id. at 557, 247 N.W.2d at 144.
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ment the state's revenues for "positive aid" to poorer districts while
restricting the capacity of rich districts to outspend the poor. 10 1 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court declared "negative aid" an unconstitutional
02
infringement upon the autonomy of the richer districts.
The Buse court invoked the traditional doctrine that school districts, like all other political subdivisions, are "but arms of the state,
carrying out state duties." 1 0 3 Nonetheless, the court treated the districts as autonomous entities and placed local rights on a par with state
power. Although the Wisconsin Constitution obligated the state legislature to provide for free public schools "which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable," the text of the constitution referred to "district
schools."' 0 4 Based on that language, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held the local interest in administering and funding schools to be of
constitutional magnitude.' 0 5 Rather than giving the state plenary
power over local districts, the court found a "state-local control dichotomy" to be "part and parcel of the constitution." 10 6 Thus, the court
concluded, "[l]ocal districts retain the control to provide educational
opportunities over and above those required by the state and they retain the power to raise and spend revenue'. . . for the support of common schools therein.' "o107 Local autonomy meant that the state could
neither limit district spending in the name of interlocal equality nor
require one school district to contribute to the support of a poorer
neighbor.
Judicial resistance to the interdistrict equalization of school resources is commonly linked to judicial deference to the legislative policy choice to fund education out of local revenues. In Buse, the one
school finance case in which the values of deference to the legislature
and support for local autonomy dictated different outcomes, the court
opted for localism. Though not typical, Buse is exemplary of the judicial concern for local autonomy characteristic of many of the school
finance cases. Despite the formal legal inferiority of local districts, the
nominal status of localities as mere delegates of the state and the indisputable evidence that local autonomy led to interlocal educational inequality, the Buse court, like many of the state courts that rejected school
finance reform claims, saw local control of education as desirable, and
sought to affirm it.
Even some of the courts that held their states' school finance sys101. Id. at 557-58, 247 N.W.2d at 144-45.
102. Id. at 570-72, 247 N.W.2d at 150-51. Buse's approach to "the fundamental
concept of the state-locality relationship in school financing" was recently reaffirmed in
Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 486-90, 436 N.W.2d 568, 575-76 (1989).
103. Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 572, 247 N.W.2d at 151.
104. Wis. Const. art. X, § 3.
105. 74 Wis. 2d at 572, 247 N.W.2d at 151-52.
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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tems unconstitutional placed a high value on local autonomy and limited the impact of their decisions on the basic structure of state-local
relations. The six state courts that based their judgments on the state
education articles necessarily limited the interlocal equalizing effect of
their decisions to education finance;10 8 broader implications for the interlocal differences in ability to spend on other basic public services or
for inequalities in local taxation were usually disclaimed.1 0 9
Moreover, although these education articles courts stressed the
states' obligations to improve educational opportunities for children in
poorer districts, they did not require their states to fund education fully
or to eradicate all interlocal wealth or spending differences. Indeed,
like the courts upholding the school finance systems, some of these
courts have indicated that locally raised revenues can still be used in
school budgets, thus allowing more affluent districts to spend above
state requirements and to outspend their neighbors.1 1 0 Where they
parted company with the other courts was in finding that their states
had failed to show that an adequate education was being provided in all
districts.
The opinions of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v.
Cahill"It are most striking, particularly given the case's status as a
landmark progressive school finance reform case and an exemplar of
contemporary state judicial activism. Robinson I rejected an equal protection challenge to the interlocal differences in fiscal capacity and
spending, finding that such inequalities are inherent in local self-gov108. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, laid heavy emphasis on the

"unique" provision of that state's constitution that made it "the paramount duty of the
state to make ample provision" for education. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90
Wash. 2d 476, 498, 585 P.2d 71, 84 (1978) (construing Wash. Const. art. 9, § 1). Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court recognized "that there are and always will be strong
public interests competing for available state funds. However, the legislature's responsi-

bility to support public education is different because it is constitutionally imposed."
Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989). Similarly, the

four state courts that found the traditional school financing system violative of state
equal protection clauses also implied that any inter-local equalization was unique to edu-

cation, either because of education's textual reference in their state constitutions or because of education's fundamental importance. See infra note 128.
109. See, e.g., Robinson 1, 62 NJ. 473, 501-04, 303 A.2d 273, 287-89 (1973); Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 526, 585 P.2d at 99; Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672,
709, 255 S.E.2d 859, 879 (1979).
110. See, e.g., Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 398; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
1989 Ky. Lexis 55 at *74, 1989 W.L. 60207 (Ky.); Robinson I, 62 NJ. at 520, 303 A.2d at
294, 298; Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 526, 585 P.2d at 99; Pauley, 162 W. Va.
at 710-12, 255 S.E.2d at 880.
111. Significant opinions in the Robinson litigation may be found at 70 NJ. 155, 358
A.2d 457 (1976); Robinson V,69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); 67 NJ. 333, 339 A.2d
193 (1975); and Robinson 1, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
See generally R. Lehne, The Quest for Justice: The Politics of School Finance Reform
(1978) (describing New Jersey's efforts to reform school finance in the wake of the
Robinson decisions).
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ernment. For that very reason such differences could not be
unconstitutional:
A signal feature of home rule as we know it is that the residents of a political subdivision are permitted within substantial
limits to decide how much to raise for [local] services ...
How much will be done by local government may, of course,
depend upon the size of its tax base ....

It is inevitable that

reexpenditures per resident will vary among municipalities,
12
sulting in differences as to benefits and tax burden.'
The Robinson I court recognized the enormous discrepancies between
local service needs and local fiscal capacities, and acknowledged that
"[s]tatewide there is no correlation between the local tax base and the
number of pupils to be educated, or the number of the poor to be
housed and clothed and fed, or the incidence of crime and juvenile delinquency, or the cost of police or fire protection, or the demands of the
judicial process."' "13 Nevertheless, these local government functions or
services were funded primarily out of local revenues. To direct the
state to equalize local fiscal capacities or to assure local governments
the resources to satisfy local needs, the court said, would have "convulsive implications" for home rule" 4 and require that "our political
structure.., be fundamentally changed." 15 The court was not willing
to countenance such a profound restructuring of state-local rela6
Thus, after giving a full accounting of the costs of local fiscal
tions. 11
responsibility in terms of the lack of fit between local funds and local
needs, and the inequality in resources and spending, Robinson indicated
a willingness to pay those costs in order to preserve the system of local
self-government. 1 7 In short, home rule-warts and all.
112. Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 493-94, 303 A.2d at 283.
113. Id. at 501, 303 A.2d at 287. The court suggested that perhaps in the idyllic
past there may have been "a rough correlation between the needs of an area and the
local resources to meet them so that there was no conspicuous unfairness in assigning
State obligations to the local units of government. Surely that is not true today in our
State." Id. at 500, 303 A.2d at 287.
114. Id. at 501, 303 A.2d at 287.
115. Id. at 494, 303 A.2d at 283.
116. Despite the state constitution's textual commitment to education, the court
declined to treat education as "fundamental" for state equal protection purposes. Id. at
491-99, 303 A.2d at 282-87. Local services such as police, fire protection or public
health could not be said to be any less essential than public schools. Id. at 489, 303 A.2d
at 281. The inequalities in the funding of all local services would stand or fall together;
the court determined that they would stand.
The Robinson court also rejected the contention that local control could be satisfied
by local administrative authority without local fiscal responsibility. The "basic tenet of
local government" was "local authority with concomitant fiscal responsibility." Id. at
499-500, 303 A.2d at 286-87. Providing that costs be borne locally served to guarantee
that local residents would be "given some voice as to the amount of services and expenditures therefor" and "to stimulate citizen concern for performance." Id. at 499,
303 A.2d at 286.
117. Indeed, the NewJersey Supreme Court rejected in a subsequent case an equal
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Robinson I did, of course, invalidate the state's school financing system. The court construed the state constitution's education article to
require the state to define the content of a "thorough and efficient"
education and to take the necessary steps to ensure that such an education is provided in all districts. 11 8 Although the state could delegate
that function and the financial responsibility for its performance to localities, the state was obligated to oversee local school districts to ensure that the "thorough and efficient" commitment was met. 1 9 The
court found that the state had never specified the content of a "thorough and efficient" education, nor had it properly monitored local district performance.' 2 0 The court interpreted the low levels of spending
in poorer districts as indicating that children in those communities
were not receiving the education to which they were entitled under the
constitution. Interdistrict inequality per se was not unlawful, but the
lower levels of spending in poorer districts put the burden on the state
of proving that the promise of the constitution had been kept.' 2 1
The Robinson court did not mandate equalization and contemplated
that richer districts could spend beyond the constitutional mandate.
The NewJersey Supreme Court subsequently withdrew from the school
finance controversy by upholding NewJersey's Public School Education
Act of 1975, which was enacted as a result of the Robinson decision.' 2 2
Although the Act increased the state's role in defining educational quality, oversight of local schools and its financial assistance to localities,
the Act still required local taxes to provide the bulk of financial support
for education. 123 Much of the state aid provided under the Act was not
equalizing, but went to rich districts as well as poor ones, and was con24
tingent on levels of local spending, not measures of local need.'
Although the Act raised the revenues available to poorer districts, it did
not reduce interlocal spending disparities. 125 Nevertheless, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held the Act constitutional on its face and responsive to the Robinson mandate.1 26 More recently, the state's board
protection challenge to the state's requirement that counties pay for local welfare and
judicial administration costs out of the local property tax, notwithstanding the disparities in local ability to pay. Bonnet v. State, 78 NJ. 325, 395 A.2d 194, aff'g 155 NJ.
Super. 520, 382 A.2d 1175 (App. Div. 1978); accord Colorado Dep't of Social Serv. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1, 13-15 (Colo. 1985).
118. Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297.
119. Id. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.
120. Id. at 515-18, 303 A.2d at 295-96.
121. Id. at 519-20, 303 A.2d at 297-98.

122. Robinson V, 69 NJ. at 467-68, 355 A.2d at 139.
123. Id. at 486-87, 355 A.2d at 149 (Conford, J., concurring and dissenting).
124. Abbott v. Burke, 100 NJ. 269, 285-87, 495 A.2d 376, 384-85 (1985).

125. Id. at 285-87 & n.2, 495 A.2d at 385 & n.2.
126. Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 467-68, 355 A.2d at 138-39. The court's approval was

contingent on the legislature fully funding the measure. The Washington and West
Virginia courts also held that their school financing systems violated their state constitutions only because those states had failed to guarantee that local school districts had the
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of education, relying in part on local autonomy concerns, rejected a
claim that the continuing substantial disparities in local fiscal capacities
and school spending under the Public School Education Act rendered
the current school finance system unconstitutional.1 2 7 Thus, even in a
state whose supreme court has pushed the state legislature hard to asfunds necessary to meet constitutionally mandated minimum levels of service. Neither
required the equalization of resources or spending or sought to limit the ability of more
affluent districts to use their local resources. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. I v.
State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 524-25, 585 P.2d 71, 97-99 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va.
672, 709, 255 S.E.2d 859, 879-80 (1979).
More recently, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court has treated the state constitution's "thorough and efficient system of free schools" clause as making education a
fundamental right for purposes of state equal protection clause review. See State ex rel.
Bd. of Educ. v. Manchin, 366 S.E.2d 743, 748-49 (W. Va. 1988). The recent education
article decisions in Kentucky, Montana and Texas also tend to blur the distinction between the "adequacy" concerns that were the focus of the prior education article decisions in New Jersey, Washington and West Virginia, and "equality" concerns. The
supreme courts in Kentucky and Texas treated their state constitutional provisions requiring the legislature to provide for an "efficient system" of public schools, Ky. Const.
§ 183, Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1, as also entailing a requirement of substantial equality of
educational opportunities throughout their states. Rose v. Council For Better Educ.,
Inc., 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, at *76, 1989 W.L. 60207 (Ky.); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). The Montana Constitution of 1972, which was
interpreted in Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689-90
(Mont. 1989), includes an equalization component in its education article. Mont. Const.
art. X, § 1(1) ("[E]quality of educational opportunity is guaranteed.").
127. Recent developments in school finance in NewJersey highlight the paradox of
Robinson. In 1981, plaintiffs representing children attending public schools in Camden,
East Orange, Irvington and Jersey City brought suit contending that the state's Public
School Education Act of 1975 ("the Act"), which had been upheld against a facial attack
in Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 467, 355 A.2d at 139, failed to satisfy the "thorough and efficient" requirement of the state constitution in their property-poor urban school districts. Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 302-03, 495 A.2d 376, 393-94 (1985). The state
supreme court remanded the case with instructions for transfer to the state Office of
Administrative Law to conduct an administrative hearing and produce a record. Id. at
301-03, 495 A.2d at 393-94. Three years later the administrative law judge issued a
607-page "initial decision" which found, inter alia, that interdistrict disparities in the
capacity to finance schools had widened substantially since the enactment of the Act;
that the Act had failed to remedy these disparities; that, as a result, there were substantial differences in the school programs and facilities of poor urban and affluent suburban
districts; and that due to these disparities New Jersey was systemically failing to assure
students in urban property-poor districts a thorough and efficient education. Abbott v.
Burke, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 5581-85, Agency Dkt. No. 307-8/85 (Aug. 21, 1988).
The Commissioner of Education, however, rejected the administrative law judge's
findings and found that the Act satisfied the "thorough and efficient" requirement.
Abbott v. Burke, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 5581-85, C. 37-89 (Comm'r of Educ. Decision, Feb.
22, 1989). The principal point of difference between the administrative law judge and
the Commissioner was the significance of continuing interlocal spending and program
differences. The Commissioner agreed that such differences exist but he found them
consistent with the "home rule and local fiscal management [that] are the hallmarks of
local school districts." Id. The Commissioner found that the administrative law judge
had erred in focusing on the spending and program differences. The "thorough and
efficient" education requirement was satisfied as long as each district was providing the
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sume a greater role in funding and monitoring local public schools, the
state has continued to support local school autonomy.
Only four state supreme courts, out of the two dozen that heard
these cases, invalidated the traditional school finance system because
the central role of interlocal wealth differences violated state equal protection clauses.' 28 These courts agreed with the other state courts that
the relationship between local school finance and local control was significant. They parted company with the others, however, in determining that local authority over the scope and content of local education
programs did not require local fiscal responsibility. Instead, these
courts found that for poorer districts true local control required substantial state fiscal support, not just nominal administrative authority,
and that an enhanced state role would not necessarily result in any reduction in local autonomy.' 29 As the California Supreme Court put it:
only a district with a large tax base will be truly able to decide
how much it really cares about education. The poor district
cannot freely choose to tax itself into an excellence which its
tax rolls cannot provide. Far from being necessary to promote
local fiscal choice, the present financing system actually deeducation required by the Act and the state education department was actively monitoring the performance of local districts to assure compliance with the statutory criteria.
The State Board of Education concurred in the Commissioner of Education's analysis. Although it, too, acknowledged that plaintiffs had demonstrated significant disparities in per pupil expenditures and program offerings between their districts and selected
suburban districts, that did not amount to "a systemic failure of our education system to
provide a thorough and efficient education." Abbott v. Burke, SB # 12-89 (April 13,
1989) at 4. The Board agreed with the Commissioner that "thorough and efficient education" was largely whatever the legislature defined it to mean and that the constitutional requirement was satisfied by the state's monitoring efforts. Although individual
school districts did fall short of the statutory requirements, those were seen as individual, not systemic failures, capable of remediation within the existing statutory structure.
Continuing interlocal spending and program differences were justified in part by "the
State's interest in giving local residents throughout the State a voice as to the amount of
educational services and expenditures, and providing that some of the cost is borne
locally to stimulate citizen concern for performance." Id. at 49. The case is currently
pending before the New Jersey Supreme Court.
128. Three courts-in California, Connecticut and Wyoming-concluded that education was a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes, thus triggering strict
judicial scrutiny, and that the existing system was unsupported by a compelling interest.
See Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764-75, 557 P.2d 929, 951-57, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345,
367-73 (1976); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 647-51, 376 A.2d 359, 373-76
(1977); Washakie County School Dist. Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333-37
(Wyo. 1980). The Arkansas court found no need to decide whether education was "fundamental" since it determined that the state's reliance on the local property tax base to
fund schools served no rational purpose. The court noted that the provision of the state
constitution directing the state to provide "a general, suitable and efficient system" of
free public education "reinforce[d]" the court's equal protection analysis. DuPree v.
Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 345-46, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983).
129. See, e.g., Horton, 172 Conn. at 651-62, 376 A.2d at 376.
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prives the less wealthy districts of that option. 130
These courts were unclear about what role local wealth differences
constitutionally could play under a reformed system. Despite the equal
protection predicate for their rulings, these courts did not require full
state funding, a centralized matching of state resources to local needs,
full equalization of district tax bases or equal spending.1 3 1 Later cases
from some of these states suggest that, despite the strong language
about equalization, these courts might be satisfied with a remedy comparable to New Jersey's solution, that is, increasing the resources available to the poorest districts without either capping the richest districts
or compelling full equalization of district tax bases. The Connecticut
Supreme Court, for example, sustained a reformed system that left local governments responsible for half the funding and continued to result in substantial spending inequalities.13 2 A decade after finding the
state's school financing system unconstitutional, the court upheld remedial legislation that "retained a salutary role for local choice by guaranteeing minimum funds without imposing a ceiling on what a town
might elect to spend for public education."' 3 3 On the other hand, the
California Court has imposed tight limits on interdistrict school spend34
ing differences that derive from wealth-related disparities.1
As the school finance cases continue to unfold, it has become more
difficult to categorize the decisions or to characterize their overall
tenor. After a period of intensive activity in the 1970s and early 1980s
and a lull in the middle 1980s, the end of the decade witnessed a flurry
of new decisions: three state supreme courts rejected school finance
reform claims;' 3 5 three state supreme courts held their state systems
invalid;' I3 and, as indicated, the New Jersey Commissioner of Education denied, subject to further judicial appeal, a claim that continuing
130. Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 611, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 620

(1971).
131. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 615-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);

Horton, 172 Conn. at 652, 376 A.2d at 376; Herschler,606 P.2d at 336. Arkansas's DuPree
decision did not address the requirements of a reformed school finance system. 279
Ark. at 349-50, 651 S.W.2d at 95.
132. Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 39, 486 A.2d 1099, 1107 (1985).
133. Id.
134. Serrano, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 593-95. The state share of school spending has
greatly increased and interdistrict spending differences have been sharply reduced in
California. Id. at 615. However, this may be as much a result of Proposition 13's drastic
restriction on local tax bases, Cal. Const. amend. XIIIA, as of the Serrano decision. See
Henke, Financing Public Schools in California: The Aftermath of Serrano v. Priest and
Proposition 13, 21 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 1-2, 22-23, 39 (1986).
135. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W. 2d 568 (1989); Fair School Fin.
Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E. 2d
470 (S.C. 1988).

136. Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, 1989 W.L. 60207 (Ky.);
Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
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interlocal fiscal disparities under the state's "reformed" school finance
13 7
system violate the state's constitution, as interpreted in Robinson.
The three most recent school finance reform victories-decisions
handed down by the supreme courts of Kentucky, Montana and Texas
in 1989-though based solely on state education articles, had a
stronger equalization thrust than earlier education article decisions in
other states. Instead of following Robinson and treating the education
articles as simply requiring the states to assure that basic adequate education is provided in all districts, the courts in these states interpreted
the education articles as mandating "substantial equality" of educational opportunities throughout their states-although the concept of
"substantial equality" has not been given judicial definition and these
courts have continued to authorize local governments to raise and
spend funds above the levels deemed necessary to assure basic adequacy.' 3 8 The Kentucky and Texas decisions, in particular, are noteworthy for their calls for systemic reform to improve the quality of
education provided in the poorest districts. 139 Since both courts have
given their state legislatures until mid-1990 to propose new school finance systems,' 40 it is too soon to tell what the long-term consequences
,for these states will be. However, Robinson and its aftermath suggest
that a school finance reform decision may be only a first step in a prolonged politico-legal conflict in which true interlocal equalization remains an elusive goal.
As a result of these recent decisions, school finance reform arguments have prevailed in a greater percentage of state courts than was
the case just two years ago. The new focus on education in public debates-as perhaps evidenced by the election of a self-proclaimed "education President"-and the belief that the quality of American public
education has suffered a decline that has long-term deleterious implications for American economic competitiveness in world markets, 14 ' may
be providing a new impetus to school finance reform. Although the
equality concern that engendered the school finance reform movement
in the 1960s and 1970s was not sufficient to offset the localism built
into the school finance system, it may be that fear of declining eco14 2
nomic competitiveness will do so.

Despite these recent decisions, after two decades of litigation a ma137. Abbott v. Burke, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 5581-85 (April 14, 1989) (state board of

education decision).
138. Rose, 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, at *73-74; Helena, 769 P.2d at 689-90; Kirby, 777

S.W.2d at 397-98.
139. Rose, 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, at *84-85 ("Kentucky's entire system of common
schools is unconstitutional."); Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 397 ("A band-aid will not suffice; the

system itself must be changed."). Kirby, however, still preserves the right of local communities to "supplement[] an efficient system established by the legislature." Id. at 398.
140. Rose, 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, at *88; Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 399.

141. See infra note 267.
142. The Kentucky court in Rose was clearly concerned by the low level of educa-
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jority of the state courts that heard school finance reform claims rejected them because of a concern that mandating greater interlocal
equalization of fiscal capacity would threaten local autonomy. More important than the scorecard of school finance reform victories and
defeats is what the school finance reform cases demonstrate about the
problematic nature of local autonomy. The basic structure of school
finance-the state delegation of authority-is predicated on the desirability of local power. Yet formal legal and administrative authority does
not by itself necessaily lead to real local power in practice. Fiscal autonomy is necessary too; but many localities lack the resources for the effective exercise of their formal legal powers. For these localities, the
state is not an enemy but, rather, a potential source of vital financial
assistance. The uncertain relationship of legal power and fiscal resources has been a consistent theme in many of the school finance
cases. A majority of the state courts acknowledged the limits on local
wealth in poorer communities, but nevertheless determined that increasing the state's share of local school funding would ineluctably
erode local operational control. Moreover, they saw interlocal equality
achieved through a cap on spending by richer districts as an inappropriate infringement on local freedom. The other state courts concluded that, unless districts with limited tax bases were provided with
substantial financial assistance, those poorer districts would be unable
to enjoy the blessings of local control.
Neither position is unreasonable on its face. On the one hand, intergovernmental grants often come with strings attached, and decisionmaking authority may be tied to the primary revenue source whatever
the formal organization charts provide.1 43 Compelling the state to take
over the school funding field may permanently jeopardize local autonomy. Professor Frug has been critical of state court activism in the area
of school finance since it interferes with the ability of localities "to work
out these problems themselves." 1 4 4 On the other hand, for a substantial number of localities fiscal incapacity makes a mockery of local contion spending in the state generally and by the state's low status in the various national
rankings of educational performance. Rose, 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, at *25-32.
143.
State aid . . . often diminishes home rule and increases the centralization of
control at higher levels of government, for there is a tendency for those who
control financing to try also to control policy. Money without strings attached
is rare. Spending priorities are eventually decided in state rather than in local
political arenas.
Pfiffner, Inflexible Budgets, Fiscal Stress and the Tax Revolt, in The Municipal Money
Chase: The Politics of Local Government Finance 37, 57 (A. Sbragia ed. 1983) (footnote omitted). But see T. Clark & L. Ferguson, City Money: Political Processes, Fiscal
Strain and Retrenchment 223-32 (1983) (local governments preserve autonomy "by
adapting outside funds to local preferences" so that there are "[r]emarkably few" policy
differences between cities receiving substantial intergovernmental aid and those receiving less).
144. Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 4, at 566.
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trol. Formal local autonomy for all, at the price of effective selfdetermination for some and fiscal burdens and impoverished public
services for others, is hardly a stirring ideal. As the school finance cases
illustrate, local autonomy in a setting of limited local fiscal capacityremediable only through greater state financing at the risk of state control-is a central dilemma of our localism.
3. The Exclusionary Zoning Cases in the State Courts: Local Autonomy and
the Definition of Community Character.- Local government efforts to use
zoning to determine the social and economic composition of the locality may be traced back to the introduction of zoning as a land use regulatory tool, but exclusionary zoning as a significant form of local
legislation did not become significant until the postwar suburban
boom. These local efforts originally received the imprimatur of state
courts. Ironically, given its current position as the leading opponent of
exclusionary zoning, the court most identified with the affirmation of
local power to use zoning to determine the demographic make-up of a
community was the New Jersey Supreme Court.
45
Deeply concerned by the "tide of suburban development"'
spreading out from New York City, Newark and Philadelphia during the
postwar period, the court endorsed the efforts of NewJersey's localities
to protect themselves from urbanization. In a series of decisions between 1949 and 1962, the court upheld efforts by NewJersey communities to zone out industry, multifamily residences and mobile homes,
and to impose costly minimum floor space, building frontage and large
lot acreage requirements. 14 6 The court adopted an expansive interpretation of the state's power to regulate land use under the police power
and an equally sweeping construction of the scope of the state's delegation of power over land use to localities. Dillon's Rule played no part
in the court's analysis of local zoning authority; instead, the court con14 7
strued zoning power "liberally in favor of the municipalities."'
Lower courts were directed to "allow fullest flexibility to the range of
well-informed local judgment as to the precise way in which local zon148
ing can best serve the welfare of the particular community."'
Moreover, not only did local governments enjoy broad powers
over land use, localities also could use their powers for the exclusive
benefit of local residents. Localities were not agents of the state, as the
black-letter law principles would have it, but of the local community.
145. Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 NJ. 232, 245, 181 A.2d 129, 136 (1962).
146. See id. at 249-52, 181 A.2d at 138-40 (ban on mobile homes); Fanale v.
Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 NJ. 320, 327-28, 139 A.2d 749, 753 (1958) (prohibition of multiple-family dwellings); Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 NJ. 194,
205-06, 93 A.2d 378, 384 (1952) (minimum five-acre lots); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v.
Township of Wayne, 10 NJ. 165, 171-75, 89 A.2d 693, 695-98 (1952) (minimum floor
space requirements for residential dwellings); Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough
of Cresskill, 1 NJ. 509, 514-15, 64 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1949) (exclusion of industry).
147. Lionshead Lake, 10 NJ. at 172, 89 A.2d at 696.
148. Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 NJ. Super. 47, 70, 124 A.2d 54, 66 (1956).
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The court's standard of review for a zoning ordinance was whether the
measure was "reasonably calculated to advance the community as a social, economic and political unit."1 4 9 Exclusionary practices were
treated as a legitimate form of local self-advancement. Suburban residents could pursue in their communities "more land, more living
room, indoors and out, and more freedom in their scale of living than is
15 0
generally possible in the city."
New Jersey was not alone in affirming local authority to enact such
exclusionary zoning measures. 151 Other state courts found these local
actions justified by a mix of interrelated concerns-the protection of
private property values, the control of public service costs and the local
tax rate, and the preservation of the "quiet and beauty" of communities
undergoing the rapid transition from small town to suburb. 15 2
Although courts occasionally warned that localities could not zone for
the sole purpose of economic segregation, they were reluctant to find
such a motivation. Indeed, courts were willing to countenance the increased housing costs caused by exclusionary measures as a necessary
incident to the defense of property values and the maintenance of at15
tractive communities. 3
The courts in the postwar decades did not see these exclusionary
measures as raising issues of interlocal or regional significance. The
interests of prospective residents, excluded by these measures from
membership in the community, were largely ignored. Rather, the
courts usually saw only a conflict between the private property rights of
landowners and the public interest of the local community;1 54 they generally deferred to the authority of local decision makers to define and
enforce the local public interest. 155 Regional concerns were advanced,
149. Vickers, 37 NJ. at 247, 181 A.2d at 137.
150. LionsheadLake, 10 NJ. at 174, 89 A.2d at 697.
151. See, e.g., Zygmont v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 152 Conn. 550, 556, 210
A.2d 172, 175 (1965); Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 257, 260, 146 N.E.2d 35, 37
(1957); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 567, 42 N.E.2d 516, 520 (1942);
Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 1041-42, 246 S.W.2d 771,
779-80 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of
Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 69, 141 A.2d 851, 855 (1958); see also Valley View Village, Inc.
v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1955) (upholding ban on all industrial uses);
8 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.127 (3d ed. 1983) (citing cases in
fifteen states upholding municipal ordinances precluding multiple-family dwellings).
But see Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 661-62, 107 S.E.2d 390,
396-97 (1959) (invalidating two acre requirement)
152. E.g., Simon, 311 Mass. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 518; Flora Realty, 362 Mo. at
1034-36, 246 S.W.2d at 775.
153. See, e.g., Simon, 311 Mass. at 565-66, 42 N.E.2d at 519; Flora Realty, 362 Mo.
at 1034-41, 246 S.W.2d at 774-79; Bilbar Constr., 393 Pa. at 76, 141 A.2d at 858.
154. See, e.g., R. Babcock & F. Bosselman, supra note 74, at 29 ("The most striking
feature of the large-lot decisions is the absence of serious judicial examination of their
exclusionary consequences. With the exception of scattered dicta the issue has not even
been posed in these cases.").
155. See, e.g., Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 N.J. Super. 47, 70, 124 A.2d 54,
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if at all, to defend exclusion; in a metropolitan area, it was thought, a
person or land use denied a place in the zoning locality could relocate
156
elsewhere in the region.
In fact, in many metropolitan areas exclusionary ordinances had
region-wide effects. By 1970, more than 99% of the vacant and developable land in northeastern NewJersey was zoned to exclude multifamily housing. 157 The minimum floor space required of new homes in
that part of the state was one-third greater than that set by United
States construction standards. 15 8 In Bergen County, 27,000 acres of
developable land were zoned for single-family housing and 131 acres
for apartments.1 59 In Connecticut's Fairfield County, 89% of the vacant land was subject to minimum lot requirements of one acre or
more.1 60 Between 1952 and 1968, the average size of a legally developable lot in New York's Westchester County rose from 0.3 acres to 1.5
acres. As a result, the county, which had been zoned for a projected
maximum population of approximately 3 million in 1952, had been
downzoned to a population maximum of approximately 1.75 million in
1969-a 40% drop during a period of rapid population growth.' 6 '
Studies have found similar widespread uses of exclusionary measures in
states with rapidly expanding metropolitan areas. 16 2 One locality's exclusionary measure, when followed by other communities in the region,
could have broad extralocal consequences. And in all areas suburban
localities sought to exclude public or publicly subsidized housing.' 63
During the last two decades, courts in several states have rejected
the view that the validity of local zoning is to be assessed solely in terms
of its effect on the "welfare of the particular community" and have re66 (1956); Bilbar Constr., 393 Pa. at 72, 141 A.2d at 856 ("[W]hat serves the public interest is primarily a question for the appropriate legislative body in a given situation to
ponder and decide.").
Often the principal legal issue was whether "aesthetic" or "community character"
considerations were a legitimate goal of local public action-and an appropriate basis
for abridging private property rights-and usually the answer was in the affirmative.
See, e.g., Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 203, 93 A.2d 378, 384 (1952);
Bilbar Constr., 393 Pa. at 72-74, 141 A.2d at 856-57; State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 271-72, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955).
156. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir.
1955); Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 NJ. 509, 513-14, 64
A.2d 347, 349-50 (1949).
157. C. Perin, supra note 69, at 181 (discussing the four New Jersey counties that
form the outer ring of the New York Metropolitan Area).
158. Id. at 61. The United States requirement was the standard for determining
the eligibility of single-family dwellings for federal mortgage insurance.
159. M. Danielson, supra note 68, at 53.
160. R. Babcock & F. Bosselman, supra note 74, at 10.
161. R. Babcock, Billboards, Glass Houses and the Law: And Other Land Use
Fables 106 (1977).
162. See, e.g., M. Danielson, supra note 68, at 60 (metropolitan St. Louis);
McDougal, supra note 74, at 319-23 (Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois).
163. See, e.g., M. Danielson, supra note 68, at 79-106.
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quired municipalities to take the regional implications of their actions
into account. 164 As zoning has been the major regulatory activity of
local governments these decisions have been the subjects of considerable scholarly attention.1 65 These cases have been seen as a part of the
"quiet revolution in land use control" 1 66 in which state-level institutions-legislatures and administrative agencies as well as courts-are
asserting greater oversight and operational responsibilities in an area
traditionally delegated to local governments.
This apparent state judicial activism with respect to zoning is cited
by Professor Clark as a prime example of the narrowing of "the class of
problems considered local."'16 7 Professor Frug also has treated state
court decisions curbing exclusionary zoning as another aspect of the
disempowerment of localities-as a denial to localities of "the ability to
decide their future by themselves."' 68 Professor Steinberger regards
zoning, "the last apparent vestige 'of local control," as "slowly but
surely being eroded under the weight ofjudicial opinion."' 69
A review of the leading state exclusionary zoning cases, however,
demonstrates that the extent of state judicial intrusion on local zoning
autonomy has been wildly exaggerated. The vast majority of state
courts have left local land use authority untouched. Only four state
supreme courts-California, NewJersey, New York and Pennsylvaniahave undertaken any significant review of local exclusionary practices.
Yet, with the exception of New Jersey, each court left the structure of
local control over land use largely intact and did not require effective
oversight by the states. Even in New Jersey, the state supreme court,
164. See, e.g., Pearson, State Court Reactions to Exclusionary Zoning, 1984 Ann.
Surv. of Am. L. 865. There have been some noteworthy decisions in other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 321,302 N.W.2d 146, 154 (1981)
(invalidating arbitrary exclusion of mobile homes; they may be excluded only for failure
to satisfy reasonable standards designed to assure favorable comparison of mobile and
site-built structures); Save a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862,
869, 576 P.2d 401,405 (1978) (requiring local government to take regional impacts into
account when considering approval of a major shopping center); Builders Serv. Corp. v.
Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 545 A.2d 530, 532, 550-51 (Conn. 1988) (invalidating
minimum floor area requirement of 1300 square feet). The significance of the Builders
Service decision is unclear since the court took pains to explain that the floor area of the
homes plaintiffs proposed to construct in East Hampton was 1026 square feet, or significantly greater than the minimum sustained in Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of
Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952); the homes were priced at or above prevailing
prices in the neighborhood; the East Hampton requirement was one of the highest in
the state; and the town had imposed varying minimum floor area requirements without
justifying the differences. 545 A.2d at 540-41, 543-44.
165. See, e.g., C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note 5, § 16.62; McQuillin, supra note
5, §§ 25.120a-25.120b; W. Valente, supra note 13, at 521-34.
166. F. Bosselman & D. Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control 3
(1971).
167. G. Clark, supra note 5, at 113-14.
168. Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 4, at 566.
169. P. Steinberger, Ideology and the Urban Crisis 148 (1985).

1990)

OUR LOCALISM -

after prodding its state legislature into action, ultimately acquiesced in
legislation that provided for the reduction, if not the rollback, of the
judiciary's antiexclusionary efforts. The discussion here will focus on
the state courts that have criticized the exclusionary consequences of
local power over land use and will show just how limited judicial activity
in those states has been. However, one should at all times remember
that more than forty other states have witnessed no judicial activism
with respect to local exclusionary zoning.
In Pennsylvania, California and New York, the courts acknowledged the regional consequences of local zoning actions, condemned
municipal parochialism and required local governments to take regional needs and requirements into account when they regulate land
use. 170 These courts ordered local governments to serve the general
welfare of the state or region when they zone, not just the interests of
the locality, 17 1 and directed the lower state courts to look to the extralocal effects of local actions when they review local land use decisions.1 7 2 In addition, these courts appealed to their states to take a
greater role in land use planning and in overseeing local zoning. 17 3 In
implementing these principles, these courts invalidated certain large lot
requirements and restrictions on multifamily housing. 174
170. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 607-09, 557 P.2d 473, 487-88, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 55-56
(1976); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110-11, 341 N.E.2d 236,
242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681-82 (1975); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182,
192, 382 A.2d 105, 110 (1977); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462
Pa. 445, 449, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
171. As the California Supreme Court noted in Livermore, the traditional standard
of state judicial review of local land use controls was whether the measure served the
"general welfare." Although previously the "general welfare" had been interpreted to
refer to only the zoning community, now a local land use measure with implications for
"the supply and distribution of housing for an entire metropolitan region" would be
judicially evaluated "by its impact not only upon the welfare of the enacting community,
but upon the welfare of the surrounding region." 18 Cal. 3d at 601-07, 557 P.2d at
483-87, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51-55.
172. See, e.g., Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681
(directing lower courts to "consider the effect of the ordinance on the neighboring communities" when they consider challenges to local zoning).
173. See, e.g., id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682; Golden v.
Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 374-75, 285 N.E.2d 291, 299-300, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Rockland County Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. McAlevey, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. (Concord Township Appeal), 439 Pa. 466,
474-76, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (1970); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 245 n.4, 263 A.2d
395, 399 n.4 (1970).
174. In Berenson, the New York Court of Appeals established standards for evaluating exclusionary zoning. 38 N.Y.2d at 106, 341 N.E.2d at 239, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
After affirming a denial of summary judgment, the court remanded for trial a challenge
to a local ordinance that excluded multifamily housing. The ordinance was subsequently invalidated. 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979). In Pennsylvania, the
supreme court has invalidated large lot requirements, Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. at 478,
268 A.2d at 770; National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 533, 215 A.2d 597, 613

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1

However, these assertions of a commitment to a regional perspective and of a concern for the parochial tendencies of local zoning were
accompanied by determinations that preserved local zoning autonomy.
The local desire to exclude new residents was not treated as illegitimate
per se, nor was the local power to regulate land use displaced. Rather,
these courts affirmed the legitimacy of the "local desire to maintain the
status quo within the community." 1 75 The residents' interest in maintaining the local status quo through restrictions against newcomers was
to be considered and balanced against the "countervailing interest" of
nonresidents that desired to come into the community and "share in
the perceived benefits of suburban life." 17 6 Primary responsibility for
reconciling competing local and regional interests would remain with
local zoning boards-the very bodies that had been found to be acting
from local self-interest and that were directly accountable only to local
electorates. In the absence of any state or regional legislative or administrative oversight the courts have continued to affirm local zoning au17 7
thority and to disclaim a judicial role in regional planning.
Similarly, although lower courts were directed to take regional
considerations into account in reviewing local zoning ordinances, they
were also required to continue to assess local zoning measures, in the
words of the California Supreme Court, "by the more liberal standards
that have traditionally tested the validity of land use restrictions enacted under the municipal zoning power."' 7 8 Judicial suspicion of local
parochialism was married to the traditional judicial deference to the
local government role in land use planning. As a result, when the zoning municipality has been able to demonstrate that it has given some
(1965), and restrictions on multifamily housing, Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 509 Pa.
413, 420, 502 A.2d 585, 588 (1985); Chesterdale Farms, 462 Pa. at 450, 341 A.2d at 468;
Girsh, 437 Pa. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398. Livermore, the leading California case, involved
not an exclusionary zoning measure but a local ordinance that imposed a complete moratorium on local growth through a ban on the issuance of new housing construction
permits. 18 Cal. 3d at 588, 557 P.2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43. Although the California Supreme Court used the case to announce the standard of "regional welfare" for
reviewing local land use restrictions, the court sustained the moratorium. 18 Cal. 3d at
610, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
175. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681. As the
California Supreme Court put it, "[s]uburban residents ... may assert a vital interest in
limiting immigration to their community." Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 557 P.2d at
488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
176. Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d at 609, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
177. See, e.g., Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 130,
511 N.E.2d 67, 70, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (1987) ("[lIt is ... anomalous that courts
should be required to perform the tasks of a regional planner.").
178. Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d at 603-04, 609, 557 P.2d at 485, 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 53, 56-57 (directing lower courts to defer to the municipality, but that "judicial deference is not judicial abdication"). For an instance ofjudicial deference to a local zoning
decision in a case with a clear spillover effect, see Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount
Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 186-89, 306 N.E.2d 155, 158-60, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 134-37
(1973).
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attention to external concerns, courts have assumed the municipality
balanced local and regional interests in good faith and have sustained
local exclusionary measures.' 7 9
The New York, California and Pennsylvania courts have been unwilling to consider local ordinances imposing large lot requirements or
excluding multifamily housing unlawful per se. 18 0 Instead, these courts
test the reasonableness of local land use measures only as they apply to
particular sites. As a result, the legal issue is often not the propriety of
a locality's general exclusion of multifamily housing, but whether a particular site ought to be rezoned.' 8 ' The commitment to case-by-case
review allows localities to initiate exclusionary zoning and puts the
onus on prospective developers to plead and prove their cases-a timeconsuming and costly process that few housing proposals survive.18 2
179. See, e.g., Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville,
51 N.Y.2d 338, 342, 347, 414 N.E.2d 680, 681, 685, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181, 184-85
(1980) (sustaining five acre minimum lot requirement), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042
(1981); Suffolk Hous. Servs., 70 N.Y.2d at 128, 130-32, 511 N.E.2d at 69-71, 517 N.Y.S.2d
at 925-27 (sustaining local zoning that made no provision for multifamily housing). In
New York, the lower courts have not been especially vigorous in challenging local exclusionary practices. See, e.g., Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 99-100, 463
N.Y.S.2d 832, 836-37 (1983); North Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc'y, Inc. v.
Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 110 A.D.2d 123, 124, 128-29, 493 N.Y.S.2d
564, 565, 567 (1985). It may be that the only effect the Berenson decision has had on
exclusionary practices in New York was in the Berenson case itself. See Rice, Exclusionary
Zoning: Mount Laurel in New York?, 6 Pace L. Rev. 135, 190 (1986); see also Appeal of
Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 350, 354,461 A.2d 771, 772, 774 (1983) (upholding exclusion
of town houses in a community 12% of whose housing units were multifamily dwellings); Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 203, 214-16, 460 A.2d 1075, 1077,
1082-83 (1983) (upholding exclusion of town houses by a town that is not a growth
area).
180. See, e.g., Suffolk Hous. Servs., 70 N.Y.2d at 131, 511 N.E.2d at 70, 517 N.Y.S.2d
at 927; Robert E. Kurzius, 51 N.Y.2d at 346, 414 N.E.2d at 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184;
Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 194, 382 A.2d 105, 111 (1977).
181. See, e.g., Suffolk Hous. Servs., 70 N.Y.2d at 131, 511 N.E.2d at 70, 517 N.Y.S.2d
at 927.
182. As one critic of New York's exclusionary zoning doctrine has noted, the "caseby-case approach.., places a heavy burden on plaintiff's experts to marshal evidence
regarding regional needs and local responsibilities. There has been no judicial guidance
as to how a region is to be defined, making it difficult to know where to collect data."
Nolon, 1987: Year for Decision in Exclusionary Zoning, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 22, 1986, at 1,
26. Two other land use experts have pointed out that" '[e]xclusionary zoning litigation
is expensive and complex and players who are not ready, willing and able to spend substantial sums of money and wait an indefinite length of time for a resolution of their
dispute should not play.'" R. Babcock & C. Siemon, The Zoning Game Revisited 221
(1985) (quoting Henry Hill, a Princeton, NJ. attorney who represents developers in zoning litigation).
The story of developer Joseph Girsh, the protagonist in one of the leading
Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning cases, is instructive. It took Girsh six years to obtain a
ruling from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the Township of Nether Providence
had to make some land in the community available for multifamily dwellings. Appeal of
Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244-46, 263 A.2d 395, 398-99 (1970). In response, the township
zoned land in a quarry for apartment development rather than rezone the property that
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This combination of deference to local zoning authority and protracted
case-by-case litigation has meant that, despite the antiexclusionary
tenor of the leading cases in these three states, there has been little
significant expansion in the range of suburban housing opportunities. l8 3 Localities retain substantial authority to regulate and control
84

growth. 1

Indeed, even as they condemned exclusionary zoning, the courts in
New York and California actually facilitated the local adoption of land
use regulatory measures with regional consequences. In Golden v.
PlanningBoard of Ramapo,18 5 the New York Court of Appeals sustained a
local growth control ordinance that curtailed the subdivision or development of land in the township for up to eighteen years, until the town
or developers made certain capital improvements, such as sewers, parks
and roads, necessitated by population growth. Timed growth controls
are not aimed directly at the would-be occupants of smaller homes or
apartments, and a growth control program can provide for a variety of
housing at different costs. Golden relied upon this distinction between
"assimilation" and exclusion in upholding the growth control measure.18 6 Yet growth controls, like exclusionary devices, may raise housing costs, reduce housing availability and ultimately exclude lower
income people.' 8 7 Moreover, local growth controls, like exclusionary
devices, can have a regional impact, either by displacing population
onto other communities or by inspiring other suburbs in the region to
emulate the growth control program, thereby reducing housing availa188
bility generally and displacing population still further.
The Golden court was aware of and concerned about the regional
implications of the Ramapo program 8 9 and it urged the state to conGirsh owned. Girsh returned to court and eventually obtained an order directing township officials to issue a building permit for a site suitable for his apartment project. By
that time, however, Girsh had died. See M. Danielson, supra note 68, at 165.
183. See, e.g., M. Danielson, supra note 68, at 190.
184. See, e.g., Robert E. Kurzius, 51 N.Y.2d at 344, 414 N.E.2d at 682-83, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 182 (1980); Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d
832, 835 (1983); Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 353, 461 A.2d 771, 773 (1983);
Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 211, 460 A.2d 1075, 1081 (1983).
185. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
186. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300-01, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
187. The principal goal of most supporters of growth controls is the exclusion of
apartment houses and high-rise housing. See M. Baldassare, Trouble in Paradise: The
Suburban Transformation in America 93-94 (1986).
188. See, e.g., Frieden, The Exclusionary Effects of Growth Controls, 465 Annals
123, 131-32 (1983); Zumbrun & Hookano, No-Growth and Related Land Use Legal
Problems: An Overview, in The Land Use Awakening: Zoning Law in the Seventies 161,
181-82 (R. Freilich & E. Stuhler eds. 1981).
Growth controls are an understandable response to the concern that population
growth burdens public facilities and ordinarily will require additional or expanded improvements; but underlying many large lot requirements were similar concerns about
the fiscal impact of population growth.
189. The court agonized at length about "communal and regional interdepen-
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sider state or regional planning.' 90 But in the absence of any state or
regional planning measures, the court's residual localism-its commitment to a broad reading of local control over land use and local power
to shape community development-prevailed over its doubts about the
ordinance's extralocal effects. Notwithstanding that the town was "not
in an absolute sense statutorily authorized to deny the right to subdivide," 1'9 the court determined that the cumulative effect of various
state laws delegating power over land use to localities was to place "the
primary responsibility for formulating and implementing zoning policy
*

.

.in the hands of local government."' 192 Planning was a "legislative

prerogative," and the court treated the Planning Board of Ramapo as a
full-fledged legislature, deserving "the usual presumption of validity attending the exercise of the police power." 9 3 Golden illustrates just how
much the Dillon's Rule mentality has faded, how easily the new regionalism and the old localism can coexist and a residual localism may prevail even with a court attentive to and troubled by the regional
implications of a local action.
In California, in the very case in which it first articulated a commitment to a regional perspective in the review of local zoning, the state
supreme court held that voter-initiated zoning ordinances need not
comply with state statutes imposing certain restrictive procedural requirements for local zoning. 194 Subsequently, the court held that the
voter initiative could be used for the spot rezoning of a specific parcel
of land to block its development' 9 5 and that state legislation requiring
municipalities to consider and balance the effect of local zoning on regional housing needs and to make findings justifying the resulting possible reduction in housing opportunities could not be applied to voterdence"; local "insularism and its correlative role in producing distortions in metropolitan growth patterns;" the tendency of growing localities "to try their hand at an array of

exclusionary devices" to avoid the burdens of growth; and the inability of "Ramapo or
any single municipality" to solve the problems of growth. 30 N.Y.2d at 374-76, 285
N.E.2d at 299-300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149-50.
190. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
191. Id. at 373, 285 N.E.2d at 298, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
192. Id. at 375 n.8, 285 N.E.2d at 300 n.8, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149 n.8. The growth

control program fell "well within the ambit of existing enabling legislation," id. at 376,
285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150, which, the court determined, gave the locality
broad power to shape community development.
193. Id. at 377, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151. As Professor Ellickson has

observed, judicial adherence to a Dillon's Rule approach to the scope of local lawmaking
would have doomed the Ramapo ordinance. Ellickson, supra note 74, at 473-74.
194. Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 589-96, 557
P.2d 473, 476-81, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44-49 (1976). California first upheld the constitu-

tionality of zoning by initiative in San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13
Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901

(1976).
195. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal.

Rptr. 904 (1980).
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initiated ordinances. 19 6 As the court noted, there would be no way of
the requisite
proving that the electorate-as-legislature had undertaken
19 7
analysis and come to the appropriate findings.
Local electorates appear to be even less likely than local legislatures to take a regional perspective on zoning restrictions. As a result,
the judicial validation of local initiative-zoning has facilitated the enactment of restrictive measures. 19 8 The California Supreme Court's affirmation of initiative zoning may have offset the antiexclusionary effect of
the court's commitment to a regional approach to local zoning.19 9
The most thoughtful and protracted judicial confrontation with local exclusionary ordinances has been in New Jersey. Unlike the more
modest efforts in New York, Pennsylvania 20 0 and California, the New
196. Building Indus. Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 718 P.2d 68, 226
Cal. Rptr. 81 (1986).
197. Id. at 823-24, 718 P.2d at 76, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 89. The court did, however,
uphold the applicability to voter-initiated land use controls of a provision of the
California Evidence Code which establishes the presumption that growth limitation ordinances adversely affect regional housing needs and places the burden of proof on the
locality to show that the ordinance is necessary to promote public health, safety and
welfare. Id. at 817-23, 718 P.2d at 72-75, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 84-88 (construing Cal.
Evid. Code § 669.5).
198. One study found that, during the 1970s and early 1980s, California communities considered 108 land use ballot propositions; 93 of those were antigrowth; and 58 of
those passed. By contrast, only four of the fifteen progrowth ballot propositions passed.
See Note, Instant Planning-Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California, 61 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 497, 514 &n.96 (1988). Zoning via initiative and referendum, and the propensity of California ballot proposition voters to take an antigrowth stance, has become
even more common in the 1980s. See, e.g., Goetz, Direct Democracy in Land Use Planning: The State Response to Eastlake, 19 Pac. LJ. 793, 795 (1987); Peterson, Land Use
Decisions Via the Ballot Box, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1988, § 10, at 1, col. 2.
199. California decisions upholding the local imposition of large subdivision and
development fees and local requirements that developers pay for community capital improvements also reflect a broad deference to local autonomy. See, e.g., Associated
Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 643, 484 P.2d 606, 614, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 638, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); J.W. Jones Cos. v. City of San
Diego, 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 756, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580, 588 (1984). Although these
measures were often based on state enabling legislation-itself an interesting commentary on the state's commitment to local autonomy in land use and community development-many exactions go far beyond the traditional power of local governments to
assess the costs of government services against beneficiaries. The California courts have
indulged their communities by taking a broad interpretation of local authority to impose
charges on developers. See Ellickson, supra note 74, at 477-89, 511 & n.421.
These fees and exactions contribute to the costs of housing and to the exclusion of
lower income residents from growing suburbs, Frieden, supra note 188, at 126-35, but
the courts have not invoked the regional perspective or any of the conventional notions
about the limited regulatory powers of local governments, in passing on their validity.
200. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was a pioneer in thejudicial attack on exclusionary zoning, and the first court to look beyond the zoning town and the affected
developer to the interests of other communities and of persons seeking housing in the
region in evaluating local zoning measures. See Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439
Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). In implementing
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Jersey Supreme Court attempted to change both the basic legal struc-

ture of state-local relations in zoning and the demographics of the
state's developing communities. The resulting litigation and legislative

and administrative activity over a period of fifteen years demonstrate
with particular clarity the intensity of local exclusionary desires, the

tension between local zoning autonomy and the state-wide perspective,
and the stubborn strength of localism in state law.
In the celebrated Mount Laurel 20 1 case ("Mount Laurel I"), the New

Jersey Supreme Court recanted its prior approval of suburban exclusionary zoning and instead sought to undo local exclusionary practices.
Mount Laurel I is an unusual combination of contemporary political
economy concerns and the shade of Dillon's Rule. The court situated

local exclusionary practices in the fiscal structure of the local government system. In the court's view, local responsibility for the funding of

basic services led to the practice of fiscal zoning: localities using their
zoning ordinances to restrict local land to users that would enhance the
2 02
local tax base.

The zoning policy employed by the town of Mount Laurel was a

textbook case of exclusionary devices: large lot zoning; high minimum
floor space requirements for homes; the reservation of most residential

sites for single-family detached houses; and requirements of costly
amenities in the handful of multifamily units. 20 3 To reduce the strain
of growth on the local tax base, the few multifamily housing units were
subject to tight limits on the number of bedrooms and school-age chilthese principles, the court has on several occasions invalidated large lot requirements,
Kit-Mar, 437 Pa. at 237, 268 A.2d at 765; NationalLand, 437 Pa. at 237, 215 A.2d 597,
and restrictions of multifamily housing, see, e.g., Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 509
Pa. 413, 502 A.2d 585 (1985); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462
Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
The Pennsylvania court, however, has declined to find large lot requirements or the
exclusion of multifamily housing unlawful per se. See, e.g., Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501
Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983); Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075
(1983). Like the New York court, it has urged the state to adopt state-wide or regional
planning, while simultaneously sustaining local measures in the absence of any new state
or regional legislative or administrative oversight. Id. In suburbs which have made token allowances for some multifamily residences, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the locality is "in the path of growth"-neither fully developed nor outside
the area of imminent metropolitan population expansion-and that the locality has not
accepted its fair share of regional housing development. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105, 108, 110 (1977). The court has proceeded on a case by case
basis, assessing the quality of local consideration of regional needs rather than developing judicial measures of region, need or fair share. See Note, The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and the Exclusionary Zoning Dilemma, 29 Vill. L. Rev. 477 (1984).
201. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 170-71, 185, 336 A.2d 713, 723, 730-31, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). The
court's fiscal perspective may not be surprising considering the contemporaneous
Robinson school finance litigation.
202. See id. at 162-69, 336 A.2d at 718-22.
203. Id. at 163-64, 168, 336 A.2d at 719, 722.
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dren. Moreover, most of the vacant land had been zoned for light industry so that the community of 11,000 residents was planning for
industries providing 43,000 jobs. 20 4 There would be substantial tax
base growth but no place to house the workers of the new industries.
Mount Laurel was not so much antigrowth as concerned about the
type of growth that occurred. The town was open to development and
new residents provided they did not detract from the average wealth of
the community. Nor was Mount Laurel unusual. The court found that
zoning had become a primary weapon in the interlocal struggle for
"good ratables" and against the immigration of residents who could
increase local public service costs. 2 0 5 Lower-income residents, denied
access to suburban homes, jobs and public services, were the casualties
20 6
of these restrictive local land use practices.
Remedying the state's emergent economic segregation required
curtailing local zoning autonomy. To accomplish this, the court summoned up the traditional notions of local government as agent and
delegate of the state: "[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that
the zoning power is a police power of the state and the local authority is
acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted in the same
manner as is the state." 2 07 The court determined to take a "non-local
approach to the meaning of 'general welfare'" in zoning cases, so that
when a local ordinance has "a substantial external impact, the welfare
of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality
cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served." 208 As the
state could have no interest in an individual locality either preserving
its own special character or keeping up its tax base at the price of limiting housing and public service opportunities for other citizens of the
state, the Mount Laurel I court ruled that localities could not zone for
2
such purposes. 09
The court's underlying concern with the state's growing interlocal
economic segmentation and the implications for the separation of rich
and poor in terms of both the quality of local public services and access
to housing and employment opportunities led it beyond the other active state courts in defining the zoning community's obligation to the
rest of the state. The mere elimination of exclusionary devices would
not suffice. Instead, the court articulated its vision of a state composed
of integrated, mixed-income communities and held that local zoning
204. Id. at 161, 163, 336 A.2d at 718-19.
205. Id. at 170-71, 336 A.2d at 723.
206. Id. at 172-73, 336 A.2d at 724.
207. Id. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
208. Id. at 177-78, 336 A.2d at 726-27.
209. Id. at 186, 336 A.2d at 731. The court did indicate that local zoning ordinances could restrict housing for ecological or environmental reasons, but warned that it
would not accept an environmental defense of a restrictive local ordinance which is
"simply a makeweight to support exclusionary housing measures or preclude growth."
Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731.
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ordinances must further that goal. Thus, Mount Laurel I obliges a locality "affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the
reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the
needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire
to live within its boundaries.

''2 10

The court acknowledged that, due to differences in the availability
of vacant land, employment opportunities and access to transportation,
new housing might be more appropriate in one community than another. 2 11 Regional planning, rather than judicial intervention in local
zoning, might be a better way to accomplish its affirmative goals. But
rather than join the other state courts in bemoaning the lack of state
planning while accepting continued local autonomy, the New Jersey
court held that until the state acted to provide some form of regional
planning, every developing community "must bear its fair share of the
'2 12
regional [housing] burden.
Despite Mount Laurel I's bold doctrine, the court was initially cautious and preserved a substantial measure of local autonomy over zoning. The basic elements of the Mount Laurel I doctrine-"region," "fair
share,". "present and prospective low and moderate income housing
needs" 2 1 3-were left undefined. In the absence of state-wide or regional planning, the court indicated that local governments-not the
courts-were to be accorded the first opportunity to give meaning to
these open concepts. Notwithstanding the historical record of, and
structural incentives for, local avoidance of sharing regional housing
'21 4
needs, zoning remained a "local function and responsibility.
In subsequent cases, the court exempted certain municipalities
from the "Mount Laurel obligation" 2 15 and held that those localities
subject to Mount Laurel I need not come up with a precise formula to
210. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728.
211. Id. at 189, 336 A.2d at 732.

212. Id. at 189, 336 A.2d at 733. The court did urge the legislature to consider
regional zoning "or at least regulation of land uses having a substantial external impact
by some agency beyond the local municipality." Id. at 189 n.22, 336 A.2d at 732-33

n.22.
213. Id. at 189, 336 A.2d at 733.
214. Id. at 191-92, 336 A.2d at 734 (vacating portion of the lower court order nullifying local zoning ordinance in toto and ordering township to present plan of affirmative
public action designed to satisfy need for low and moderate income housing).
215. In Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 74 NJ. 470,483-84, 379 A.2d 6, 13

(1977), the NewJersey Supreme Court held that fully developed, single-family residential communities did not have any Mount Laurel obligation. This holding was reaffirmed
in Fobe Assocs. v. Mayor of Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 524-27, 379 A.2d 31, 34-35 (1977),

in which the court upheld the decision of the Demarest Board of Adjustment denying a
variance for multifamily housing since a "developed" municipality like Demarest did not
have a Mount Laurel obligation.
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determine their "fair share" of regional housing needs. 2 16 Reviewing
courts were to look simply to the "substance" of a challenged zoning
ordinance and the "bona fide efforts" of a municipality to remove exclusionary barriers in order to determine whether the municipality had
met its Mount Laurel obligation. 217 Most importantly, lower courts were
cautioned against issuing remedial orders that would permit developers
to build new housing. 21 8 The court eschewed direct affirmative judicial
intervention in local zoning. As a result, in the first eight years after
Mount Laurel I little new low- or moderate-income housing was built in
New Jersey's suburbs. Local governments dug in their heels, 219 the
22 1
courts temporized 2 20 and the state government remained inactive.
Only in 1983 did the court conclude that it would no longer defer
to local decision making or wait for the state to come up with comprehensive regional plans. In Mount Laurel 11,222 the New Jersey Supreme
Court moved decisively beyond both the other state courts and the New
Jersey legislature to effectuate its vision of economically integrated
communities. The court put the burden on New Jersey's suburbs to
demonstrate that they were providing for their fair share of regional
present and prospective housing needs. Localities would be required
216. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 498-99, 371
A.2d 1192, 1200 (1977).
217. Id. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200.
218. Although a builder's remedy was granted in Oakwood at Madison, the court emphasized that the plaintiff, after six years and through two trials and an extended appeal,
had "borne the stress and expense of this public-interest litigation, albeit for private
purposes." Id. at 550, 371 A.2d at 1226. The court warned that its "determination is
not to be taken as a precedent for an automatic right to a permit on the part of any
builder-plaintiff who is successful in having a zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional. Such relief will ordinarily be rare .... " Id. at 551-52 n.50, 371 A.2d at 1227
n.50.
219. The Township of Mount Laurel, for example, responded to the New Jersey
Supreme Court's requirement that it make a place for its fair share of the regional low
and moderate income housing needs by rezoning for new housing a swamp, a flood
plain and land in the path of a high-speed commuter rail line. The town understated its
fair share; provided for costly planned unit development housing; and required developers to undertake expensive studies of the transit impact, the environmental impact, the
municipal services cost and the economic costs and benefits of new housing. See
McDougal, supra note 74, at 337.
220. See Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 483-84, 379 A.2d 6,
13 (1977); Fobe Assocs. v. Mayor of Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 524-27, 379 A.2d 31, 34-35
(1977); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 498-99, 371
A.2d 1192, 1200 (1977); Castroll v. Township of Franklin, 161 NJ. Super. 190, 391 A.2d
544 (App. Div. 1978) (sustaining denial of a variance for multifamily dwelling); Nigito v.
Borough of Closter, 142 NJ. Super. 1, 359 A.2d 521 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 74
NJ. 265, 377 A.2d 670 (1977) (upholding municipality's denial of use variance for garden apartment complex).
221. For a discussion of the inactivity of the state legislature between Mount Laurel I
and Mount Laurel II, see R. Babcock & C. Siemon, supra note 182, at 218-19.
222. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
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to make determinate calculations; the courts would no longer rely on
local good faith. 2 23 Localities would be required to remove all excessive restrictions and exactions and to provide appropriate incentives for
the construction of low and moderate cost housing. 224 Further,
although it acknowledged a lack of professional expertise, the court resolved to render amenable to judicial resolution the issues of determining the proper areas for future housing growth, defining "region,"
predicting future needs and making interlocal allocations. To accomplish this it borrowed from the planning studies of state administrative
agencies and improved the capacity of the lower courts to deal with
2 25
technical planning matters.
Most importantly, trial courts were authorized to enter remedial
orders permitting successful developer-plaintiffs to build. 2 26

The

builder's remedy proved crucial to subsequent developments in the
Mount Laurel litigation. Challenges to local exclusionary zoning were
slow, costly and complex. Few public interest organizations had the
resources for a sustained assault on local exclusionary practices, but
developers did. Mount Laurel 11 was followed by a dramatic increase in
Mount Laurel litigation, and all of the new cases were brought by developers. 22 7 Even though the remedy was conditioned on the developer's
setting aside a portion of the new housing for low- or moderate-income
inhabitants, developers still were willing to litigate. The developer became a kind of private attorney general for the economic and social
integration of New Jersey's suburbs; in the three years following Mount
Laurel II, a considerable amount of new housing was built as a result of
228
the builder's remedy.
The threat to local zoning autonomy engendered by Mount Laurel
II, and the builder's remedy in particular, aroused a storm of controversy. Governor Kean denounced "the wholesale revision of local zoning ordinances by the judiciary [as] an undesirable intrusion on the
home rule principal [sic]" and rescinded the state planning documents
upon which the court had relied in determining the communities subject to the Mount Laurel obligation. 22 9 Mount Laurel became a focal
223. Id. at 215-16, 220-23, 456 A.2d at 418-19, 421-22.
224. Id. at 258-74, 456 A.2d at 441-50. In addition, the court overruled its prior
decision in Vickers v. Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), which had permitted townships to ban mobile homes. 92 N.J. at 275, 456 A.2d at 450.
225. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 223-58, 456 A.2d at 422-41.
226. Id. at 278-81, 456 A.2d at 452-53.
227. See J.W. Field Co. v. Township of Franklin, 204 N.J. Super. 445, 452, 499
A.2d 251, 255 (1985) ("Mount Laurel litigation has increased dramatically since Mount
Laurel 11 and every suit has been brought by a builder rather than a nonprofit or public
agency."); Rice, supra note 179, at 167 (1986).
228. ByJanuary 1986, twenty-two Mount Laurel lawsuits had been settled, and the
affected communities had agreed to the construction of 14,000 low and moderate income units. See McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning Law,
22 Harv. G.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 623, 623 n.4 (1987).
229. See R. Babcock & C. Siemon, supra note 182.
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point in many local elections, and in a nonbinding referendum the state
electorate voted to abolish the decision. 23 0 The legislature was finally
galvanized into action.
In the Fair Housing Act of 1985 (the "Act"), 2 3 1 the legislature accepted Mount Laurel in principle but moderated it in effect. The Act
codified Mount Laurel's determination that developing communities
have a "constitutional obligation" to use their land use regulations to
provide "a realistic opportunity" for a fair share of regional present
and prospective need for housing for low and moderate income families. 23 2 It also provided for greater state administrative oversight of

local zoning than ever before.
However, the legislature preserved a substantial measure of local
autonomy in zoning and rejected Mount Laurel's goal of promoting
mixed income communities through affirmative state action. Formally,
the Act provided for a state-local sharing of power with respect to local
compliance with the Mount Laurel obligation. The initial determination
of a municipality's "fair share" and the preparation of implementation
plans would remain at the local level, but a new state Council on Affordable Housing would set criteria and guidelines, monitor municipal
actions and, through its power to immunize municipalities that had submitted acceptable plans from Mount Laurel-style lawsuits, affect the content of municipal zoning and housing programs. 23 3 The Act's
standards for municipal zoning were more protective of the local interest in controlling growth and maintaining community character than
the court's had been. The Act acknowledged the need for more low
and moderate income housing, but directed the new council in developing local housing plans to respect "the established pattern of development in the community" and to consider the costs of improving
public facilities and adding new infrastructure capacity.2 3 4 In addition,

the legislature firmly disclaimed any intention to "require a municipalrevenues in order to provide low and
ity to raise and expend municipal
'2 35
moderate income housing.
The Act signalled a shift away from the goal of integrated communities that had animated Mount Laurel. The state agreed to fund low
and moderate income housing, but only in low and moderate income
areas, not in more affluent suburbs. Localities subject to the Mount
Laurel obligation were permitted to transfer half their "fair share" hous230. See Hanley, Housing the Poor in Suburbia: A Vision Lags inJersey, N.Y.
Times, June 1, 1987, at B1, col. 2. According to one observer, "There is not an election
in New Jersey nowadays in which Mount Laurel does not play a part .... DePalma,
Mount Laurel: Slow, Painful Progress, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1988, § 10, at 1, col. 2.
231. 1985 N.J. Laws 222 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (West
1986)).
232. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-302(a) (West 1986).
233. Id. § 52:27D-303 to -319.
234. Id. § 52:27D-307(c)(2)(b), (g).
235. Id. § 52:27D-311(d).
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ing duty through payments to other, presumably less exclusive, localities to fund the construction or rehabilitation of low and moderate
income housing in the latter.23 6 Like the additional state housing moneys, these regional contribution agreements would tap into the resources of wealthier localities for transfer payments to poorer localities,
but they would preserve the existing spatial and political separation of
social and economic groups. Finally, the Act imposed a moratorium on
builders' remedies and provided for the transfer of all Mount Laurel litigation from the courts to a new administrative process. 23 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the Act. 238 As with
Robinson V and the Public School Education Act, 23 9 the court's figura-

tive sigh of relief that the state was finally willing to accept some responsibility for local practices was almost audible.2 40 The court
interpreted the Act as a ratification of Mount Laurel and of the state's
obligation to oversee local zoning and held that the governor and the
legislature could dispense with the judicial standards and enforcement
mechanisms developed during the course of the Mount Laurel litigation.
Thus, the court acquiesced in the transfer of pending Mount Laurel
cases from the lower courts to the new Council on Affordable Housing,24 1 the elimination of the builder's remedy 24 2 and the provision al-

lowing communities to buy their way out of part of their Mount Laurel
obligation. 243 As in school finance, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
under enormous political pressure, found that it had achieved success
in principle, declared victory and readily decamped from the field of
battle.
Since the court sustained the Act, the effects of Mount Laurel on
exclusionary practices by New Jersey's suburbs have been attenuated,
although the doctrine remains a flashpoint of controversy. The Council
on Affordable Housing halved the judicial projections of low and moderate income housing needs and reduced even more drastically the
share to be allotted to the state's developing suburbs. Now, more than
half of the housing is to be satisfied by units in central city areas, including rehabilitated older units, and not by the construction of new subur236. Id. § 52:27D-312(a).
237. Id. § 52:27D-315, -316, -328.
238. Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 40-47, 510 A.2d 621,
642-46 (1986).

239. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
240. See Hills Dev. Co., 103 NJ. at 21-26, 510 A.2d at 632-34.
241. Id. at 47-56, 510 A.2d at 646-50. One provision of the Act authorized parties
in pending cases to move for transfer to the Council and directed the trial court in reviewing such a motion to "consider whether or not the transfer would result in a manifest injustice." NJ. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-316 (West 1986). Although the trial judges
read the "manifest injustice" standard to require "a balancing of all relevant factors,"
the supreme court read the Act as mandating the transfer of "every pending Mount Laurel
action to the Council." Id. at 47-53, 510 A.2d at 646-49.
242. 103 NJ. at 42-46, 60, 510 A.2d at 643-45, 652.
243. Id. at 37-38, 510 A.2d at 640-41.
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ban homes. 24 4
The legislative repudiation of the builder's remedy also eliminated
the principal incentive to local cooperation. As of August 1989, only
one-third of New Jersey's municipalities had submitted housing plans
to the Council, and only one-eighth of the state's municipalities have
been certified as having completed plans that comply with Mount Laurel.245 About 2,000 low and moderate income units have been built,
compared with 14,000 during the three years between Mount Laurel 11
24 6
and the court's validation of the Fair Housing Act.

24 7
In Mount Laurel Township itself, "little has changed."
Although it has nearly tripled in population since the original New
Jersey Supreme Court decision, the only openings to low and moderate
income families are a dozen mobile homes in a marginal area of town
2 48
and plans for twenty subsidized units to be limited to older adults.
The town's mayor was quoted as saying, "We'd just like to see our town
2 49
develop in a nice way. We should have the right to run our town."
After more than a dozen years of litigation and political ferment, it does
that the state is seriously interested in challenging that
not appear
"right." 2 50

244. See, e.g., Hanley, supra note 230; DePalma, supra note 230; Mondics, N.J.
Easing Mt. Laurel Obligations, The Bergen Record, May 6, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
245. Of NewJersey's 567 municipalities, just 187 had submitted plans as of August
7, 1989, and only 71 of the municipal plans had been substantively certified by the
Council on Affordable Housing as in compliance with the Mount Laurel requirement.
N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., Press Release (Aug. 7, 1989). These plans provided
for the construction or rehabilitation of 13,504 low and moderate income housing units
out of a total of 145,000 units which the Council has estimated as the statewide need.
Id. In addition, as ofJanuary 9, 1989, the Council on Affordable Housing had approved
19 regional cooperation agreements pursuant to which affluent communities agreed to
pay $37 million to poorer localities for the rehabilitation of 1,579 old units and the
construction of 341 new affordable units. 3 Council on Affordable Housing Newsletter,
no. 4 (Winter 1989).
246. See DePalma, supra note 230 (although state supreme court had estimated
that New Jersey needed 277,000 moderately priced houses and apartments, fewer than
2,000 had been built, and those were located in just 14 of the state's 567 municipalities);
McDougall, supra note 228.
247. DePalma, supra note 230.
248. Id.
249. Hanley, After Seven Years, Town Remains Under Fire for Its Zoning Code,
N.Y. Times,Jan. 22, 1983, at 31, col. 1. The residents of other NewJersey communities
are equally emphatic in their opposition to Mount Laurel. Morris Township, a town of
18,000 people, settled its Mount Laurel suit prior to the passage of the Fair Housing Act,
and agreed to accept 300 low-income units and 1,200 market-priced units-which subsidized the low-income units-to be built on ten sites dispersed throughout the community. See Winerip, Taking Control In the Wake of Mount Laurel, N.Y. Times, March 31,
1989, at B1, col. 1. Thereafter, the local voters ousted the mayor and all the incumbents
on the town's governing bodies. The new mayor promptly fired the town planning consultant, the town engineer and the town's law firm and is leading efforts to resist implementation of the settlement.
250. Currently, the focus of Mount Laurel litigation in New Jersey has been the re-
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As with school finance, the handful of exclusionary zoning cases
and the lack of comparable litigation in most states underscore the fundamental misconception of the idea of local legal powerlessness and
illustrate the problematic nature of our localism. Whatever the formal
legal superiority of the state, power over land use has been delegated to
localities with minimal constraints on its use. Exclusionary zoning, intended to protect the local fisc and preserve the class and social homogeneity of local communities regardless of the harm to other state
residents, frequently has been the result. Courts have been ready to
extend the idea of local self-determination to include exclusionary zoning and slow to realize that such local actions impose burdens on other
localities. Even the New Jersey Supreme Court, with its rigorous postMount Laurel hostility to exclusionary zoning ran into difficulty when it
sought to graft its anti-exclusionary principle onto a politico-legal system that continues to assure substantial local power over land use.
Local exclusionary zoning is both a consequence and a cause of
interlocal fiscal inequality. Local responsibility for funding local services provides a structural incentive to exclude the poor and compete for
the affluent; the local zoning response furthers the disparities in taxable
wealth among localities. But the impetus for exclusionary zoning is
more than fiscal. Some land uses are discouraged even though they
may contribute to the local tax base or impose little fiscal burden.2 5 1
Like school finance, local land use regulation illustrates a basic ambiguity in the concept of local power. Local autonomy is intended to
give people an important degree of participation in, and control over,
decisions affecting their lives. Few actions affect local life more than
changes in land use. Local zoning enables local residents to affect the
character of the local community-to determine "the look of the
2 -and to decide
place" 2 5R
who their neighbors will be. It gives residents
political control over the physical environment surrounding their
homes, and thereby allows them to protect their investment in their
houses and their neighborhoods. 25 3 Local zoning authority is a critical
element of community self-determination that allows local people to
mediate the pace and pattern of residential change and manage the
economic and social dislocations attendant on local development. The
state judicial and legislative affirmation of broad local zoning autonomy
gional contribution agreement provision of the Fair Housing Act. The State Department of Public Advocacy has challenged the Council on Affordable Housing's review of

regional contribution agreements, contending that the Council's regulations do not allow analysis of the exclusionary zoning implications and in some instances "have the

effect of reinforcing racial stratification." Hanley, Open Housing Is Mired in Lawsuits
Again, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at B1, Col. 2.

251. See, e.g., Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 Duke L.J. 761,
762-67 (controlling land use as means of excluding certain classes of land users).
252. Rose, supra note 4, at 911 (noting that strong preference for localized land

use decision making cannot be wholly explained by economic arguments).
253. See generally C. Perin, supra note 69, at 129-209.
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is a core component of contemporary legal localism. Even courts troubled by exclusionary zoning have affirmed the right of localities to
shape the local physical and social landscape and have sought only to
infuse local zoning autonomy with a greater attention to regional
needs.
But, as with local control of public schools, not all localities benefit
from zoning autonomy equally. Only communities with resources sufficient to meet their needs and content with the character of local development can use local zoning to greatest effect. The power to exclude,
like the right to spend on public schools, is no boon to communities
short on local resources. To build their tax bases, these localities may
feel compelled to seek development, even at the cost of upsetting traditional neighborhoods and introducing unsettling changes. Moreover,
local zoning power is far less effective in enabling poorer communities
to capture new investment than it is in enabling affluent communities to
protect local social values and community character.
More generally, local zoning autonomy often results in the promotion of local parochialism and a commitment to the preservation of
community status regardless of the cost to other localities and to the
balanced development of a region. "Community character" is often a
code phrase for the local preference for expensive homes and the affluent people who can afford to own them. Inexpensive houses, apartments, rentals, public or publicly subsidized housing and mobile
homes, and the people who would reside in these sorts of dwellings, are
often considered inconsistent with the character of the community or
the character to which the community aspires.2 54 Local zoning will
have external effects as these unwanted residents, and many industrial
and commercial uses as well, are displaced onto neighboring communities, or, in areas where exclusionary zoning is the norm, driven from
the region.
By enabling some localities to insulate themselves from the economic and social costs of growth and from poorer people and their
problems, local land use authority may reinforce the class and cultural
differences that drive communities apart and breed interlocal suspicion,
tension and conflict. Local zoning authority may encourage the localities that benefit from it to believe in the legitimacy of local autonomy
and to resist state intervention, on behalf of poorer communities or
poorer people, in land use and other matters that are assumed to be
"local." The danger that local autonomy will degenerate into local parochialism and lead to an ideological predisposition to local solutions
for problems that only some localities have the resources to solve is a
dilemma of our localism.
4. The Patterns of State Legislative Change: New State Activity and Continued Local Autonomy. - Litigation is not the only avenue of legal
254. Id. at 32-80.
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change, and the courtroom is not the only forum for addressing issues
of state-local relations. State legislatures are the primary state institutions concerned with financing public services and regulating land use,
and they have been increasingly active in recent decades. The conventional stress on local legal helplessness and plenary state power, the
alleged centralizing tendencies of the states and the lack of protection
for local authority would suggest that state legislatures are likely to shift
the balance of power in these areas toward the states at the expense of
local autonomy. That, however, has not been the case. Although the
state role in both school finances and land use has grown, recent state
legislative activity continues to assume substantial local responsibility
in both areas. Indeed, the patterns of state legislative change reveal a
deep commitment to strong decision-making roles for local governments, protection of local communities from outside interference, reluctance to displace local choices and unwillingness to address the
social and economic differences among localities. Localism remains an
important factor in state legislative decisions.
a. School Finance. - State legislatures have been busy in the area of
education. Many states have revised their school finance laws and have
given new attention to the content and quality of the education provided by local districts. 25 5 Overall, the states have expanded their financial and administrative roles, but significant interlocal spending and
program differences tied to local wealth differences remain.
The states have greatly increased their spending on local public
education. The states are now the source of the largest share of school
revenues-50%, compared to the 44% provided by local governments. 25 6 Twenty years ago the state portion was 41% and the local
share 52%.257 Since state revenues are collected on a state-wide basis
255. See Education Comm'n of the States, Education Finance in the States: 1984;
Augenblick, The Current Status of School Financing Reform in the States, in The Fiscal,
Legal and Political Aspects of State Reform of Elementary and Secondary Education
3-20 (V. Mueller & M. McKeown eds. 1986) [hereinafter Fiscal, Legal and Political
Aspects].
256. Fiscal Federalism, supra note 61, at 37, table 28.
257. Id. The remainder of local education expenditures is funded by federal aid.
The figures in this report conceal significant interstate and interregional variation. In
some states, the state provides nearly all of the funds for public education, and in others
the state provides very little. The overall pattern has been a shift towards state financial
responsibility, with the state government being the predominant revenue source in most
states, although in most states a substantial portion of school funds continues to originate locally. In the Northeast, the Midwest and the Rocky Mountain states, local governments still provide more than 50% of the expenditures for public schools. Only in the
South and the Far West does a majority of school funds come from the state.
Interestingly, in three of the seven states in which the state supreme courts held in
the 1970s or early 1980s that the traditional school finance systems were unconstitutional, more than half of school revenues in 1984-85 still came from local sources. In
Connecticut, local governments were the source of 55.5% of school expenditures, in
New Jersey, 52.7%, and in Wyoming 60.3%. The most "reformed" states were
Arkansas, where the state provided 60.8% of school revenues; West Virginia, where the
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and state aid is ordinarily paid out according to criteria other than the
source of the tax receipts, wealthier districts cannot restrict their resources for the exclusive use of their own schools, while poorer districts
are not entirely dependent on local resources. Thus, the shift in the
balance of funding responsibility has the potential for promoting
interlocal equality by reducing the significance of local wealth in determining local spending.
But there has been much less equalization than the numerous state
school finance legislative reforms and the shift in financial responsibility might suggest. The limited equalization effect of the enhanced state
financial role is attributable to two factors: a significant portion of state
school aid is not designed to equalize, and state equalization programs
are not intended to be fully equalizing.
Most state school aid programs include components based on
neither poverty nor educational needs nor local tax effort. Most states
have some form of flat grant, which provides a set amount per child to
every district, and some form of "save harmless" program, which prevents reductions in aid from the previous year. 2 58 Flat grant and save
harmless moneys are provided to affluent districts as well as to poor
ones. 2 59 In addition, many state educational assistance programs contain "categorical" elements, which defray specific types of expenses:
2 60
transportation, construction, special education or teacher pensions.
This aid may be based not on local poverty but on the level of local
spending on the categorical programs. Therefore, high wealth, high
expenditure districts may receive more categorical aid than poorer
26 1
districts.
state share was 64.9%; California, where the state share was 68.3%; and Washington,
where the state share was 74.5%. These figures may overstate the significance of courtordered reforms since in Arkansas, Washington and West Virginia the states were providing a significant proportion of school funds as early as 1959-60. The only really
dramatic shift was in California, and there Proposition 13 has been a major factor in
holding down local spending. See infra note 265.
258. M. Yudof, D. Kirp, T. van Geel & B. Levin, Educational Policy and the Law
568-69 (2d ed. 1982).
259. See, e.g.,Johnson, supra note 62, at 325, 365 (in Ohio, 15 of the 20 wealthiest
districts received save harmless aid); Robinson V",69 N.J. 449, 472, 355 A.2d 129, 141
(1976) (Hughes, CJ., concurring) (minimum aid compensating "rich" districts at expense of "poor" districts is "clearly regressive and antithetical to the constitutional
goal"); id. at 477-78, 493-94, 355 A.2d at 144, 152-53 (Cornford, J., concurring and
dissenting) (minimum aid unconstitutional as long as equalization aid is inadequately
funded).
260. D. Mandelker, D. Netsch & P. Salsich, supra note 10, at 676; see, e.g., Board of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 485, 608 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (summarizing New York's categorical grant programs); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of
Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 763 (Md. 1983) (summarizing Maryland's categorical aid programs); Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1140
(Okla. 1987) (summarizing Oklahoma's categorical aid program).
261. See, e.g., Robinson V, 69 NJ. at 473, 355 A.2d at 141 (Hughes, C.J., concurring) (categorical aids "regressive in the constitutional sense"); id. at 547-49, 355 A.2d
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Flat grants, save harmless and categorical aid programs are tributes to legislative localism. Localism entails concern for the fiscal stability of every locality, regardless of local wealth. In order for a needy
locality to obtain state aid, every locality, regardless of need, must also
receive a state grant. Legislative localism means that state aid will be a
general support for all school districts rather than a purely redistribu26 2
tive measure.
Equalization programs are also limited by localism. With the exception of Hawaii, no state provides full state funding of local schools, a
central determination of local spending needs or a central allocation of
education resources.2 63 Even with equalization aid, local wealth continues to play a major role in school spending. 264 Limited state fiscal capacities and resistance to increased state taxes constrain the scope of
equalization programs, so that most equalization assistance serves not
to equalize but to raise the level of spending in poorer districts to some
target amount-usually at or below the median spending level in the
state, and certainly not up to the spending of the more affluent districts.
The "levelling up" component of state school aid thus tends to level to
the middle. At the same time, judicial and legislative localism precludes limits on the spending autonomy of more affluent districts. Efforts to "level down" the spending of affluent districts to the level of
at 181-82 (Pashman,J., dissenting) (categorical aids for transportation and special education disbursed without regard to need); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School
Dist. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d 217, 226, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 849 (1981) ("[Ihe formulas
employed in computing transportation and [Boards of Cooperative Educational Services] aid are more beneficial to property rich districts than to those of low wealth.").
262. In New York, state aid to local school districts rose by more than one billion
dollars between 1983-84 and 1986-87, and the state share of school funding rose from
42% to 44%, but in the process every district in the state received an increase in unrestricted aid. Of the state's more than 700 school districts, 239 received save harmless
aid and all districts received a $360 per pupil flat grant. N.Y. State School Bds. Ass'n,
supra note 62, at i, 6. Pocantico Hills, a wealthy district with assessed valuation per
pupil of $979,000, received a half million dollars from the state. The Fisher's Island
school district, with $1,567,000 assessed valuation per pupil, received a 2% state aid
increase, and the Quogue district, with assessed valuation per pupil of $1,798,000, received a 7.5% aid increase. Overview of N.Y. State Aid, supra note 62, app. II, at 14-16;
see alsoJ. Berke, M. Goertz &J. Coley, Politicians, Judges and City Schools: Reforming
School Finance in New York 74 (1984) ("[Ihe legislative design for the distribution of
state aid to education continues to mirror the distribution of power in the legislature
rather than the education needs of the state or the implications of equity in the raising
and distribution of revenues for education.").
263. 2 W. Valente, Education Law: Public and Private 283 (1985).
264. The most radical approach to school aid considered by the states has been the
district power equalization concept, see supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text. Yet
even district power equalization assumes local authority to determine the level of local
support for education and to set priorities among education and other local spending
programs. Indeed, the principal proponents of district power equalization have emphasized the degree to which such a program would maintain local autonomy. SeeJ. Coons,
W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 200-43.
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poorer districts are very rare. 26 5
During most of the 1980s, the interest of state legislatures in
equalization of school finance abated, 2 66 and state concern in education
shifted to the promotion of "excellence. '2 67 In pursuit of "excellence," the states have become more actively involved in setting and
monitoring curricula, skills requirements, teacher qualifications and
compensation, standards for promotion and graduation, and overall
268
district performance.
There is no necessary tension between equity and excellence. The
265. See supra note 95. Yet, as school finance analysts have recognized, the widening gap in fiscal capacities that separates wealthy districts from poorer ones can only be
closed by either some form of recapture or a massive infusion of new state aid to poorer
districts. SeeJ. Aronson &J. Hilley, supra note 60, at 217.
One of the few states to advance significantly toward interlocal spending equality
and the reduction of differences based on local wealth has been California. Although
the impetus for school finance equalization in California was undoubtedly the Serrano
decision, the real cause for the substantial reduction of interlocal spending differences
was the local property tax limits enacted through Proposition 13, now article XIIIA of
the California Constitution. Although Proposition 13 was intended ai a property tax
reduction measure, "a major side effect was to force fully centralized state funding of the
California schools." Henke, supra note 134, at 23. Proposition 13 has been particularly
important in limiting the ability of high wealth districts to outspend their neighbors.
Indeed, much of the equalization in California is a "consequence[] of years of effective
levelling down" for high spending districts. Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 619
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
266. The greatest period of legislative reform was in the 1970s, when the threat of
serious judicial intervention in the name of equality seemed greatest. Many state legislatures increased both the commitment of state resources and the equalization component
of state aid to local schools. There is some evidence that the state share of school revenues peaked in 1979 and receded slightly in the early 1980s. See Augenblick, supra note
255, at 4, 9-10. For most of the 1980s, as state courts rejected most challenges to
school financing systems, the spectre of court-mandated equality appeared to recede in
all but a handful of states. The recent successful challenges to the constitutionality of
the Kentucky, Montana and Texas school systems, see supra text accompanying notes
138-40, may usher in a new period of legislative efforts to promote interdistrict equality.
267. Stirred by studies such as A Nation at Risk and the reports of the Twentieth
Century Fund, the Carnegie Foundation and others, which were released in the early
and middle 1980s and portrayed many American school districts as mired in mediocrity
and incapable of meeting the needs of today's students and tomorrow's economy, state
legislatures during the last several years have adopted numerous measures designed to
improve educational quality. See, e.g., Education Comm'n of the States, supra note 255,
at vi ("[T]he issue in 1984 is excellence and not the equity and access issues that have
been on the agenda for the last 15 years. The fiscal.issue is not school finance reform,
but raising money to finance education excellence.").
268. Most states have lengthened the school day and the school year, raised course
work standards for high school graduates, imposed or raised standards for the hiring of
teachers and required students to take more, or more difficult, skills assessment tests as
a condition for promotion or graduation. See M. Goertz, State Educational Standards:
A 50-State Survey (1986); McDonnell & Fuhrman, The Political Context of School Reform, in Fiscal, Legal and Political Aspects, supra note 255, at 43; Steller, Implications
for Programmatic Excellence and Equity, in Fiscal, Legal and Political Aspects, supra
note 255, at 79-82.
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states' expanded administrative role, the setting of state-wide standards
and requirements and the general concern for work force skills and
American international economic competitiveness, which provides
much of the impetus for the educational excellence movement, could
apply to poorer districts as well as richer ones. These educational reforms assume that the states bear responsibility for local educational
quality; that responsibility could be the basis for requiring states to
commit the resources necessary to ensure that all students receive quality educations. Since poorer districts will need to spend more money
and to receive additional state assistance to meet state standards of
quality, the educational excellence movement could imply a greater obligation of state support for poorer districts and thus reduce interlocal
26 9
inequality.
In practice, however, the concern for excellence has thus far not
led to greater fiscal equity. Despite the numerous state measures
designed to require greater academic achievement and increase local
accountability for educational failures, "very few states have provided
extra funding to implement these additional requirements, ' 270 and
there has been "little or no attempt by states to link new standards to
school finance." 2 7 ' The pattern of state legislative activity has been
one of mandates without money. Where new facilities or courses have
been required, supplemental state financial assistance has not usually
been provided; one commentator has remarked, "Apparently, policy
makers assume that such courses should be funded out of new local
revenues or that trades should be made between these courses and
others now viewed as marginal." 27 2 Similarly, when districts have been
required to adopt self-improvement plans, new state money has not
been forthcoming to finance the costs of local self-improvement. 2 73
269. My colleague James Liebman has argued that these state-set standards of quality can generate an administratively and judicially enforceable obligation on the states to
provide the funds necessary to assure that students in poorer jurisdictions receive a
quality education as the state has defined it. See J. Liebman and the Right to a Minimally Adequate Education Group, Columbia University School of Law, Political Reconstruction,

Liberal

Recollection,

and Legislative

Reform:

New

Strategies for

Implementing Brown, 76 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1990).
270. McGuire, Implications for Future Reform: A State Perspective, in Fiscal, Legal

and Political Aspects, supra note 255, at 314.
271. Id. at 321.
272. Id. at 314.
273. See, e.g., New York State Educ. Dept., New York State Board of Regents Action Plan to Improve Elementary and Secondary Education Results in New York (1984).

The Regents Action Plan provides an elaborate mechanism for assessing the performance of local school districts.
For identified low performing schools, a self-improvement plan will be required. If sufficient progress has not been made in correcting the deficiencies
identified by the CAR [Comprehensive Assessment Report], the [State Educa-

tion] Department will require corrective measures targeted at the specific deficiency. Corrective measures may include required use of the State syllabi, time
on task for certain subjects, State-approved approaches to remedial work, com-

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1

Indeed, the excellence standards may be widening the disparities
among school districts. State requirements for expanded curricula, advanced facilities, additional credentials for teachers and enhanced
teacher compensation are a greater fiscal burden on poorer districts
than affluent ones. State incentives for the adoption of new instructional technologies may be taken advantage of more often by rich districts than by poorer ones. New programs, without new resources, may
increase differential access to educational quality according to the
2 74
wealth of the school district.

b. Land Use. - The much-vaunted "quiet revolution in land use
control" has failed to transform state-local relations in land use. The
"quiet revolution" phrase was coined in the early 1970s to describe
legislation in Hawaii, Vermont and other states that increased state involvement in land use planning and regulation, often by superseding
local regulation. 27 5 Scholars predicted that an increased awareness of
interlocal interdependence, the extralocal implications of local land use
actions and the economic and social segmentation resulting from uncontrolled local zoning autonomy would result in the spread of the
"revolution" and a general shift in land use responsibility from localities to the states.2 76 Although the last two decades have witnessed nuprehensive planning, and the use of the State-supported in-service education
days to address deficiencies identified by the CAR.
Id. at 68. Conspicuous by its absence from the list of "corrective measures" to remedy
local deficiencies is additional state money.
Where new money has been provided it is often categorical and not equalizing. See
Education Comm'n of the States, supra note 255, at 22.
274. See Long, An Equity Perspective on Educational Reform, in Fiscal, Legal and
Political Aspects, supra note 255.
275. See F. Bosselman & D. Callies, supra note 166. For a critical appraisal of the
record of state-based land use regulation in Hawaii, see D. Callies, supra note 61.
276.
This country is in the midst of a revolution in the way we regulate the use of
our land....
The ancien regime being overthrown is the feudal system under which the
entire pattern of land development has been controlled by thousands of individual local governments, each seeking to maximize its tax base and minimize
its social problems, and caring less what happens to all the others.
The tools of the revolution are new laws taking a wide variety of forms but
each sharing a common theme-the need to provide some degree of state or
regional participation in the major decisions that affect the use of our increasingly limited supply of land.
F. Bosselman & D. Callies, supra note 166, at 1; see R. Babcock & F. Bosselman, supra
note 74, at 151 (resurgence of state role in land use planning is "one of the most significant events in shaping the growth of the United States since the homestead laws"); R.
Healy &J. Rosenberg, Land Use and the States 1 (2d ed. 1979) (in early 1970s "it was
considered only a matter of time before some form of state involvement in land use
regulation was universally adopted"); see also W. Colman, supra note 63, at 98-108
(states asserting authority over a field long ago left entirely to local government"); Comment, State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1154
(1977) (trend toward some measure of state control); Developments in the Law-Zon-
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merous state enactments on land use, in most states these new
measures have left intact the structures of local control and the tradi27 7
tional commitment to local land use autonomy.
State land use legislation has focused primarily on protecting environmentally fragile "critical areas" and in controlling "developments
of regional impact" ("DRIs"). Critical areas laws protect coastal zones,
shorelands, wetlands, scenic areas, historic sites and wildernesses from
overdevelopment. 278 These are areas where the benefits of development, in terms of new jobs or an expanded tax base, will be enjoyed by
local residents, while the environmental losses will be felt statewide.
Developments of regional impact are industrial, commercial or residential projects, such as industrial parks, shopping malls or tract homes,
that cover large sites or provide for occupation or use by large numbers
of people. 2 79 Because of their scale, these projects often will have impacts on water supply, sewage facilities, transportation networks and
other infrastructure services that extend far beyond the locality in
which the project is to be sited. As with the critical areas, there is concern that the host locality will receive the fiscal benefits of a substantial
addition to the local tax base, while the costs of congestion, pollution
and strained services may be spread over a number of neighboring
localities.
Laws protecting critical areas and regulating DRIs are important in
two respects. First, they constitute a state displacement of local authority, either through the creation of new state or regional agencies that
regulate the affected areas directly or through the enactment of state
standards that bind local decision makers and render local actions subject to state judicial or administrative review. 28 0 Second, they demonstrate a legislative acknowledgement that local actions have extralocal
ing, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1427, 1590-1624 (1977) (state control over limited land-use
issues).
277. See, e.g., Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46J. Am. Plan. A. 135, 142
(1980) ("[I]t is a local, and not a state or regional, law which seems to have moved the

country along the land use control continuum ....
). See generally R. Healy &J.
Rosenberg, supra note 276, at 1 (traditional role of local land use); T. Pelham, State
Land-Use Planning and Regulation (1979) (selective areas of regulation by state).
278. See, e.g., F. Bosselman & D. Callies, supra note 166, at 205-61; P. Florestano
& V. Marando, The States and the Metropolis 129-30 (1981); R. Healy &J. Rosenberg,

supra note 276, at 80-125, 135-44, 177-80; T. Pelham, supra note 277, at 75-143.
279. See, e.g., F. Bosselman & D. Callies, supra note 166, at 54-107 (Vermont); id.

at 187-204 (Maine site location law); R. Healy &J.Rosenberg, supra note 276, at 40-79
(Vermont's Environmental Control Act); id. at 144-64 (Florida's regulation of develop-

ments of regional impact); T. Pelham, supra note 277, at 15-74; Pelham, Regulating
Developments of Regional Impact: Florida and the Model Code, 29 U. Fla. L. Rev. 789

(1977).
280. Judicial review of critical areas laws has occasioned affirmations of plenary
state power over land use and over local governments. See, e.g., CEEED v. California
Coastal Zone Conserv. Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974);
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949
(1977);J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 116 R.I. 54, 352 A.2d 661 (1976).
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effects, that people outside a locality have interests affected by local
actions and that, when those interests are not adequately represented
in the traditional institutions of local control, some state intervention
on behalf of nonlocal residents may be necessary.
Yet these laws are only a limited intrusion on local autonomy. The
process for designating an area as critical is often long and difficult,
reflecting the concern that the usual rule of local control of land use
requires a strong justification for state intervention. 28 1 Critical areas
are by definition atypical; their essential characteristic is their environmental fragility. They are different from most other parts of their
states. 28 2 Indeed, critical areas legislation, by highlighting the special
nature of the areas affected and assuming an unusual predicate for state
regulation, may serve to underscore the tradition of local control. It is
the exception that proves the rule and may legitimate a generally localist approach to other land use questions.
The DRI concept is potentially more radical since DRIs are not
limited to unique areas of a state or keyed to fragile environments. DRI
laws indicate a broader acceptance of the notion that the extralocal effects of local actions merit some state or regional review of local decisions. They imply some recognition that politically independent
localities are parts of interdependent economic regions and that traditional local land use regulation is unable to cope with regional
problems or protect regional interests. In its strongest versions, DRI
legislation enables state or regional bodies to block local development
or condition approval on modifications intended to mitigate the negative regional effects. 28 3 Weaker versions simply require the host locality to advise a regional body of the planned DRI and to consider the
regional body's objections or conditions before proceeding. Even the
weaker versions may permit a regional appeal to a state-wide body of a
local decision authorizing an objectionable development. 28 4 DRI laws
could be a step toward metropolitan area regional planning.
In fact, DRI legislation has not significantly displaced local land
use autonomy. There are very few strong DRI states; regional bodies
with purely advisory or recommendatory roles are far more common
281. See, e.g., Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977), aff'd, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978). For a general discussion of the process of
designating critical areas in Florida, see R. Healy &J. Rosenberg, supra note 276, at
135-43; T. Pelham, supra note 277, at 110-26.
282. Indeed, Florida's Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972,
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 380.012-380.10 (West 1988), provided that only five percent of the
land in the state could be designated as "critical areas." Id. § 380.05(20); see R. Healy
&J. Rosenberg, supra note 276, at 135.
283. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 276, at 1166-70 (discussing Vermont's system
of direct state control over local development).
284. See, e.g., R. Healy & J. Rosenberg, supra note 276, at 144-48 (discussing
procedure under Florida's DRI law).
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than those with the power actually to block local action. 2 85 These reviewing bodies are rarely either arms of the state or independent regional planning institutions. They do not impose external notions of
regional development on localities or create general regional development plans. Rather, they are typically part-time councils created and
controlled by local governments and are often composed of local interests. 28 6 Instead of framing and pursuing guidelines for the best interests of a region, they serve as forums for interlocal negotiations and
have a "tendency . . . to degenerate into 'reciprocal back-scratch-

ing.' ",287 As one critical study of Florida's DRI program found, "collections of local government officials in regional guise but ultimately
accountable politically only to their local constituencies cannot be expected to produce effective advocacy for state and regional
28 8
interests."
Moreover, DRI laws are premised on a one-sided concern about
local land use regulation. Under DRI statutes, regional review is triggered only when a locality approves a development proposal. DRI laws
do not supersede initial local power to review or regulate local land
uses. Typically, the locality retains all prior controls over development.
Nor does regional oversight occur if the locality rejects a proposed development. Usually DRI laws merely provide a second layer of review
of development plans. It is, as commentators have described it, a
"double-veto system ' 289 that requires potential developers to surmount two layers of review.
In its bias against change, DRI legislation is consistent with the
land use policies of many local governments. 290 DRI laws check local
zoning autonomy by requiring certain large-scale developments to proceed only with some external review, but that restriction serves the general local interest in being able to exclude unwanted development. In
many areas, local zoning autonomy by itself is inadequate to provide
for effective community control of development: individual localities
285. See, e.g., id. at 191-96; Morgan & Shonkweiler, Urban Development and
Statewide Planning: Challenge of the 1980s, 61 Or. L. Rev. 351, 385-86 (1982).
286. See, e.g., R. Healy &J. Rosenberg, supra note 276, at 110-13, 158; T. Pelham,
supra note 277, at 41-43.
287. T. Pelham, supra note 277, at 40.
288. Id. at 42.
289. R. Healy &J. Rosenberg, supra note 276, at 189.
290.
[T]he selected activities and critical-areas approaches have been utilized primarily to deal with physical environmental problems in undeveloped areas

rather than with urban problems.
With the exception of isolated selected-activities legislation ... these two
techniques have not been utilized to combat such peculiarly urban problems as
exclusionary zoning, urbanization of agricultural lands, preservation of open
space and growth control.
T. Pelham, supra note 277, at 202-03.
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cannot exclude the consequences of land use decisions by their neighbors. DRI laws enable localities to object to development proposals in
nearby localities, thereby projecting local growth control policies beyond local boundaries. The double-veto system exhausts the developer, while regional review provides local residents with a second
opportunity to block projects that may disturb the physical and social
setting of their community.
This localist interpretation of DRI legislation is reinforced by a
comparison of DRI laws and critical areas legislation with states' treatment of proposals to restrict local power to exclude facilities, such as
low and moderate income housing, which serve regional needs but are
usually considered undesirable by the host locality. Such a "development of regional benefit" ("DRB") is the inverse of a DRI, which may
provide fiscal benefits to the host locality but have an adverse impact on
the region. A local decision to block a DRB, like a local decision to
permit a DRI, imposes costs on the region for the sake of the regulating
locality.
In the American Law Institute's Model Land Development
Code, 29 ' DRBs were linked to DRIs and critical areas in one comprehensive package of land use subjects meriting state regulation. Critical
areas and DRI laws restrict local autonomy but do not force new development; DRI laws also protect the interests of localities in preventing
unwanted development nearby. DRB legislation, by contrast, could impose an unwanted land use on a community. State or regional review
of local rejections of DRBs would constitute a far more serious intrusion on the tradition of local autonomy. Although many states have
passed critical areas or DRI laws, none has enacted general DRB legislation. The lack of DRB legislation is powerful evidence of the localist
29 2
orientation of the land use control system.
The reluctance of state legislatures to limit local authority to exclude is well-illustrated by the paucity of state laws concerning exclusionary zoning and the siting of low and moderate income housing.
Only New York and Massachusetts ever provided for a direct state over291. Model Land Dev. Code (1975). The Model Code generally sought to preserve
local land use autonomy but determined that, with respect to critical areas, DRIs and
DRBs, there were significant state or regional interests at variance with the interests of
the regulating localities that were likely to go unprotected without affirmative state or
regional intervention. See id. §§ 7-201, -301.

292. See, e.g., Bosselman, Raymond & Persico, Some Observations on the American Law Institute's Model Land Development Code, in The Land Use Awakening, supra

note 188, at 105-06 (remarks of G. Raymond); R. Healy &J. Rosenberg, supra note
276, at 162, 182-83; Pelham, supra note 279, at 801; Note, supra note 276, at 1603.
Although the states have not enacted general DRB laws or, with rare exceptions, laws
displacing local power to exclude low and moderate income housing, many states have
preempted local governments with respect to the siting of undesirable infrastructure
facilities, such as power plants. See, e.g, P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 278, at
130; T. Pelham, supra note 277, at 13-14.
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ride of local exclusionary measures, and New York quickly abandoned
that effort. In 1968, the New York Legislature created the Urban
Development Corporation ("UDC") to build low and moderate income
housing and authorized it to overrule local zoning that precluded such
construction. At first, the UDC moved cautiously, undertaking projects
primarily in central city areas. When it announced plans for subsidized
housing units in small projects in a number of Westchester County
towns, the state's suburbs rallied under the banner of home rule. The
legislature promptly revoked the UDC's power to override local zoning
and authorized localities to veto UDC residential
projects even if the
29 3
projects at issue conformed to local zoning.
In Massachusetts, the legislature in 1969 authorized the Housing
Appeals Committee of the Department of Community Affairs to overrule decisions of local zoning boards that deny permission to build low
or moderate income housing where the local action is not "consistent
with local needs." 2 94 The legislation defines consistency with local
needs to include a determination whether the local action was "reasonable in view of the regional need for low and moderate income housing
"295

Despite this commitment to a regional approach, the
Massachusetts law is sharply limited in scope. Only public agencies or
not-for-profit organizations can take advantage of the state override;
private builders willing to accept housing subsidies or provide subsidized units have no right of appeal under the law. The measure imposes no limit on local power to enact large lot or large floor area
requirements for single-family homes, 29 6 to restrict the size of apart2 98
ments 29 7 or to reduce the number of apartments in the community.
Moreover, the law provides that a local permit denial is consistent per
se with local needs if ten percent of the housing in the locality is low or
moderate income, regardless of regional low or moderate income housing needs. 29 9 The act does not provide for the financing of any low or
293. See 1973 N.Y. Laws 446 (Codified in N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 6253(16),
6265(5) (McKinney 1979)). For a general discussion of the rise and fall of the Urban
Development Corporation's power to supersede local zoning, see M. Danielson, supra
note 68, at 313.
294. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40B, § 23 (Law. Co-op 1983).
295. Id. § 20; see also Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm.,
363 Mass. 339, 346, 294 N.E.2d 393, 402 (1973).
296. See, e.g., Note, The Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law: First Breach in the
Exclusionary Wall, 54 B.U.L. Rev. 37, 70 n.225 (1975) ("One primary reason for not
setting statutory maximums for lot sizes was that it would be too great an erosion of
local land use control.").
297. See Hallenborg v. Town Clerk, 360 Mass. 513, 521, 275 N.E.2d 525, 531
(1971).
298. Bellows Farms, Inc. v. Building Inspector of Acton, 364 Mass. 253, 260, 303
N.E.2d 728, 733 (1973); Reed, Tilting at Windmills: The Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, 4 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 105, 120 (1981).
299. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40B, § 20 (Law. Co-op. 1983).
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moderate income housing or require that any community do so.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Massachusetts statute is an
affirmative state legislative displacement of local power in the name of
regional concern for low and moderate income housing. Although its
effect on interlocal economic segregation in Massachusetts is uncertain, 3 00 it is an important legal statement. It is also unique; it took two
decades for another state-Connecticut-to pass a comparable law, and
the Connecticut law has not yet gone into effect. 30 1
Aside from critical areas and DRIs, the state's role in land use regulation is relatively limited. Several states have adopted general land
use planning laws, but these almost always follow the traditional pattern of state-local relations by delegating the responsibility for planning, implementation and enforcement to local governments, albeit
subject to greater state oversight than previously. Those states that require localities to conform to professional standards and procedures
probably have improved the local capacity to regulate, without supplanting local control by state administrators.3 0 2 Nor do state laws typically intrude on the local authority to shape the local social setting.
Rather, they usually require local plans to give detailed attention to the
physical and fiscal consequences of growth-the burdens on natural resources, air and water quality, infrastructure and government services. 3 0 3 These state planning requirements are likely to slow down
300. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 298, at 131 (zoning appeals law has had "negligible
effect").

301. See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 228, at 645; Note, supra note 296, at 73
n.243 (in the 1970s Connecticut and Wisconsin legislatures considered and rejected
laws based on Massachusetts model).
The recently enacted Connecticut law establishes an "affordable housing land use
appeals procedure" for the judicial review of local zoning commission decisions concerning affordable housing developments. Act of June 29, 1989, Pub. Act No. 89-311,
1989 Conn. Legis. Serv. 706 (West). An "affordable housing development" is defined
as either government-assisted housing, or housing in which twenty percent of the dwelling units are restricted to low or moderate income persons and families. Id. § 311.1(a).
A developer whose application is either denied outright or approved with restrictions
"which have a substantial adverse impact on the viability of the affordable housing development or the degree of affordability" may appeal to a designated state superior
court. Id. § 311.1 (b).
Under the law, the burden will be on the locality to prove:
(1) the decision from which such appeal is taken and the reasons cited for such
decision are supported by sufficient evidence in the record; (2) the decision is
necessary to protect substantial public interests in health, safety or other matters which the [municipality] may legally consider; (3) such public interests
dearly outweigh the need for affordable housing; and (4) such public interests
cannot be protected by reasonable changes to the affordable housing
development.
Id. § 311.1(c).
The new appeals procedure takes effectJuly 1, 1990. Id. § 311.4.
302. See, e.g., R. Healy &J. Rosenberg, supra note 276, at 11-13, 162-65, 191; T.
Pelham, supra note 277, at 16-23, 42-44, 145-46, 192.
303. See, e.g., P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 278, at 129-30; R. Healy &

1990]

OUR LOCALISM

development and provide new bases for exclusion, rather than encourage social or economic change. Thus, many state planning requirements are consonant with the growth control concerns of most
local governments.
Only a few states require localities to plan for mixed-income levels
of housing. New Jersey is one of the rare states that has legislation
formally imposing on localities a duty to plan for a "fair share" of low
and moderate income housing. As we have seen, that state's Fair Housing Act was adopted under intense pressure from the state courts, and
its effect has been to moderate the more vigorous integrative efforts of
30 4
the state judiciary under Mount Laurel.
Aside from a few states and a few regulatory issues, then, state legislatures have been no more aggressive than state courts in disturbing
local land use autonomy or curtailing local power to shape local social
and economic development. Although the states have been increasingly active in the land use area, recent state legislation, like state case
law, generally fits in with the localist tradition.
Thus, in land use, as in school finance, recent state legislative initiatives generally have been consistent with the deep structure of the
local government system. Greater state administrative involvement,
new state standard-setting, oversight mechanisms and substantive requirements are compatible with the preservation of considerable local
decision making. Although in both areas there has been a movement of
power toward the states, the pattern of state activity has not entailed a
general retraction of the traditional broad delegations of power to local
governments in education or land use. Nor have the states assumed a
significantly greater responsibility to remedy interlocal inequalities or
J. Rosenberg, supra note 276, at 40-46, 60, 80-120, 126, 177-79; T. Pelham, supra note
277, at 16, 75, 192; Bosselman, Raymond & Persico, supra note 292, at 115; Comment,
supra note 276, at 1158-59.
304. See infra notes 229-37 and accompanying text. California and Oregon planning laws also require localities to include "housing elements" in their plans. See Cal.
Gov't Code §§ 65302(c), 65583(a), 65584(a), (b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 197.307(1) (Butterworth 1985) (declaring "the availability of affordable,
decent, safe and sanitary housing opportunities for persons of lower, middle, and fixed
income is a matter of state-wide concern"); id. § 197.312 (prohibiting cities and counties
from including in their charters provisions barring from all residential zones specified
types of housing). But cf. Cal. Gov't Code § 65584(d), (e) (local governments still have
power to limit building permits and impose moratoria on residential construction and
the state's authority to review and revise a local government's share of regional housing
need "shall not constitute authority to revise, approve or disapprove the manner in
which the local government's share of the regional housing need is implemented
through the housing program"). As the previous discussion of California law suggests,
however, the widespread use of the voter initiative to regulate land use has limited the
effectiveness of the housing element requirement.
Although Oregon's law requires localities to plan to accept a share of regional housing needs, the general purpose of Oregon's law has been the preservation of agricultural
lands and the limitation of urban growth. See Morgan & Shonkweiler, supra note 285,
at 247, 264-79 & n.144.
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rein in local parochialism. Instead, local autonomy remains the legal
norm. Local actions continue to rely on local resources and to be the
outcomes of local political processes. For the most part, neither state
courts nor state legislatures have questioned the structure of localism;
instead, their actions have tended to assume it.
C. The Law of Local Government Formation
An unstated premise of both the school finance and exclusionary
zoning cases is the existence of fixed local boundaries that give political
and fiscal significance to local wealth differences. The law of local government formation is, in a sense, the third leg of the legal triangle that
structures the relationship of local regulatory authority, interlocal
wealth inequalities, and local government actions. Indeed, local land
use regulation and local responsibility for funding basic public services
would not be so problematic if local governments were either relatively
equal in taxable wealth or populated by similar mixes of high, middle,
and low income residents. Neither Mount Laurel's effort to promote the
economic integration of local units by facilitating the settlement of low
and moderate income people in more affluent areas nor the school finance reform program of making local wealth irrelevant to the provision of public education by requiring state equalization aid would be
necessary if local boundary lines were drawn in order to combine more
and less affluent areas into common political and fiscal units. Such a
standard for boundary-setting would eliminate fiscal inequality and
much of the incentive for exclusionary regulation.
One may object that even if localities could be formed on such a
basis, the system of equalized interlocal wealth or economic integration
would break down rapidly. The constitutional guarantees of the free
movement of people, goods and capital across local borders30 5 would
assure the re-emergence of interlocal differences. Interlocal wealth
equality and economic integration could be preserved, however, if local
boundaries were periodically reconfigured with equality of wealth or
economic integration as the lodestar. Local governments could be
treated like congressional or state legislative districts, which have their
boundaries redrawn every ten years in order to conform to the constitutional command of one person, one vote.3 0 6 But, of course, this is
not the case, nor is it conceivable that it will ever occur. The difficulty
of according local boundaries the plasticity we readily associate with
congressional districts indicates that local governments enjoy a far
more protected place in our system than do other subdivisions of the
states.
305. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 & art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (right of people to travel).
306. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964).
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This Section examines the state law principles governing local incorporation, annexation and consolidation, as well as state legislation
that attempts to infuse local formation and expansion decisions with
greater attention to regional concerns. As in all matters local, there is
considerable state-to-state and regional variation, but, notwithstanding
the plenary power of the states, the law of local formation, local boundaries and the preservation of local political existence is generally dominated by local concerns. Unlike congressional and legislative districts,
which must satisfy stringent standards of population equality and which
have no claim to legal existence beyond the next census, local governments are formed largely in response to local desires. Once created,
they are rarely abolished, and their boundaries are only infrequently
modified.3 0 7 Such boundary changes as do occur are often a result of
local decisions. If the rules of local government formation and continuation are the nucleus of the system of local governments, then local
government law is localist at the core.
1. Incorporation. - The law of local government formation is primarily about municipal incorporation. Municipal corporations-variously known as cities, boroughs, towns or villages-are general
purpose governments, providing a broad array of public services and
authorized to exercise general police powers and impose general taxes
on residents within the territorial limits. 3 08 Within the category of gen-

eral purpose governments, municipalities have conventionally been the
units most associated with urbanness, and the additional, more extensive services and regulations that greater density of population is
thought to require. 309 Although most land lies within unincorporated
307. See, e.g., P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 278, at 56-57.
308. General purpose governments differ from special districts, which possess only
limited authority to provide one or a handful of services and whose regulatory and revenue powers, if any, are focused on the provision of that particular service. Although
special districts are a significant feature of the American local government system, most
general discussions of local government law focus on general purpose governments.
309. The other type of general purpose government-the county-has differed historically from the municipal corporation in the nature and scope of the government
provided and the relationship to the state. Counties are more truly administrative divisions of the state, performing the traditional law enforcement and welfare functions of
the minimal state-such as registering deeds, probating wills, operating roads, providing relief and running elections-at a substate level. As befits an adminstrative subdivision, nearly every state is entirely divided up into counties, so that every bit of territory
of the state falls within a county. The county division usually occurred when the state
was formally organized, and the number of counties in the United States and the location of county lines has remained virtually unchanged for decades. During the quarter
century between 1957 and 1982, the total number of counties in the entire United States
changed by six, dropping from 3,047 to 3,041. That is a percentage change of twotenths of one percent. See J. Aronson & J. Hilley, supra note 60, at 76. There is, in
effect, no law of county formation or boundary alteration, because counties are no
longer being formed or having their boundaries altered.
Although the operational distinction between municipal and county governments
has been somewhat blurred with the rise of the "urban county" and the assumption by
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territory, most people live inside municipal boundaries. 3 10
In most states, general enabling legislation places municipal incorporation in the hands of local residents or landowners. State laws provide for the initiation of the process by petitions signed by some
number or percentage of local residents or landowners. Thereafter, an
election is held in which local residents or landowners participate, and
if a requisite percentage of the local electorate approves the incorporation goes forward. 3 1' Neighboring localities, regional entities and residents outside of the boundaries of the territory proposed to be
incorporated generally have no role. 3 12 Judicial or administrative re-

view is usually ministerial and limited to a determination of whether
the
3 13
signature, voting and other formal requirements have been met.

The principal criterion for deciding whether a municipality will be
incorporated is whetherthe local people want it. There are few limits
on local discretion. In many states, the principal requirement is that
the incorporators provide a map describing an area of contiguous, unincorporated land containing a population greater than the statutorily
prescribed minimum. The statutory minima are often quite small: in
some states as few as seventy-five people may suffice for an incorporation.3 14 Thus, if a relatively small number of people living on unincorcounties in metropolitan areas of some of the functions traditionally associated with municipal governments, the conceptual difference remains.
310. The legal issues surrounding municipal incorporation are of pressing importance since new municipalities continue to be created in large numbers every year and
nearly 2,000 municipalities have been incorporated in the last three decades. See id.
(number of municipalities increased from 17,183 in 1957 to 19,076 in 1982); Miller,
Municipal Annexation and Boundary Changes, in International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book 1986, at 73 [hereinafter Municipal Year Book 1986]
(in an approximately one-and-one-half year period in 1984 and 1985, 86 municipalities
were incorporated and 23 disincorporated or merged, for a net increase of 63).
311. See I C. Antieau, supra note 5, §§ 1.09-.14; 1 E. McQuillin, supra note 8,
§§ 3.24-.35g; -1C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note 5, §§ 8.11-.16. Many states limit
the right to petition for an incorporation or an annexation to landowners in the area
proposed to be incorporated or annexed. In re Char, 59 Ohio App. 2d 146, 149-50,
392 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-15 (1,978) (construing Ohio law making "good of territory"
principal criterion for annexation approval to mean best interests of area landowners
since statute limits right to petition for annexation to owners of real estate). It is generally assumed that such a limitation raises no constitutional question since the petition is
not itself an election triggering the one person, one vote principle. See, e.g., Berry v.
Bourne, 588 F.2d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1978); Township of Jefferson v. City of West
Carrollton, 517 F. Supp. 417, 420-21 (S.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd mem., 718 F.2d 1099 (6th
Cir. 1983); see also Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local
Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259 (1977) ("one-shot" local formation decisions not subject to
one person, one vote rule for organization of ongoing local legislatures).
312. 1 C. Antieau, supra note 5, § 1.27; C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note 5,
§§ 8.03-.17.
313. C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note 5, §§ 8.16, .21.
314. According to the 1982 Census of Governments, the minimum population for
the incorporation of a municipality was 75 in Alabama; 100 in Nebraska; 150 in New
Mexico, Oregon and Wisconsin; 200 in Tennessee; and 250 in Nevada. See Bureau of
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porated land want to create their own municipality, and they can
persuade a majority of their neighbors to agree, then they are likely to
be able to form that government.
Some states go further and require that the local population be
concentrated; that the land be "urban" or suitable for urban development; that the proposed municipality have the need and ability to pay
for governmental services; or that the people share a "community of
interest. ' 31 5 These standards appear to go beyond the subjective local
desire for incorporation and suggest an inquiry into whether there is an
objective need for a new government. They also indicate a concern for
the burden of government on local residents, especially landowners. 31 6
These requirements, however, do not address the effect of the formation of a new government on the surrounding area, the region or the
state.
These additional criteria often prove to be without bite. Courts
have treated the local desire for municipal government, as revealed by
the incorporation request, as dispositive of the question of local benefit
from incorporation.3 1 7 Similarly, the courts have been disinclined to
use the "community of interest" requirement as a substantive standard.
Courts have sustained proposed incorporations of areas lacking common stores, businesses, schools or social and cultural amenities, in the
face of contentions that the lack of such common facilities negated the
the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1982 Census of Governments 105, 237, 254, 281,
333, 303, 241 (1983) [hereinafter Census of Governments].
In those states that classify their municipalities according to population, it may take
as little as 1,000 (Oklahoma), 2,000 (Colorado, Mississippi) or 2,500 people (Illinois) to
be incorporated as a city. See id. at 277, 132, 223, 166.
315. See, e.g., 1 C. Antieau, supra note 5, at §§ 1.20-.22; D. Mandelker, D. Netsch
& P. Salsich, supra note 10, at 52-54; 1 E. McQuillin, supra note 8, at § 3.15c; C. Sands
& M. Libonati, supra note 5, at § 8.06.
316. A new government may be seen as portending a reduction in liberty through
additional regulation and taxation. The requirements of population concentration, projected development or urban service needs are intended to assure that there is a real
need for a new government to justify the potential imposition of new regulations and
taxes. Moreover, local wealth is unevenly distributed and an area may be composed of
different economic interests. In such a setting, incorporation could provide a means for
local electoral majorities to seize political power and, through redistributive and tax and
spending programs, exploit wealthier minorities. Proposals by neighbors of an oil field,
a shopping mall or a factory to incorporate the neighborhood so as to be able to tax and
regulate the industrial or commercial facility in their vicinity illustrate some of the possibilities. See, e.g., Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Comm'r, 28
Utah 2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972); cf. Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628
S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (similar considerations in an annexation case), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 802 (1982). The "community of interest" requirement may pose
some check on redistribution by requiring that the proposed municipality function as a
social community, with bonds uniting the members, thereby allaying the concern that
incorporation may result in exploitation.
317. See Mandelker, Standards for Municipal Incorporations on the Urban Fringe,
36 Tex. L. Rev. 271, 276-89 (1958).
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presence of a "community of interest. 3 18 In these cases, "community"
was often supplied by the common demand for municipal services, as
3 19
evidenced by the petition for incorporation.
Similarly, courts have found a "community of interest" even when
the area proposed for incorporation was only a small piece of a larger
area that arguably comprised a true "community" of common economic and social interactions. 320 There is nothing in the incorporation
criteria in most states to preclude incorporators from drawing lines that
bring in high-tax or elite residential properties and fence out tax-exempt lands or poor or black people. 32 ' As a general rule, the impact of
the incorporation on the well-being and development of the broader
"community" outside the proposed municipal borders is not a factor in
3 22
judicial review of the incorporation or the proposed boundaries.
Local incorporations may be based on the desires of ethnic or economic groups to separate themselves politically from their neighbors,
to wield planning and zoning authority, to control the pace of growth
and to restrict local taxable wealth for their immediate uses. Local governments may be created, and usually are, without any regard to differences in wealth among localities or to the fact that incorporation may
aggravate those differences or interfere with regional approaches to
318. See State ex rel. Stephens v. Odell, 61 Wash. 2d 476, 378 P.2d 932 (1963).
319. See State ex rel. Pickrell v. Downey, 102 Ariz. 360, 366, 430 P.2d 122, 128
(1967); In re Incorporation of Eden Park, 158 Pa. Super. 40, 43, 43 A.2d 529, 530
(1945); In re Incorporation of Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. 380, 383, 170 A. 319, 320
(1934); In re Incorporation of Oconomowoc Lake, 7 Wis. 2d 400, 403-04, 97 N.W.2d
189, 191 (1959).
320. See Rose v. Barraud, 61 Misc. 2d 377, 379, 305 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723-24 (Sup.
Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 36 A.D.2d 1025, 322 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1971); State ex rel. Cole v.
City of Hendersonville, 223 Tenn. 365, 445 S.W.2d 652 (1969); In re Incorporation of
Elm Grove, 267 Wis. 157, 162-64, 64 N.W.2d 874, 877-78 (1954).
321. See, e.g., Taylor v. Township of Dearborn, 370 Mich. 47, 56, 120 N.W.2d 737,
742-43 (1963) (racially motivated incorporation); Village of Inkster v. Wayne County
Supervisors, 363 Mich. 165, 170-71, 108 N.W.2d 822, 825 (1961) (same); Rose v.
Barraud, 61 Misc. 2d at 379, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (fiscal factors); In re Incorporation of
Bridgewater, 87 Pa. Commw. 599, 604-05, 488 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1985) (racially motivated incorporation); NAACP v. Town of Hilton Head, 287 S.C. 254, 335 S.E.2d 806
(1985) (same). Race may also be a factor in other forms of local government boundary
change. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 465-67 (1987)
(all-white city annexing parcels that were either all white or unpopulated and refusing
annexation of black area); Marshall v. Mayor of McComb City, 251 Miss. 750, 756-58,
171 So. 2d 347, 349-50 (white majority town detaching a black district), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 836 (1965); Symposium, The White Curtain: Racially Disadvantaging Local
Government Boundary Practices, 54 J. Urb. L. 679-1073 (1977).
322. See, e.g., Marcus v. Baron, 57 N.Y.2d 862, 863, 442 N.E.2d 437, 456 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1982) (invalidating town law conditioning village incorporation on "overall public
interest," including that of remainder of town); McManus v. Skoko, 255 Or. 374, 376,
467 P.2d 426, 427 (1970) (county may not deny incorporation on grounds of good government, general welfare or the public interest); cE City of Town & Country v. St. Louis
County, 657 S.W.2d 598, 606 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (overruling precedent requiring best
interests of county perspective in an annexation).
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economic and social problems. Incorporation subtracts land and revenues from the surrounding jurisdiction and denies it to other localities
in the area. Incorporation on the urban fringe precludes the extension
of central city boundaries to recapture middle-class residents who have
moved to outlying areas. In most states, none of this provides a legal
basis for challenging or denying an incorporation. Instead, these factors often constitute practical incentives to incorporate.
Despite the lack of a right to local self-government, courts often
treat the formation of a local government as a healthy development,
reflecting an area's growth and the democratic desires of its residents.3 23 This combination of liberal incorporation laws and indulgent
judicial attitudes has resulted in a multitude of municipalities-more
than 19,000 of them.3 24 Many of these municipalities are quite small.

More than three-quarters of all municipalities have fewer than 5,000
inhabitants, and fewer than 500 municipalities have populations greater
than 50,000.325 In most metropolitan areas, there are dozens of in-

dependent municipalities. To paraphrase the old saw about God and
the poor: the states must love local governments, since they have made
so many of them.
Of course, the pattern of large numbers of small municipalities is
not entirely attributable to ease of incorporation. If municipalities were
easily created but just as easily destroyed, there might be far fewer municipal governments. But that is not the case. Under the law of annexation and consolidation, municipalities are significantly protected from
reorganization or elimination from outside.
2. Annexation and Consolidation. - Municipal expansion through annexation and consolidation3 26 has been of great significance for the development of American urban centers. As historian Kenneth Jackson
observes, "Without exception, the adjustment of local boundaries has
been the dominant method of population growth in every American
city of consequence."3 2 7 There is greater state-to-state variation in the
laws governing annexation and consolidation than in those governing
323. See, e.g., State ex rel. Northern Pump Co. v. So-Called Village of Fridley, 233
Minn. 442, 451, 47 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1951); State ex rel. Burnquist v. Village of St.
Anthony, 223 Minn. 149, 26 N.W.2d 193 (1947); Town & Country, 657 S.W.2d at 605;
Oconomowoc Lake, 7 Wis. 2d at 402-04, 97 N.W.2d at 191; Elm Grove, 267 Wis. at 162, 64
N.W.2d at 877 ("[T]he size of the village and the location of its boundaries are matters
within the choice of the electors of the territory proposed to be incorporated and not
within the discretion of the court.").
324. 1982 Census of Governments, supra note 314, at v (19,076 municipalities).
325. Id. at 8 (table 6).
326. Annexation is the territorial expansion of a municipal corporation through the
addition of new land. Consolidation is the merger of one or more local governments,
either municipal corporations or municipal corporations and the county in which they
are located.
327. K.Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States 140

(1985).
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incorporation. Some states do not authorize annexation at all, 3 28 while
others make it extremely easy, at least for some cities. 3 29 Most states
fall somewhere in between. But, as with incorporation, state laws concerning annexation and consolidation are quite localist.
The states have devolved the decisions concerning annexation and
consolidation to local actors. As one commentator has noted, the relevant state laws commit "to the people and communities directly concerned the final determination of territorial and boundary
questions. ' 3 30 As a general rule, the states no longer provide for annexation or consolidation by special legislative act. Indeed, some state
courts have interpreted the constitutional proscription against special
acts concerning local governments to operate as a ban on annexation
by state law. 331 Instead, the states have delegated territorial and
boundary decisions to the annexing city, the territory to be annexed or
3 32
the localities to be merged.
Municipalities are generally protected from forcible annexation or
consolidation. It is a nearly universal rule that an incorporated area
may not be annexed without its consent and that a consolidation requires the separate consent of each unit proposed for merger. 3 33 The
328. The Rhode Island Code flatly states: "The extent and boundaries of the several cities and towns shall remain as now established by law." R.I. Gen. L. § 45-1-1
(1988). Other states that appear to make no provision for annexation include Maine,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Hawaii. See F. Sengstock, Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problem 11 (1960); Note, Stumbling GiantsA Path to Progress Through Metropolitan Annexation, 39 Notre Dame Law. 56, 63
(1963).
329. Texas and Missouri permit home rule cities to engage in unilateral annexation. See F. Sengstock, supra note 328, at 19-23. North Carolina and Oklahoma also
permit municipalities to annex contiguous urbanized territory by unilateral action in
some cases. See J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics and
Economic Life 287-88 (2d ed. 1970); Note, The Coulwood Horror-North Carolina's
Unilateral Annexation Statutes, 19 Wake Forest L. Rev. 215 (1983).
330. 2 E. McQuillin, supra note 5, § 7.15.
331. See, e.g., Jamison v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 51, 165 S.E.2d 647 (1969).
332. F. Sengstock, supra note 328, at 13-41 (1960); Thomas & Marando, Local
Governmental Reform and Territorial Democracy: The Case of Florida, 11 Publius 49,
62 (1981) (with respect to local government reorganization state operates as facilitator
and supervisor, but does not mandate changes in basic territorial structures and operations of local units); Comment, Annexation by Municipal Corporations, 37 Wash. L.
Rev. 404 (1962).
333. See, e.g., Chastain v. City of Little Rock, 208 Ark. 142, 185 S.W.2d 95 (1945);
Rogers v. Board of Directors, 218 Cal. 221, 22 P.2d 509 (1933); Taliaferro v. Board of
Supervisors, 354 Mich. 49, 92 N.W.2d 319 (1958); Appeal of Snyder, 302 Pa. 259, 153
A. 436 (1931); 1 C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note 5, § 8.30; 2 E. McQuillin, supra
note 5, §§ 7.16, 7.22; M. Hill, supra note 25, at 43-44, F. Sengstock, supra note 328, at
13-19.
With the exception of the partial consolidation of Indianapolis with Marion County,
Indiana in 1969, in the twentieth century no state legislature has ordered a major consolidation of local governments without also making provision for a local referendum.
SeeJ. Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 96. Because of suburban resistance, voter approval
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rules vary for unincorporated territory, but in some states the annexation of even unincorporated land requires the consent of the voters in
the area to be annexed. 33 4 Most Northeastern and Midwestern states
discourage annexation in this way. As a result, the large cities in these
states are unable to add new land. They have experienced little or no
territorial or population growth since World War II, although their surrounding metropolitan areas have swelled. 33 5 A metropolitan area may
function as one economic market, but, characteristically, it is broken up
into a multiplicity of political units. Thus, in 1982 there were 121 municipalities in Cook County, Illinois; 89 in St. Louis County, Missouri;
56 in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio; and 123 in the three New
York counties of Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester combined.3 36
The requirement of local consent is a classic example of localism.
It treats all local areas-large cities and outlying areas alike-as equally
deserving of respect as political units, and it protects the right of every
incorporated residential grouping to retain its local independence. Areas with tax bases adequate for their needs may prefer to control their
own services and their own development. If there are race, class, or
income differences between the annexing city and the area proposed
for annexation, or between the entities considering consolidation, then
the annexation or consolidation is unlikely to win local approval. 33 7
Local consent is a staunch protector of local autonomy and a major
"stumbling block" to annexation or consolidation. 33 8
Some states, particularly in the South and West, favor urban exrequirements are generally fatal to consolidation proposals. See, e.g., F. Sengstock, P.
Fellin, L. Nicholson & C. Mondale, Consolidation: Building a Bridge Between City and
Suburb (1964) (case study of unsuccessful consolidation efforts in St. Louis); Filer &
Kenny, Voter Reaction to City-County Consolidation Referenda, 23 J.L. & Econ. 179
(1980); Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or Reality, 58 Geo.
LJ. 675, 690-97, 715 (1970).
334. Of the 41 states that authorize municipal annexation by general law, 23 require a referendum and the approval of a majority of the voters in the area to be annexed. M. Hill, supra note 25, at 44-45.
335. Chicago and Cleveland have registered very little territorial growth and
Detroit and Pittsburgh have registered virtually no territorial growth since 1930.
Baltimore, Boston and Cincinnati have been virtually confined within the same boundaries since 1920. New York City has added only minimal territory since 1900. St. Louis
has not expanded since 1880, and Philadelphia has added fewer than seven square miles
since the Civil War. Municipal Year Book 1986, supra note 310, at 78-79.
336. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Local Government in Metropolitan Areas 37-74 (table 3) (1985).
337. See, e.g.,J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 329, at 292; F. Sengstock, P.
Fellin, L. Nicholson & C. Mondale, supra note 333, at 135 ("fear of racial integration
inspired a great deal of opposition to consolidation" among residents of suburban St.
Louis); Dye, Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associated with Annexation in
American Cities, 8 MidwestJ. Pol. Sci. 430, 439-42 (1964); Filer & Kenny, supra note
333, at 183-84 (poor areas more likely to support consolidation and above median income areas more likely to oppose).
338. F. Sengstock, supra note 328, at 16.
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pansion, permit certain cities to annex unincorporated territory unilaterally and restrict new incorporations in the vicinity of cities with broad
annexation authority.3 3 9 Indeed, much of the population growth of the
large cities of the Sunbelt in recent decades is a result of substantial
territorial expansion attributable to the liberal annexation laws of those
states.3 40 State laws that facilitate municipal annexation may also be
termed localist because the annexation decision remains a local one: it
is a decision of the annexing city and not of a state or regional entity.
Promoting big city growth may be state policy, but the decisions concerning annexation-what areas to annex? when? which city will do the
annexing?-generally remain within the discretion of local govern339. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-24 to -30 (1982); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
970(a) (Vernon 1963). In the postwar period, Texas has led all states in population and
land area annexed. In the 1970s, 16.8% of all the territory annexed by cities in the
United States, and 14.4% of the people annexed, were in Texas. See Ashcroft &
Balfour, Home Rule Cities and Municipal Annexation in Texas: Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 15 St. Mary's L.J. 519, 546 (1984). Among the major Texas cities, Dallas
was 40 square miles in 1940 and 331 square miles in 1984; Houston was 73 square miles
in 1940 and 565 square miles in 1984; and San Antonio was 36 square miles in 1940 and
278 in 1984. Municipal Year Book 1986, supra note 310, at 78-79. See generally Note,
supra note 329, at 215 (overview of state's unilateral annexation process and compilation of major appellate court decisions concerning it).
340. For example, Texas and North Carolina. See, e.g., C. Abbott, The New Urban
America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities 49-51 (1981);J. Bollens & H. Schmandt,
supra note 329, at 242-45; K.Jackson, supra note 327, at 154-55 (population growth of
Memphis, Houston, Phoenix and Indianapolis since 1940 based entirely on annexation).
In the 1970s, American cities annexed territories containing 3.2 million people1.8 million in the South, and 0.7 million in the West. Forty percent of all annexations
occurred in four states: California, Florida, Illinois and Texas. Miller & Forstall,
Annexations and Corporate Changes: 1970-79 and 1980-83 in Int'l City Mgmt. Ass'n,
The Municipal Year Book: 1984, at 96-99. In the first half of the 1980s, seven statesCalifornia, Texas, North Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana and Nebraska-accounted for the bulk of annexations measured according to population. See Miller,
Municipal Annexation and Boundary Changes, in The Municipal Yearbook 1986, supra
note 310, at 74. Of the 85 voter referenda on city-county consolidations that occurred
between 1921 and 1978, 80 occurred in the South and the West, and of these 59 occurred in the South. Indeed, the four Southern states of Florida, Georgia, Tennessee
and Virginia accounted for 49 of the referenda, or more than half of the votes that occurred in the whole country over a 67 year period. See Glendening & Atkins, CityCounty Consolidations: New Views for the Eighties, in Int'l City Mgmt. Ass'n, The Municipal Year Book: 1980, at 68-69.
More recently, Southern and Western state legislatures have begun to move away
from easy annexation. In Texas, increasing suburban growth and the class and ethnic
differentiation of outlying areas from central cities have led to statutory changes
designed to slow down annexation and require the consent of annexed areas. See
Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 339, at 530-42. In California, a court declared: "It is
the strong public policy of this state, in respect of municipal annexation proceedings,
that the inhabitants and the owners of land proposed to be annexed have the ultimate
decision therein." Schaeffer v. County of Santa Clara, 202 Cal. Rptr. 515, 516, 155 Cal.
App. 3d 901, 904 (1984) (affirming trial court's invalidation of annexation without sole
landowner's consent). See Cal. Govt. Code § 57000 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); see also
C. Abbott, supra, at 189-93 (resistance to annexation in suburbs of Denver and Atlanta).
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ments. One local interest-that of the area to be annexed-may not be
heard, but the relevant decision makers are still local ones.
Finally, not only are local governments and local residents the primary decision makers, but local desires are the ruling criteria. An affluent jurisdiction has no obligation to annex a fringe area that would
benefit from the extension of municipal services. A well-to-do suburb
has no obligation to consent to annexation by the adjacent central city
with a declining tax base. Two communities of differing ethnic composition or social status need not merge. Each jurisdiction may decide
based on its own perception of its self-interest, without considering the
34 1
interest of the region as a whole.
These rules assure the continued autonomy of localities that want
autonomy. Indeed, the law of annexation is an incentive to incorporation. Since an incorporated entity may not be annexed or consolidated
without its consent, the best way to avoid an undesirable political connection is to incorporate.3 4 2 Such "defensive incorporation" is wide3 43
spread in metropolitan areas.
Ease of incorporation and the requirement of consent to annexation together provide the legal basis for the multiplicity of autonomous,
economically and socially differentiated local governments in most metropolitan areas. The main criterion for the creation and preservation
of a local government is whether local people-with the definition of
local supplied by the people themselves-want it. For people with resources adequate to their local public service needs or desiring to regulate local land use, the answer is usually in the affirmative. The
interests of other localities or of the region as a whole usually need not
be taken into account.
3. Recent State Boundary Review Legislation. - As with school finance
and exclusionary zoning, there has been some movement toward state
341. See, e.g., City of Town & Country v. St. Louis County, 657 S.W.2d 598, 606

(Mo. 1983).
342. Southern and Western metropolitan areas generally have fewer municipalities

than their Northern and Eastern counterparts, but because of the universal rule permitting incorporated areas to escape forcible annexation, even the metropolitan areas in
Sunbelt states with liberal annexation laws are politically fragmented into multiple municipalities. Thus, even though San Diego, California, has grown by annexation from 99
square miles in 1950 to 322 square miles in 1984, and Phoenix, Arizona, grew from 10
square miles in 1940 to 386 square miles in 1984, see Miller, supra note 340, at 78, by
1967 there were already 14 separate municipalities in the San Diego area and 18 in
greater Phoenix, seeJ. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 329, at 289.
343. See, e.g., City of Olivette v. Graeler, 338 S.W.2d 827, 837 (Mo. 1960) (many
of the 99 incorporated cities in St. Louis County incorporated as "defensive measure"
against annexation); W. Colman, supra note 63, at 18-19, 23-24 (discussing instances of
defensive incorporation); S. Sato &A. Van Alstyne, State and Local Government 48 (2d.
ed 1977) (discussing examples in Missouri and Minnesota); Note, supra note 328, at
79-80; Note, Promoting Rational Land Use Planning: The Municipal Incorporation
Statute as a Comprehensive Plan Implementation Device, 57 St. John's L. Rev. 127,
142-43 (1982).
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or regional oversight of decisions to incorporate, annex or consolidate,
and toward legislative standards that require greater attention to state
or regional concerns. Again, as with schools and zoning, only a small
fraction of state legislatures have acted to provide a state or regional
review of local boundary decisions. A focus on this minority of states
may give the misleading impression of state activism. Nevertheless,
some attention to the handful of states with boundary review laws is
appropriate, if only to indicate the limited nature of the control on local
autonomy in even these activist states.
In the 1950s and 1960s, several states, primarily in the Middle and
Far West, passed laws providing for some administrative review of incorporations and boundary changes. 3 44 These laws, and the review
they authorize, vary in structure and scope, but they have two common
features. Procedurally, some external administrative agency passes on
the wisdom of the proposed local organizational action and may reject
it. Substantively, the reviewing body is authorized to decide whether
the local action is in the best interests of the region as a whole, and not
345
just of the areas seeking annexation, incorporation or consolidation.
In some states, the reviewing body is a state agency; in others it is
34 6
composed of both state and local officials, or just local officers.
Some states review all local government formations or boundary alterations, while others limit oversight to major metropolitan areas or designated types of localities. 3 47 Review may entail consideration of the
344. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.014-.016 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 414.02 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); Cal. Gov't Code § 56250 (repealed by
Stats. 1985, c. 541, § 4) See, now, Cal Gov't Code § 56826 (West Supp. 1989) (West
1983 & Supp. 1989).
345. See J. Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 110-20; P. Florestano & V. Marando,
supra note 278, at 79-80; see also Goldbach, Local Formation Commissions: California's Struggle Over Municipal Incorporations, 25 Pub. Admin. Rev. 213 (1965) (describing aims of California's law governing agency review and outlining standards of and
viewpoints regarding make-up of agency itself); Johnson, The Wisconsin Experience
with State-Level Review of Municipal Incorporations, Consolidations, and Annexations,
1965 Wis. L. Rev. 462 (administrator's account of early years of agency in Wisconsin);
Note, The Minnesota Municipal Commission-Statewide Administrative Review of Municipal Annexations and Incorporations, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 911 (1966) (overview of the
establishment of agency review of municipal boundary activities); Note, 1969 Amendments to Minnesota's Incorporation, Consolidation, Annexation and Detachment Statute, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1052 (1970) (discussion of procedural and substantive changes in
agency review).
346. See J. Zimmerman, State Responses to Urban/Rural Problems 12 (Aug.
30-Sept. 2, 1984) (unpublished paper presented at Am. Political Science Ass'n 1984
annual meeting).
347. See generally 1 C. Antieau, supra note 5, § 1.16 (summarizing general state
administrative supervision of local government incorporation); P. Florestano & V.
Marando, supra note 278, at 79-80 (listing the substantive powers generally given to
state agencies);J. Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 110-19; Woodroof, Systems and Standards of Municipal Annexation Review: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Geo. L.J. 743,
754-65 (1970) (outlining the discretionary aspects of state agency review standards).
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impact of the formation or boundary change on the revenues, service
capacity, regulatory authority and growth of the jurisdiction from which
the area in question is being subtracted, on other local governments in
3 48
the area and on the structure of the area as a whole.

These laws have reduced the proliferation of small local governments.3 4 9 In 1959, Minnesota was one of the first states to provide for
state review of local government formation. In the nine years preceding the creation of the state boundary review commission, sixty-two local governments were incorporated-thirty-six in the Twin Cities area
alone.3 5 0 In the nine years after the commission's creation, only five
new municipalities were created, and these were, on average, four times
as large as the municipalities incorporated in the 1950s. 3 5 1 In

Wisconsin, which also enacted its administrative review in 1959, new
incorporations were sharply reduced, and in the first six years of the
state agency's existence approximately one-third of all proposed incor3 52
porations were rejected.
But these laws do not empower the boundary review agencies to
eliminate local governments that already exist, nor do they authorize
the forcible merger of localities that prefer to maintain separate political existences. A boundary commission can block a local incorporation
or annexation proposal it deems not in the best interest of the region,
but a commission cannot initiate or compel a boundary change that it
determines would be of regional benefit. Annexations and consolidations in these states continue to require local consent,3 5 3 and the local
consent requirement is still a significant barrier to annexations and
35 4
consolidations.
In the states providing some region-oriented oversight of local organizational decisions, the departure from localism is thus only partial.
Local government formation is no longer a purely local matter, but lo348. See Cal. Gov't Code § 5479b (West 1983); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 414.031 subd. 4
(West 1987); Wash. Rev. Code § 35.13.173 (West 1965 & Supp. 1989); Wis. Stat. Ann.

§ 66.016 (West 1965 & Supp. 1988). For example, the reviewing agency may decide
that annexation by an existing municipality would better serve the interests of the region

than would formation of a new local government. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.016(2)(b),
66.021(11)(c) (West 1965 & Supp. 1988); Johnson, supra note 345, at 467-69.
349. See, e.g., Martin &Wagner, The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency Formation Commissions in California,
21 J.L. Econ. 409, 422-25 (1978).

350. Note, The Minnesota Municipal Commission, supra note 345, at 911.
351. SeeJ. Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 111-13; Note, supra note 345.

352. See Johnson, supra note 345, at 471.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has treated the state's municipal incorporation re-

view scheme as intended to "place substantial obstacles in the path of the incorporation
of a city or village which falls within the metropolitan area" and has sustained that legis-

lative purpose. Town of Pleasant Prairie v. Department of Local Affairs, 113 Wis. 2d
327, 339, 334 N.W.2d 893, 900 (1983).
353. See, e.g., Woodroof, supra note 347, at 758-59.

354. See id. at 748-49.
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cal governments that were already formed, and those that win approval
as new incorporations, retain their autonomy. Even Wisconsin and
Minnesota, which have had the longest experiences with regional review, declined to eliminate the referendum requirement for those annexations or consolidations that won administrative approval. 3 55
More importantly, these administrative review commissions have
not become national models. Most state review procedures were
adopted between 1959 and 1967, when the effects of the postwar
proliferation of local governments in metropolitan areas had become
manifest. Since then, relatively few states have followed suit. Today,
four-fifths of the states have no such regional administrative review
3 56
mechanism.
Thus, despite some recent gestures in the direction of greater state
oversight, the law of local government formation and preservation remains essentially localist in character. Local inhabitants are the primary actors, local concerns are their criteria, and the continued
existence of local governments is generally protected. These rules have
been largely unquestioned in court and largely unaffected by legislative
change. This is consistent with, and indicative of, the general structure
of our localism in the states.3 57 Moreover, the law in this area gives
little attention to the proper size of local units or to the standards for
marking off the territory of one local government from that of another.
Local governments are often self-defined; their boundaries are the
product of history, the self-interested actions of local decision makers,
and the legal system's deference to the result. Local governments are
frequently created and defended not to strengthen local interests
against the state but to insulate one set of local people or interests from
the regulatory authority and population of another local government.
As with school finance and land use regulation, the law of local government formation and preservation indicates that not all local governments benefit from state delegations of power and that often local
355. See Note, 1969 Amendments, supra note 345, at 1064-65 &n.61 (state legislature retained referendum requirement over objections of Minnesota Municipal Com-

mission); Note, The Rule of Reason in Wisconsin Annexations, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 1125,
1129, 1131 (Wisconsin Assembly defeated bill that would have permitted annexation of

unincorporated contiguous territory upon approval of boundary review board without
consent of residents of area to be annexed).
356. SeeJ. Zimmerman, supra note 346, at 12.

357. State commitment to local territorial integrity is also illustrated by other state
laws governing local government reorganization. Florida, for example, permits metropolitan areas to address urban problems through either the consolidation of city and
county governments or county adoption of a charter enabling it to exercise powers comparable to those of home rule cities. Thomas & Marando, supra note 332, at 50-53.
Both forms of reorganization, however, require local voter approval, id. at 53-54, and

noncity voters are often opposed to greater county responsibility for urban problems,
id. at 60. Thus, one recent study found that 10 out of 10 proposed city-county consolidations were rejected, as were 11 out of 14 proposed county charters. Id. at 56.
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power is wielded against the interests and concerns of other localities.
In such a setting, the very idea of local power becomes ambiguous.
D. Local Autonomy and FederalConstitutionalLaw
Although the law of local autonomy and state-local relations is primarily a product of state law, no critical description of the place of local
governments in the American legal landscape would be useful without
some attention to federal constitutional law. The traditional view is
that the Supreme Court has predicated the constitutional status of local
governments entirely on the theory that a local government is merely
an administrative arm of the state, utterly lacking in autonomy or in
constitutional rights against the state that created it.358 The Supreme
Court's 1907 decision in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, which sustained the
merger of the city of Allegheny into the city of Pittsburgh over the objections of Allegheny's residents, is usually treated as the purest statement of the black-letter position:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to
them. .

. The number, nature and duration of the powers

.

conferred upon these corporations and the territory over
which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of
the State. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental -powers . . . constitutes a contract with the State

within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The State,
therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such
powers .

.

. expand or contract the territorial area, unite the

whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done.., with
or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their
protest. In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution,
by any provision of the Constimay do as it will, unrestrained
59
tution of the United States.A
Hunter remains fundamental to the federal constitutional status of
local governments.3 60 Yet the Supreme Court has gone beyond Hunter
in recent years. Without according local governments formal constitutional rights against their states, the Court has affirmed the importance
of localism in our political culture. The Court has treated localities as
active, locally responsive governments, not just administrative arms of
the states. The Court has endorsed the appropriateness of local deci358. See, e.g., 1 C.Antieau, supra note 5, §§ 2.00-.05; 2 E. McQuillin, supra note
5, §§ 4.17-.19; C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note 5, §§ 1.05, 3.06.
359. 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).

360. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
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sion-making and has frequently promoted localism and protected the
considerable autonomy local governments enjoy under state law.
This Section explores the changing place of local governments in
federal constitutional law. It is not a comprehensive survey3 6 ' but a
thematic study of the concern for local autonomy evinced in recent
Supreme Court decisions. The first subsection examines the general
status of local governments, exploring a number of cases in which the
Court emphasized the interest of local people in self-government and
the authority of localities, distinct from their states, to initiate actions
and to respond to their residents' interests. The second subsection
analyzes how the Court has sustained localist values in the critical areas
of education finance, land use and local government formation.
1. The ConstitutionalStatus of Local Governments.
a. Local Governments and Local Self-Government. - The Supreme
Court's recognition of and support for the widespread practice of local
autonomy is illustrated most clearly by the application of the one person, one vote doctrine to local governments. In Avery v. Midland
County,3 6 2 the Court articulated a view of local government that emphasized not the traditional authority of states to structure local arrangements, but the constitutional implications of the local inhabitants' stake
in local self-government363
361. For a general survey, see M. Gelfand, Federal Constitutional Law and
American Local Government (1984); see also Gelfand, The Constitutional Position of
American Local Government: Retrospect for the Burger Court and Prospect for the
Rehnquist Court, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 635 (1987); Lee, The Federal Courts and the
Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1982); Williams,
supra note 15, at 83.
362. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
363. Id. at 481. As a local voting rights case with implications for local autonomy
and state-local relations, Avery was presaged by Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), the celebrated Alabama racial gerrymandering case in which the Supreme Court
gave some indication of the contemporary limits of Hunter. Gomillion held that Hunter did
not provide that "the State has plenary power to manipulate in every conceivable way,
for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that
the State's authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution
considered in those cases," that is, the contracts, due process, and privileges and immunities clauses. Id. at 344. The fifteenth amendment was not constrained by the Hunter
rule and precluded the state from redrawing municipal boundaries if the state's purpose
was to deny blacks the right to vote in municipal elections. Id. at 345.
Although nominally a voting rights case, Gomillion's fifteenth amendment analysis
may have broader significance for the notion of local self-government and the right to be
a member of a particular community. The Court has always considered residency in a
jurisdiction a constitutionally valid prerequisite for the exercise of the franchise in that
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972); Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S.
621, 625 (1969). The plaintiffs in Gomillion did not allege the loss of the right to vote in
federal, state or county elections, or even the denial of the right to vote in any new
community they might choose to incorporate outside the borders of the new Tuskegee.
Their only claim was a disenfranchisement from Tuskegee elections. 364 U.S. at 341.
But only residents of Tuskegee have a right to vote in Tuskegee elections, and the state,
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Avery considered a challenge to the apportionment of the Midland
County Commissioners Court-the county legislature-which gave a
tiny rural minority a majority of the seats. 364 The Midland apportionment had been adopted pursuant to a provision of the Texas Constitution that, the Texas Supreme Court held, did not require districts of
equal population.3 65
The Court began its analysis by invoking the Hunter notion that
local governments are arms of the state; indeed, the county's status as a
political subdivision of the state was the predicate for application of the
equal protection clause to the commissioners court, since the equal
protection clause reaches only the exercise of state power.3 66 But the
county's status as an extension of the state was not alone sufficient to
require that the commissioners court be subject to one person, one
vote. 3 6 7 If, as Hunter's theory of state-local relations suggests, the state

by redrawing Tuskegee's borders, had made them nonresidents. Traditional doctrine
was that the state had the unlimited authority to determine municipal boundaries, including the alteration of pre-existing boundaries. The finding of a fifteenth amendment
violation suggests not only that the plaintiffs had the right to vote in Tuskegee elections,
but, more importantly, that they had a right to be members of the territorial and political
community known as Tuskegee. To that extent, Gomillion implies that a state does not
have the unlimited power to decide who are the residents of a municipality or to draw
municipal boundaries.
Of course, Gomillion is first and foremost a race discrimination case. Even if the
black plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected interest in preventing race-conscious
line-drawing that would exclude them from the political community of Tuskegee, cf.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding state enforced residential segregation
unconstitutional), Gomillion provides only modest support for a more comprehensive argument that local residents generally have a constitutionally protected interest in municipal boundary lines and local government arrangements. Cf. Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at
68-70 (holding state legislature may provide city with police jurisdiction over residents
immediately outside city boundaries without giving those noncity residents a vote in city
elections).
364. Avery, 390 U.S. at 476.
365. The Texas Constitution required a division of the counties of Texas "into four
commissioner precincts in each of which there shall be elected by the qualified voters
thereof one County Commissioner .... " Tex. Const. of 1854, art. V, § 18. The trial
court had found that the challenged apportionment of the Midland County Commissioners Court had been adopted " 'for political expediency, to maintain the status quo' "
and reflected a" 'gross abuse of... discretion'" by the Commissioners Court, and the
trial court invalidated the apportionment. Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422,
424-25 (Tex. 1966) (quoting trial court findings). The Texas Supreme Court sustained
the trial court's finding of "obvious arbitrariness in the current districting order," id. at
428, but rejected the claim that either the "convenience of the people" provision or the
equal protection clauses of the state or federal constitutions required precincts of equal
population. See id. at 426 & n. 1 (under Hunter county governments not subject to "one
man, one vote" principle); id. at 428 (population is a factor under Tex. Const. art. V,
§ 18, but "the convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a county may
require-and constitutionally justify-a rational variance from equality in population").
366. Avery, 390 U.S. at 479-80.
367. Special districts, which are the most numerous of the political subdivisions of
the state, are generally not subject to the one person, one vote requirement. See Ball v.
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legislature is the only true legislative body in the state, then the principle, embraced in Reynolds v. Sims, 368 that representative government requires legislative apportionment to be based on one person, one
vote 3 69 could have been fully satisfied by the proper apportionment of
the state legislature without further application to local governments
since, under Hunter, localities are subordinate administrative bodies
and not real units of government.3 7 0 Moreover, the Hunter view of local
governments as creatures of the states suggests that local government
structure is a matter for either state legislatures, which by the time of
Avery were subject to proper apportionment rules under Reynolds, or
state constitutions. 3 7 1 The particular problem in Avery-rural domination of the county government-should not have been a problem since
the county primarily attended to rural matters. 3 72 If the county government were simply a state agency, and the state saw the county's function as the protection of rural interests, the7 3state reasonably could have
3
sought a rural-oriented county structure.
James, 451 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973). But cf. Hadley v.Junior College Dist., 397 U.S.
50, 53-54 (1970) (junior college district subject to one person, one vote rule); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (school district subject to one person,
one vote rule).
368. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
369. Id. at 561-68.
370. Indeed, Reynolds relied on just this distinction in rejecting the so-called "federal analogy" as a defense for malapportioned state legislatures. 377 U.S. at 575. Proponents of the federal analogy argued that when states utilize the county as the basic
unit of representation in the legislature-creating state senates based on a one county,
one vote rule and state lower houses with a minimum of one representative per county
and the remaining representatives apportioned among the counties according to population-they are simply following the model set forth in the United States Constitution
for the structure of Congress. See id. at 571-72. The Supreme Court dismissed the
federal analogy, and any argument that local governments are polities comparable to the
states. Whereas the states are "separate and distinct governmental entities which have
delegated some, but not all, of their formerly held powers to the single national government," id. at 574, "[p]olitical subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or whatevernever were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have
been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by
the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions." Id. at 575 (citing
Hunter).
371. See Avery, 390 U.S. at 489 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
372. Id. at 483-84.
373. The rural focus of county government and the concomitant need to give rural
voters disproportionate strength in elections to the Commissioners Court played a role
in the Texas Supreme Court's decision. As the court explained, "The voice of the rural
areas will be lost for all practical purposes if the commissioners precincts of counties are
apportioned solely on a population basis except, perhaps, in those few sparsely settled
counties without a concentration of urban centers. Yet, important affairs of the county
administered by the Commissioners Court-such as roads, bridges, taxable values of
large land areas-disproportionately concern the rural areas." Avery, 406 S.W.2d at 428.
The dissenting justices on the United States Supreme Court expressed similar views.
See Avery, 390 U.S. at 491-92 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 507 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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The Court rejected this reasoning and held that the requirement of
equal representation applies at the local level, and not just to the states,
because local governments are governments, possessed of autonomous
decision-making authority on behalf of local residents. Even a properly
apportioned state legislature could not authorize a departure from one
person, one vote at the local level. The Court relied on the practice of
local autonomy in the states, the states' extension of home rule and the
value of local self-government:
While state legislatures exercise power over their constituents
and over the various units of local government, the States universally leave much policy and decisionmaking to their governmental subdivisions. Legislators enact many laws but do
not attempt to reach those countless matters of local concern
necessarily left wholly or partly to those who govern at the local level. What is more, in providing for the governments of
their cities, counties, towns, and districts, the States characteristically provide for representative government-for decisionmaking at the local level by representatives elected by the
people. And, not infrequently, the delegation of power to local units is contained in constitutional provisions for local
home rule which are immune from legislative interference. In
a word, institutions of local government have always been a
major aspect of our system, and their responsible and responsive operation is today of increasing importance to the quality
of life of more and more of our citizens.3 74
The contrast in perspective between Hunter and Avery is clear.
Hunter's view is top-down: local governments are creatures of the state,
subject solely to state control and performing state functions in a statespecified local area. Juridically, a local government is little more than
the Department of Motor Vehicles, with a geographically specific territory that the state can alter at will. Avery's view is bottom-up: a local
government belongs to local people, and local citizens have a stake in
its "responsible and responsive operation." Moreover, a local government is a government. It makes authoritative policies, laws and decisions in response to the demands of local residents.
Avery is not in formal conflict with Hunter. It does not hold that
people have a right to local government or require states to respect
local wishes concerning the delegation of local power or the configuration of local boundaries. The Court merely recognizes the "universal"
existence of local governments possessing considerable autonomy and
providing an important representational function and reasons from
there. But the normative implications are unmistakable. Avery treats
counties and municipalities as political institutions that initiate their
own actions on behalf of local citizens rather than just implement state
actions locally. The Court applied one person, one vote to the county
374. 390 U.S. at 481.
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commissioners court-and to all city and county governments-because one person, one vote is the one constitutional "ground rule" 37 5
of American representative institutions.3 76 Local legislatures are representative institutions; therefore, they must be structured in accordance
with the equal population principle even though state administrative
3 77
agencies need not be.

According to the Court, local self-government is a basic value in
the American political system, "of increasing importance to the quality
of life of more and more of our citizens."13 78 Notwithstanding Hunter's
broad disclaimer of a federal constitutional interest in state-local relations and its view of localities as mere arms of the state, Avery recognizes the representative nature of local governments and assumes a
significant measure of local political self-determination. By raising localities to the status of governments, Avery also raises the standing of
79
the principle of local self-govemment.3
Avery's localism fits nicely with the localist pattern of state law
375. Id. at 485.
376. The Court continues to model its approach to one person, one vote at the
local level on Avery. The rule for determining whether to apply one person, one vote to
a particular local unit is whether the unit is governmental "with general responsibility
and power for local affairs." 390 U.S. at 483. Avery held that cities, counties and all
general purpose governments are subject to one person, one vote. Subsequently, the
Court also extended one person, one vote to school districts and special purpose districts involved in education. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 52 (1970);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). Thereafter, the Court declined
to extend one person, one vote further and held that the doctrine did not apply to water
storage districts. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 362 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973). Even here, the Court did not
retreat from Avery's treatment of general purpose local governments such as cities and
counties as entities distinct from the state. One person, one vote was held inapplicable
in the water storage district cases not because those entities were considered appendages of the state, but because their narrow grants of authority and their limited functions
led the Court to treat them more like business enterprises than governments. See, e.g.,
Ball, 451 U.S. at 366-68; Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 728-29; see also Ball, 451 U.S. at
372 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (distinguishing the application of the one person, one
vote rule to the school boards in Hadley and Kramer as "reflect[ing] the Court'sjudgment
as to the unique importance of education among the functions of modern local
government").
377. The Court recently and unanimously restated this principle: "Both state and
local elections are subject to the general rule of population equality between electoral
districts. No distinction between authority exercised by state assemblies, and the general governmental powers delegated by these assemblies to local elected officals, suffices
to insulate the latter from the standard of substantial voter equality." Board of Estimate
v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433, 1437 (1989).
378. Avery, 390 U.S. at 481.
379. Indeed, by sustaining the representative nature of local governments, Avery
may have strengthened local political development since general purpose local governments are now required to be fully representative of all local residents. Rural domination of county government, in particular, would be difficult to maintain after Avery. But
see Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1519, 1559
(1982) (contending that Avery inhibits local experimentation and local recalculation of
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where, as we have seen, local autonomy is largely a product of institutional arrangements and political values rather than formal local legal
rights.
Avery in a sense complements Hunter, providing doctrinal recognition of the fact that, in practice, local governments are agents of both
the state and of local constituents, carrying out state functions locally
and acting on behalf of local residents and local interests.3 8 0 These two
ways of conceiving of local legal status are not entirely inconsistent but
there is a tension between them. The strain of reconciling de facto local autonomy with formal plenary state power over localities may be
seen in a range of cases concerning local government inclusion in state
immunities, state liability for local government misconduct and local
ability to assert federal claims against a state.
b. Local Governments and State Immunities. - Local governments may
not always enjoy the immunities from federal regulation available to the
states, as they would if localities were merely state agencies. This is the
lesson of Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,38 1 in which the
Supreme Court held that the exemption from federal antitrust laws the
"the competing interests of allocative efficiency, administrative efficiency, progressive
redistribution, and participation").
380. A later local voting rights case, Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S.
60 (1978), marked a partial return to Hunter, but even here the Court continued to link
local government with local political control. Holt involved an Alabama law which gave
certain cities-in this case Tuscaloosa-limited "police jurisdiction" over unincorporated areas within a three-mile radius of the city limits but did not provide a concomitant
extension of the right to vote in municipal elections to residents of the police jurisdiction. Relying on Hunter, which, the Court asserted, "continues to have substantial constitutional significance in emphasizing the extraordinarily wide latitude that States have
in creating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them,"
id. at 71, the Court upheld the Alabama law, id. at 70.
In Holt Civic Club as in Hunter, the Court saw the role of local government as providing basic services on behalf of the state at the local level. The function of Tuscaloosa in
exercising its extraterritorial authority was to satisfy the needs of urban fringe residents
for basic municipal services such as police, fire and public health. Id. at 74. It was not
the policy-making or representational role emphasized in Avery. The state had discretion to decide how these needs would be met, whether by the state government directly,
by the county, by a new municipality, or by vesting extraterritorial authority in a neighboring municipality. Under Hunter, "[a]uthority to make those judgments lies in the
state legislature." Id.
But Holt Civic Club was not pure Hunter and the nature of the Court's departure from
the traditional Hunter stance reflects the significance ofAvery. The Court emphasized the
limited scope of the extraterritorial authority granted to Tuscaloosa. "[A]mong the
powers not included" in the municipal police jurisdiction were general taxation and land
use regulation-"the vital and traditional authorities of cities and towns." Id. at 73 n.8.
If Tuscaloosa had been granted these hallmarks of local government power in the extraterritorial ring, it in effect would have been the municipal government for the urban
fringe residents. Arguably, these residents therefore would have had the right to vote in
municipal elections and to participate in municipal politics.

381. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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states receive under ParAerv. Brown3 8 2 does not automatically extend to
local governments, and that the state's grant of broad home rule powers to its municipalities is not by itself sufficient to immunize those municipalities from federal antitrust liability.3 8 3 Because Boulder exposed
local governments to liabilities from which the states are shielded, the
case may seem difficult to square with a claim that it gives support to
localism. But Boulder reflects the Supreme Court's treatment of localities as legally autonomous governments. The gist of Boulder is that local governments are not simply administrative subdivisions or
extensions of their states. Localities are independent entities, even
though their autonomy may cost them some of the protections
states
38 4

enjoy. Local governments must take the bitter with the sweet.
Boulder's rejection of home rule as sufficient authorization for local
anticompetitive activity further underscores the Court's recognition of
a home rule municipality's independence from direct state control.3 8 5
382. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The state action exemption was created by the Supreme
Court in Parkeras a matter of statutory interpretation. Relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the Court found that Congress had not intended the Sherman
Act "to restrain state action or official action directed by a state," id. at 351, and therefore that states and state officials could not be subject to antitrust liability for anticompetitive actions. Subsequently, the Court recognized that Parker'sfederalism rationale, and
its intention to permit states to pursue anticompetitive programs, must also shield private parties engaged in anticompetitive arrangements pursuant to state authorization.
Patrick v. Burget, 108 S.Ct. 1658, 1662 (1988). Private parties may enjoy Parkerimmunity, but only if their anticompetitive actions are predicated on" 'clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed [s]tate policy'" and are "'actively supervised' by the State itself." California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.)). Thus, although Boulder and its progeny are cases of
statutory interpretation, the Parkerdoctrine's grounding in principles of federalism indicates that the local government antitrust cases provide some insight concerning the constitutional status of local governments.
383. 455 U.S. at 50-57. Prior to Boulder, a fragmented Supreme Court had held
that a local government could be sued under the antitrust laws in Lafayette. There was no
majority opinion in Lafayette, which involved a suit by the private competitor of a municipal utility. See 435 U.S. at 391-92. Lafayette thus constituted an uncertain precedent for
antitrust liability for local regulatory action. Boulder, which involved anticompetitive municipal regulation of cable television franchises, squarely presented the broader issue of
municipal immunity. 455 U.S. at 44.
384. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974).
385. The city of Boulder made two arguments that its home rule status under the
Colorado Constitution entitled it to antitrust immunity. First, the city argued that since
the Colorado home rule amendment vested plenary legislative power in the city, Boulder should be treated like the state of Colorado for purposes of the antitrust exemption.
Second, even if home rule did not turn Boulder into Colorado, the broad home rule
grant assertedly constituted sufficient state authorization of local anticompetitive action
to satisfy the requirements for Parkerimmunity for entities other than states.
The Supreme Court rejected both assertions. 455 U.S. at 52-56. With respect to
Boulder's first point, the Court explained, "[t]he Parkerstate action exemption reflects
Congress' intention to embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the
States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this
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The Parkerstate action exemption extends only to those measures that
pass the two-pronged test of being both the result of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" and "actively supervised
by the State itself."3 8s 6 The "clear articulation" requirement generally
means that the anticompetitive restraint must be either compelled by
state law or explicitly authorized by state legislation.3 8 7 The Boulder
Court properly treated home rule as a statement of the municipality's
relative autonomy from state supervision and of the state's neutrality
concerning municipal decision making, rather than as an affirmative authorization of local anticompetitive actions. Under home rule, municipal decisions are not decisions of the state. Boulder's denial of the Parker
immunity to home rule municipalities is therefore consistent with the
theory of home rule.
But while Boulder supported local autonomy in theory, it jeopardized it in practice. The Court left local governments in a bind: either
localities could enjoy broad discretion as a matter of state law but be
subject to antitrust suit, or they could immunize themselves from antitrust claims at the price of greater state oversight and control. However, the potentially antilocal thrust of Boulder was substantially
ameliorated by the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,388 which
eliminated money damages in antitrust suits against local governments,3 8 9 and by the subsequent decision in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire,3 9 0 which liberalized the criteria for Parkerimmunity for localities.
Hallie was a suit against a Wisconsin city that was the sole provider
of sewage treatment services in a two-county region and refused to
treat the sewage of towns in the area unless they accepted the city's
sewage collection and transportation services as well.3 9 1 Thd Court inprinciple contains its own limitation: Ours is a 'dual system of government'... which
has no place for sovereign cities." Id. at 53 (quoting Parker, 317 U.S. at 351).
Boulder's refusal to set local governments on a par with the states is not surprising.
The fifty states are unique in our system. The states enjoy textual protection under the
Constitution and function as fundamental components of the structure of the national
government. American federalism has consistently been framed in the context of nation-state and state-state relations. Local governments lack the political status and historic role of the states, and have no claim to the states' special relationship with the
national government. In the absence of a specific congressional grant of immunity, the
most local governments can aspire to is autonomy, not sovereignty.
386. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1662-63 (1988).
387. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
388. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36
(Supp. V 1987)).
389. The act continues to permit suits for injunctive relief against local
governments.
390. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
391. The towns contended that the city used its monopoly over sewage treatment
to gain an unlawful monopoly over sewage collection and transportation services, in
violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended that the city's actions constituted an
illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the towns. Id. at 37.
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terpreted Wisconsin's general authorization to municipalities to provide extraterritorial sewage treatment services and to determine the
areas to be served to "clearly contemplate that a city may engage in
anticompetitive conduct. '3 92 The city could obtain the Parkerimmunity
as long as its action was "a foreseeable result" of the state legislation
authorizing local regulation or service provision. 39 3 Immunity would lie
even if the state law neither mandated nor mentioned anticompetitive
local conduct. 3 94 The governmental status of municipalities entitled
them to broader protection of their anticompetitive behavior than
would be available to private firms, the Court reasoned: "We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to
39 5
be acting primarily on his or its own behalf."
Further, Hallie completely released local governments from the obligation to prove that their actions were subject to active state supervision. 3 96 Again, the Court relied on the fundamental difference between
local governmental and private conduct. Local government activity,
the Court reasoned, raised "little or no danger" of private self-interest.3 9 7 Therefore, there was no need for close state review. 3 98 In effect, the two-pronged test for Parker immunity for private parties was
pruned down to half of one prong for local governments. Together,
then, Hallie and the Local Government Antitrust Act took some of the
sting out of Boulder and restored a measure of local antitrust immunity.
As Boulder affirmed local autonomy in theory, Hallie supported it in
practice.
c. Local Action and State Responsibility. - Much as localities do not
automatically enjoy state immunities, states are not automatically liable
for the constitutional violations of their local governments. The lack of
state derivative liability for local misconduct was underscored dramatically by Milliken v. Bradley,3 99 in which the Supreme Court relied on the
formal legal disjuncture of a state from its localities to reject interdistrict busing as a remedy for unconstitutional segregation in the Detroit
school system. The lower court in Milliken found that racial segregation
within the Detroit public schools was irremediable unless suburban
school districts were included in the busing program. 40 0 The lower
court also took seriously the Michigan Constitution's statement that
public education is a state responsibility and Michigan law's treatment
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id.
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Id. at 732-33 (lower court opinion).
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of state districts as creatures and agents of the state. 401 In the lower
court's view, Detroit and the suburban districts were merely different
components of the Michigan school system, and cross-district busing
was analogous to busing students from one school to another within a
single school district. 40 2
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court would not approve an
interdistrict remedy unless either the state or the suburban school districts were also legally liable for interdistrict segregation. 4 03 The
Detroit school district was, in theory, a creature of the state: its boundaries had been drawn by the state and it was carrying out the state's
education function at the local level. But, as in Avery, the Court turned
from the state's theoretical supremacy to the practice of local autonomy, particularly in education: "No single tradition in public education
is more deeply rooted than local control over the operations of schools;
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and the
quality of the educational process. '40 4 Despite the state's formal legal
responsibility and its uncontested authority to redistribute power and
restructure the school system, Michigan, "in common with most states,
provide[d] for a large measure of local control. '4 0 5 That local control
deserved respect and operated as a brake on the lower court's -remedial
authority.
The Court held that the state and its school districts stood on independent legal footings. The state was not legally obligated to
restructure public school administration in the greater Detroit area to
remedy the segregation in Detroit. 40 6 In the absence of separate evidence of direct state or suburban involvement in Detroit's segregation,
an area-wide remedy that impaired local control in the suburban dis4 07
tricts would not be sustained.
By combining dozens of school districts into a single metropolitan
area-wide system, the interdistrict remedy threatened the suburban districts' control of their own schools. But why were the suburban districts, and their particular boundaries, the proper reference point for
local control? The metropolitan remedy did not necessitate central
state operation of local schools. Metropolitan desegregation could
401. Id. at 726 & n.5.

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 741.
at 745.
at 741-42.
at 742.
at 745.
at 748-52. The Court was willing to assume arguendo that the state was

responsible for segregated conditions in Detroit "on the theory that actions of Detroit as

a political subdivision of the State were attributable to the State." Id. at 748. But in the
absence of a showing that any local school district boundaries were drawn for racially

invidious reasons there was no basis for requiring an interdistrict remedy. Id. at
748-49.
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have been reconciled with local control through the creation of a metropolitan district composed of and controlled by area residents. However, a metropolitan remedy threatened local control by the existing
local school districts-and for the Milliken Court, that was the local control that mattered. The district court in Milliken erred not only in ignoring the significance of local autonomy, but in treating the school district
boundaries as "no more than arbitrary lines on a map drawn for political convenience. ' 40 8 Both the general principle of local control and
the particular configuration of school districts deserved respect. The
suburban school districts were "separate and autonomous" not only
from the state, but from Detroit.40 9 The state's formal legal authority to
consolidate school districts was irrelevant. Unless and until a state consolidation occurred, the suburban school districts could rely on their
independent political existence to insulate themselves from Detroit's
problems. The federal courts had to respect existing local boundary
lines, even if that made an effective remedy for school segregation in
the metropolitan area impossible.
d. State-Local Conflicts. - The autonomy of localities and the occasional willingness of the Supreme Court to vindicate local decision
making are also revealed in two recent cases involving local assertions,
in federal court, of federal claims against the states that created them.
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,410 the Court permitted the
school district to assert the fourteenth amendment to invalidate a state
measure that would have banned a local program of busing for school
integration. In Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District No. 401,41 1 the Court permitted a South Dakota county to assert the
supremacy clause to pre-empt a state law that would have limited the
county's discretion to use federal funds.
In Washington, as in Avery and Milliken, the practice of local autonomy was as important as the state's theoretical legal superiority. The
state had endowed the locality with the powers it was attempting to
retract. 41 2 Contending that it "necessarily retains plenary authority
over Washington's system of education, '4 13 the state sought to withdraw authority from local school districts and to make school busing
policy a matter for state determination. 4 14 The Supreme Court acknowledged the state's underlying authority over local school districts,
but found it significant that the state had "generally delegated to a lo408. Id. at 741.
409. Id. at 744.
410. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
411. 469 U.S. 256 (1985). For a third instance of a locality asserting a constitutional claim against its state, see City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 951 (1978) (sustaining Boston's argument that state restriction on city spending in election campaign
violates first amendment).
412. 458 U.S. at 475-78.
413. Id. at 475.

414. Id. at 477.

1990]

OUR LOCALISM

cal, and locally accountable, board final responsibility in most matters." 4 15 Local control was the operational baseline of education
governance. The state's ban on local busing was not equivalent to state
adoption and repeal of its own voluntary busing law; 4 16 rather, the

state's intervention in the traditionally local area of education "worked
a major reordering of the State's education decisionmaking process."'4 17 The Court viewed the state's action not as a mere "internal"
redistribution of decision-making authority from a line agency to the
main office, but as an unusual interference with local school boards'
status as "separate entities for purposes of constitutional adjudication."'41 8 The state's reallocation of authority with respect to desegregative busing effected a highly suspicious structural change in statelocal relations. 4 19 In departing from the widespread and traditional
pattern of local school autonomy, the state's action made local adoption of a measure that would benefit minorities difficult and thus created an unconstitutional burden on minority interests. 4 20
415. Id.
416. Id. at 483.
417. Id. at 479.
418. Id. at 482.
419. As the Court pointed out, "It is the State's race-conscious restructuring of its
decisionmaking process that is impermissible, not the simple repeal of the Seattle [busing] plan." Id. at 485-86 n.29. The Court determined that the restructuring was raceconscious because the state measure "was carefully tailored to interfere only with
desegregative busing." Id. at 471. But the unusual nature of the state's departure from
the traditional pattern of local control further confirmed the race-conscious nature of
the state's action, id. at 474-82. Washington may be compared to Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960), discussed more fully in note 363 supra. In both cases a state action
with respect to a local government was invalidated because the state's action was racially
motivated. The formal effect on the doctrine of plenary state power over state-local
relations is the relatively limited one that Hunter must give way to the anti-discrimination
principle of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Yet in both cases the Court's
view of local government has elements not caught even by a Hunter doctrine with a race
discrimination exception. In Washington, part of the proof of discrimination may have
been the departure from normal state-local arrangements. Moreover, part of the harm
to Seattle's minority residents was the loss of the opportunity to pursue a particular
policy at the local level-a loss not offset by the comparable opportunity to pursue the
same policy at the state level. That a restriction on the scope of permissible local policy
making is an injury to local people reflects some of Avery's localist concern about the
value of local government and local political activity to local residents, as Well as of the
institutional separation of state and local governments.
420. 458 U.S. at 483-84. Noting that the Seattle busing plan was not constitutionally mandated, Justice Powell's dissent sharply criticized the Court for "cut[ting] deeply
into the heretofore unquestioned right of a State to structure the decision-making authority of its government"-assuming, of course, that a local school district is a part of
the state's government. Id. at 493 (Powell, J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell's dissent.
Washington serves as a useful reminder that local autonomy is consistent with a range
of policy outcomes-racial separation in Milliken and desegregation in Washington-and
that one should be careful before equating a commitment to localism with any other
substantive vision. Cities, as many advocates of local power insist, can be more progres-
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Lawrence County displayed Avery's localist spirit in its interpretation
of the federal Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act. The act provides localities
with funds to replace tax revenues lost because of tax-exempt federal
lands, and it authorizes the recipients to "use the payment for any governmental purpose." 42 ' South Dakota sought to require the county to
allocate the federal funds in the same manner as the state mandated
county spending of locally raised revenues. The state contended, in
classic Hunter top-down fashion that, as the county's creator, it had sole
authority to determine the county's "governmental purpose." 4 22 But
the Supreme Court read "any governmental purpose" in Avery's bottom-up style. County expenditures were the result of local decisions,
responding to local needs and emerging from the local political representation process. Thus, the Court determined that Congress intended
to "ensur[e] local governments the freedom and flexibility to spend the
federal money as they saw fit."'4 23 Local self-determination, not state
control, better suited the Court's view of the source of local govern4 24
mental purposes.
These cases suggest that the Supreme Court's treatment of local
governments is not fully captured by Hunter and traditional notions of
plenary state power. The institutional arrangements of local autonomy,
and the accompanying support for local self-government as a political
value, have affected federal constitutional and statutory interpretation.4 25 Although there is no constitutional localism that formally prosive than their states. Nevertheless, the factual setting in Milliken is more indicative of
our local government system than the one in Washington. Most metropolitan areas look
more like Detroit, where blacks and whites tend to live in separate localities, than
Seattle, which had an adequate racial mix within the city for internal busing to have an
effect.
421. 31 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1982).

422. 469 U.S. 256, 259-60 (1985).
423. Id. at 263.
424. Justice Rehnquist would have continued "the long history of treatment of
counties as being by law totally subordinate to the States which have created them." Id.
at 273 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At least one court of appeals has reiterated the
Supreme Court's view. See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding
that school district had standing under supremacy clause to sue state of Texas over conditions of participation in federal school breakfast program, but finding for state on
merits).
425. Indeed, localism as a political doctrine that influences federal constitutional
and statutory interpretation in ways that assume or advance local autonomy without providing local governments constitutional protection against their states may not be much
less substantial in our constitutional order than federalism, notwithstanding federalism's
superior formal status as a legal doctrine. As my colleague Henry Monaghan has
pointed out, "The radical transformation that has occurred in the structure of 'Our Federalism' in the nearly two centuries of our existence has emptied the concept of legal
content and replaced it with a frank recognition of the legal hegemony of the national
government." Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," 43 Law & Contemp. Prob. 39, 39 (1980). "In major part at least 'Our Federalism' is a political, rather
than a legal, doctrine." Id. at 42.
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tects local units against higher level governments, the Court's belief
that locally accountable governmental units are significant in practice
and desirable in theory has led it to affirm the representative nature of
local governments, the operational independence of local governments
from their states, and the important role local governments play in
making law and policy in critical areas. Localities do not enjoy the status of states; they remain formally subordinate to the states; and local
autonomy entails liability as well as power. But under the outer shell of
plenary state power, a hardy inner skin of local control over local political institutions, and local articulation of local laws and policies, has
grown.
2. The Supreme Court'sAffirmation of Our Localism. - The Court's protection of local autonomy is particularly evident in the areas that constitute the basic fabric of state-local and inter-local relations: education
finance, land use regulation and local government formation. In each
area, the Court's concern for localist values contributed to its adoption
of an expansive notion of the proper scope of local decision making or
to its ratification of the distribution of power that has resulted from
state legislative and judicial action.
a. Education Finance. - The Supreme Court's principal school finance case, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 42 6 set the
pattern in this area. In Rodriguez, the Court accepted plaintiffs' contentions that significant spending, taxing and educational quality differences resulted from the state's delegation of responsibility for funding
public schools to localities of unequal wealth, and that the state had
failed to provide revenues adequate to compensate for interlocal wealth
differences. These profound differences, however, were not a sufficient
basis for invalidating the school finance system.
Like many state courts, the Supreme Court acknowledged that local fiscal responsibility meant that there was "less freedom of choice
with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others. '4 2 7 But
that was offset by the "freedom to devote more money to the education
of one's children" 4 28 that local control provides for those districts fiscally capable of spending. Decentralization was worth the price of interlocal inequality because it protected that freedom to spend. 42 9 The
Court emphasized the constitutionality of fiscal decentralization in general, noting that most states rely on the local property tax to fund
schools as well as most other basic public services. 4 30 Plaintiffs' conten426. 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
427. Id. at 50.
428. Id. at 49. The Court suggested that interlocal wealth differences are not
"static": "Changes in the level of taxable wealth within any district may result from any
number of events, some of which local residents can and do influence." Id. at 54. In
other words, localities ought to engage in fiscal zoning in order to build up local tax
bases.
429. Id. at 49-50.
430. Id. at 48 & n.102. Among the other public services usually funded by locally
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tion that it was arbitrary to make educational, quality turn on local
wealth and "the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines of political
subdivisions" 4 3 1 was treated as a direct attack on the system of local
government. It was, for that reason, rejected. 4 32 Neither interlocal
wealth differences nor the alleged arbitrariness of local boundaries
troubled the Court: "[T]he very existence of identifiable local governmental units.., requires the establishment ofjurisdictional boundaries
that are inevitably arbitrary. It is equally inevitable that some localities
are going to be blessed with more taxable assets than others. '43 3 Interlocal inequality was not sufficient reason for upsetting the American
system of decentralized fiscal responsibility for public services, espe43 4
cially education.
Rodriguez, especially in light of Milliken and Washington, illustrates
the Court's belief that the proper locus of educational decision-making
authority is the local level. 43 5 Local control of education is the federal
raised property tax revenues were "local police and fire protection, public health and
hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds." Id. at 54.
431. Id. at 53.
432. Like many state courts, the Supreme Court also justified fiscal decentralization
as essential to assuring effective local administrative decentralization. Requiring the
equalization of school finance would, by increasing the state's control of "the purse
strings," erode local school autonomy. Id. at 51-53 & n.109. Administrative decentralization, in turn, was lauded because it gave local people an opportunity to participate in
and control local schools. Id. at 49-50. Local control was considered both an operative
fact and a normative strength of the public school system. As indicated in the text, the
Court was not persuaded by the argument, embraced by the California Supreme Court
in Serrano v. Priest, that for school districts without sufficient funds "local control" is
illusory and that true local control required the state to assure that all school districts
have adequate resources. See Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 611,487 P.2d 1241, 1260, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 620 (1970); see also Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 651-52, 376 A.2d
359, 376 (1977) (state equalization aid necessary to "permit all towns to exercise a
meaningful choice as to educational services"). The California and Connecticut decisions, of course, reflect a distinctly minority view among the state courts. See supra text
accompanying notes 128-133 & 265.
433. 411 U.S. at 54.
434. The Court's subsequent decision in Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986),
underscores its commitment to local spending differences based on local wealth disparities, as well as its acceptance of the naturalness of arguably arbitrary district lines.
Papasaninvolved a challenge to a state school aid program that gave certain districts far
less aid than others, for reasons unrelated to either fiscal or educational needs. The
Court treated the statute in Papasan as "very different" from the system sustained in
Rodriguez. Id. at 287. In Rodriguez, the variations in local spending "resulted from allowing local control over local property tax funding." Id. The disparities caused by
differences in local wealth "ivere a necessary adjunct of allowing meaningful local control over school funding." Id. at 288. Rodriguez, however, would not justify an unequal
distribution of state funds to local districts. The Court treated the state aid statute in
Papasan not as fiscal decentralization but as "a state decision to divide state resources
unequally among school districts." Id. The same description could have been given to
the state's action in dividing the state into districts of unequal taxable wealth.
435. Obviously, these cases present only a partial picture. In other decisions, the
Court has affirmed that local school boards, like the federal government, states and
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constitutional norm much as it is for most state courts. It is not a result
of local right, but is the outcome of a process of political delegation,
combined with a judicial belief that local control is a value deserving of
protection.
b. Land Use Regulation. - The Supreme Court has relied on the
value of local autonomy to validate the local use of zoning authority to
shape the economic and social character of local communities. The
Court has treated as unproblematic local practices with economically
restrictive effects; it has endorsed, within limits, the right of localities to
promote socially homogeneous communities; and it has raised procedural hurdles that make it difficult to test in federal court those local
practices that may run afoul of constitutional limitations.
The centerpiece of the Court's affirmation of local zoning power,
and of the local right to exclude potential residents whose presence
would be inconsistent with the local vision of proper community character, is Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.4 36 Belle Terre, a small Long
Island community, restricted all land uses to family residences. It defined family to include only those persons related by blood, adoption or
marriage. 43 7 As a result, a group of unrelated college students were
4 38
unable to live in a house they had leased in Belle Terre.
The dispositive issue in Belle Terre was the standard of review to
apply to the local ordinance; the resolution of that issue required a determination of the constitutional status of the rights at stake. If the
individual's interest in moving into a community or choosing a particular residential arrangement was held to be a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection review, then the ordinance would be
subjected to strict scrutiny. Moreover, treating the right to choose
one's place or form of residence as a fundamental right in Belle Terre
could, by implication, also subject to strict scrutiny all other local restrictions on the rights of people to move into a locality or local regulations confining people to a particular type of residence. Thus, a
fundamental rights approach would have thrown into question the presumptive legitimacy of local zoning for community character.
The application of strict scrutiny in Belle Terre would have compelled the village to demonstrate that the ordinance was necessary to
secure a compelling local interest and that no less restrictive alternative
would suffice. While the village's asserted goals of controlling noise,
congestion and traffic were legitimate, all could have been achieved
other public bodies, are fully subject to constitutional constraints. See, e.g., Frisby v.
Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982).
These cases do not challenge the locus of decision-making authority, although they do
limit the range of local government discretion.
436. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
437. The ordinance contained an exception permitting two unrelated people living
and cooking together in a single housekeeping unit to constitute a family. Id. at 2.
438. Id.

COLUMBIA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 90:1

without this restriction on the character of the residential use. 4 39 How-

ever, the village's basic goal-to maintain its character as a family community-required the "families only" provision. Full protection of the
right to create a community of traditional families would have been inconsistent with protection of the right of outsiders to move into Belle
Terre and establish their own living arrangements there. In short, finding that the local ordinance infringed upon a fundamental right would
have required the Court to weigh the conflicting local and individual
4 40
interests in self-determination.
The Court avoided the need for close constitutional review by determining that the Belle Terre ordinance had no impact on fundamental rights. An outsider has no constitutionally protected right to make a
home in a locality; the right to travel does not encompass the freedom
to move into the community, and the right of association does not extend to residential arrangements. 441 Notwithstanding its exclusionary
social
effect, the Belle Terre zoning ordinance was mere economic and 44
2
legislation, reviewable solely according to the rational basis test.

Nor did the Court simply sustain the Belle Terre ordinance with a
brief statement that the ordinance was rational. Instead, the Court
gave a ringing endorsement of the right of Belle Terre to maintain itself as a traditional family community through restrictions on growth
and controls on development. 443 In exercising its zoning power, a local
government may seek to preserve itself as "a quiet place where yards
are wide [and] people few." '4 44 Although the Court's opinion referred
to local power to "lay out zones" for "family values" and "quiet seclusion," 4 45 there was no implication that the locality also had to lay out
zones for other uses or greater population, since the entire village was
zoned family residential. The zoning power was developed to permit
the separation of inconsistent uses; in Belle Terre, the Court sustained
local use of zoning to exclude entirely residents not wanted by the
community.
Belle Terre does not provide a blanket immunity for all local exclusionary practices. The Court has limited local zoning autonomy when
the restrictions violated clearly protected constitutional rights 44 6 or
439. Id. at 18-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
440. See Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. L.J. 145, 196-98
(1977).
441. 416 U.S. at 7-8.
442. Id. at 8.
443. Id. at 9; see also Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
444. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
445. Id.
446. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981); Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Moore is illustrative of both the limitations on Belle Terre and Belle Terre's underlying
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were based on race 44 7 or plainly arbitrary or irrational concerns. 4 48
But even these cases reflect respect for the presumptive right of localities to control local land uses and exclude undesired users, and the
ordinary use of zoning to serve the economic and social interests of a
community through the exclusion of unwanted outsiders has not been
seen as arbitrary or irrational. 4 49 The Court treats local zoning ordinances with the deference normally accorded state laws and has broadly
sustained local authority to wield the zoning power to shape the economic and social features of local communities.
The exclusionary measure affirmed in Belle Terre differed from the
typical zoning restriction in its focus on individual life style rather than
the cost of a home. 450 In other cases, however, the Court's support of
local zoning autonomy included more typical economically exclusionary measures. Thus, in Village of Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing
Development Corp.,4 5 1James v. Valtierra,45 2 and City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises,45 3 the Court sustained local exclusions of public housing,
force. In Moore, the Court invalidated a local zoning restriction aimed at the exclusion of
extended families. The ordinance was held to infringe the fundamental right of family
privacy, which protected the right of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption to
live together. Id. at 498-500. The Moore plurality reconciled its treatment of the East
Cleveland ordinance with the one in Belle Terre around the shared theme of "family
needs" and "family values": Belle Terre's action had been consistent with the constitution's protection of the traditional family, since it did not exclude persons related by
blood, marriage or adoption, while East Cleveland's attempt to exclude blood relatives
interfered with family rights.. Id. at 498. Consequently, Moore constitutes little or no
restriction on the authority of localities to adopt socially exclusionary ordinances, as
long as there is no formal interference with the right of family members to live together.
447. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
448. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The
restriction on group homes for the mentally retarded in Cleburne fell because the local
action had been prompted by "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding." Id. at 448. The Court did
not indicate what factors are properly cognizable by local regulators, but did nothing to
suggest that economic and fiscal concerns were not proper factors for local zoning. Indeed, Cleburne gave implicit support to certain typical local exclusionary measures. The
Court found the restriction on group homes arbitrary because the area in which the
home sought to operate had been zoned residential without any other restriction on the
type of structure or use. Id. at 447-48. Negative attitudes and fear were not "permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment
houses, multiple dwellings and the like," which were allowed in the neighborhood. Id.
The city's authority to exclude would have been stronger if it had consistently zoned to
exclude all nontraditional single family uses.
449. See Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 253-54 (9th Cir. 1974) (no
duty of zoning community to make provision for needs of nonresidents).
450. Belle Terre's ordinance did not differ, however, from other zoning ordinances
seeking to determine the character of community residents. See Richards, Zoning for
Direct Social Control, 1982 Duke LJ. 761, 776-81 (discussing ordinances excluding
nontraditional families and children).
451. 429 U.S. 252, 268-71 (1977).
452. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
453. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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subsidized housing and all forms of multifamily housing.
Arlington Heights involved an application by a not-for-profit developer of low-cost housing to a Chicago suburb to rezone a parcel of land
from single-family to multifamily so that the developer could build 190
subsidized units. Public hearings on the developer's application occasioned large and vocal demonstrations in opposition by local residents
concerned about the "social issue" and the threat to property values
posed by the introduction of low and moderate income people into an
affluent community. 4 54 The local planning commission and the village
board voted against the rezoning.
Before the Supreme Court, the issue was framed as one of racial
discrimination. Arlington Heights had twenty-seven black people out
of a population of 64,000, while 40% of the Chicago area residents
eligible for the subsidized units were black. 4 55 Local zoning decisions,
like all other government actions, may not be based on racially invidious motives. However, the Court found no evidence that the village
to preserve itself as a
was motivated by anything other than the desire
45 6
middle-class, single-family home community.
Arlington Heights treated as unproblematic a community's decision
to zone itself entirely for single-family uses; to refuse to rezone to accommodate a small subsidized housing project; and to provide no alternative site for lower-cost multifamily housing. The very consistency of
the village's zoning policy-the site the developer sought to build on
and the surrounding area had long been zoned for single-family usewas taken as a rebuttal of racial motivation. 4 57 .In the absence of racial
motivation, there was no basis for challenging the local land use policy.
The village had an unquestioned right to pursue a policy of economic
segregation.
In James and Eastlake, the restrictions on public or multifamily
housing were procedural rather than substantive: state or local provisions required the approval of the local electorate as a precondition to
certain land use changes. 458 In James, a referendum requirement454. 429 U.S. at 257.
455. According to one commentator, Arlington Heights was the most segregated
municipality with a population greater than 50,000 in the Chicago area. McGee, Illusion
and Contradiction in the Quest for a Desegregated Metropolis, 1976 U. Ill. L.F. 948,
979.
456. The contested site had been zoned single-family since 1959 when Arlington
Heights first adopted a zoning ordinance, and it was entirely surrounded by single-family homes. The village "[was] undeniably committed to single-family homes as its dominant residential land use." 429 U.S. at 269.
457. Id. at 270. See Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A
Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1217, 1239-40 (1977).
458. James involved Article XXXIV of the California Constitution, which provides
that no low-rent housing project may be developed, constructed or acquired by a state
public body, such as a housing authority, unless the project had been approved by a
majority of those voting in a local referendum. 402 U.S. at 139. Eastlake involved a
provision added to the charter of a Cleveland suburb which required that any changes in
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aimed at public housing exclusively-had resulted in the rejection of
several projects. 45 9 In Eastlake, a referendum requirement had been
added to the charter of a Cleveland suburb by voter initiative while the
plaintiff developer's application for rezoning to permit construction of
a multifamily project was pending before local zoning officials. 4 60 A
justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, which had invalidated Eastlake's
referendum requirement, had "little doubt of the true purpose of
Eastlake's charter provision-it is to obstruct changes in land use by
rendering such change so burdensome as to be prohibitive. '4 6 1
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court had little difficulty
sustaining either measure. InJames, Justice Black echoed the concerns
of public housing opponents when he noted that public housing "may
lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased
public services and to lower tax revenues. '4 62 It was entirely proper to
give "all the people of a community.., a voice in decisions that will
affect the future development of their own community. '4 63 The potential impact on the locality thus justified special procedures designed to
assure that the community as a whole gave its assent. The impact on
the availability and affordability of housing in the region was not
considered.
In Eastlake, the Court continued to equate local zoning referenda
with local devotion to democracy. The Court found no need to address
the antimultifamily housing motivation or the impact on regional housing opportunities of the Eastlake ordinance and similar restrictions in
64
other Cleveland area communities. 4
Procedurally, James and Eastlake clear the way for local use of the
referendum in zoning and for the current widespread use of voter initiative and voter approval requirements to establish growth controls and
to enact and enforce exclusionary restrictions. 4 6 5 Substantively, James
land use agreed to by the city council would also have to be approved by 55% of the
voters in a local referendum. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 670
(1976).
459. The case involved low-cost housing that had been rejected by the voters in

referenda in San Jose and in San Mateo County. 402 U.S. at 139.
460. A dozen other Cleveland suburbs had imposed similar referendum requirements for zoning changes, usually in response to multifamily or low-income housing
proposals. See Forest City Enters. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 200-01, 324
N.E.2d 740, 748 (1975) (Stern, J., concurring).
461. Id. at 199, 324 N.E.2d at 748.
462. 402 U.S. at 143.
463. Id.
464. These issues are addressed briefly in Justice Stevens's dissent. 426 U.S. at
689-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotingJustice Stem's concurring opinion in the Ohio
Supreme Court decision). The only issue that detained the Court was the landowner's
right to have his application for rezoning considered in a manner comporting with due
process, and the Court held that the referendum requirement raised no due process
issue. Id. at 675-80.
465. One study conducted prior to the Eastlake decision found that eight states-
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and Eastlake are of a piece with Belle Terre and Arlington Heights in the
approval of local authority to control economic and social development, to set a community life style and to exclude lower income
residents.
Two more cases complete the picture: Hills v. Gautreaux4 66 and
Warth v. Seldin.46 7 In Hills, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court's
order requiring the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which had practiced racial discrimination in its siting of
public housing projects in Chicago, to site future housing in the suburbs.4 68 In distinguishing its affirmance of metropolitan area relief in
Hills from its contemporaneous rejection of area-wide school integra-

tion in Milliken, the Court managed to use Hills to renew its commitment to local zoning autonomy, including the right to exclude
subsidized housing.4 69 Hills differed from Milliken, the Court reasoned,
because HUD had authority to operate in the Chicago housing market,
which extended beyond the Chicago city limits; thus, the larger boundaries of the housing market determined the territorial scope of the remedy. 4 70 Moreover, the remedial order against HUD did not impair the

zoning autonomy of Chicago's suburbs or interfere with their right to
exclude HUD projects. HUD had no authority to build housing without
a local application or approval. "An order directed solely to HUD
California, Colorado, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont and Virginiarequired local voter approval of low-rent housing projects. M. Danielson, supra note 68,
at 99 n.68. But that study referred only to state-wide requirements and did not address
the widespread practice of local adoption of referendum requirements, as in the village
of Eastlake in Ohio.
The exclusionary effect of such referendum requirements is two-fold. First, the referendum constitutes an additional procedural obstacle that the new housing proposal
has to overcome. Campaigning to win voter approval is costly, and the delay resulting
from the referendum requirement adds to the cost of construction. The provision in
Eastlake actually required the developer to defray the municipality's costs of conducting
the referendum. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 671 n.3 (1976).
The Ohio lower court's decision invalidating the assessment of election costs against the
developer was not appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court or to the United States
Supreme Court.
Second, referenda on development tend to be one-sided in their results. See supra
note 198.
Voters often reject public, subsidized or multifamily housing, which they fear will
cause undesirable changes in local social status, physical environment or fiscal burdens.
See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291,
292 (9th Cir. 1970) (referendum blocked subsidized multifamily housing); Ranjel v. City
of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970) (same); M.
Danielson, supra note 68, at 99-101; Goetz, Direct Democracy in Land Use Planning:
The State Response to Eastlake, 19 Pac. LJ. 793, 814-17 (1987).
466. 425 U.S. 284 (1976)
467. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
468. 425 U.S. at 286-91.
469. Id. at 295-96.
470. Presumably, if the defendant in Hills had been the Chicago Housing Authority,
Milliken would have precluded metropolitan relief.
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would not force unwilling localities to apply" for housing assistance,
but merely would limit HUD's discretion in allocating federal funds
among locally authorized projects. 4 7 ' The order would not preempt
local power to decide not to accept federal housing funds or undercut
the independent role of these localities in the federal housing assistance scheme.
Unlike the Milliken remedy, the Hills order "would not consolidate
or in any way restructure local governmental units. The remedial decree would neither force suburban governments to submit public housing proposals to HUD nor displace the rights and powers accorded
local government entities under federal or state housing statutes or existing land-use laws."' 47 2 Since metropolitan relief would have no impact on the structure of local government, local land use autonomy or
the suburbs' authority to exclude subsidized housing, it could be
473
affirmed.
In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme Court effectively precluded federal
judicial review of most local exclusionary zoning practices. Warth involved an attack on the zoning actions of Penfield, a residential suburb
of Rochester, New York. Ninety-eight percent of Penfield was zoned
for single-family detached housing, with, plaintiffs alleged, lot size, setback and floor area requirements that placed housing in the town beyond the means of low or moderate income people. 4 74 Moreover,
Penfield had taken administrative actions to delay or bar low and moderate cost housing, including the refusal of variances, permits, tax
4 75
abatements and support services.
In Warth, the Court rejected the right of outsiders to challenge
Penfield's zoning, and refused to take a regional perspective on local
zoning practices. Low and moderate income people in the region who
wanted to live in Penfield, but could not afford to do so because of the
cost of local homes, had no standing to attack Penfield's zoning unless
they could cite specific housing projects that Penfield had blocked in
which they had been guaranteed homes. 4 76 In the absence of such a
"demonstrable, particularized injury," 47 7 these nonresident plaintiffs
were merely victims of "the consequence of the economics of the area
housing market, rather than of respondents' assertedly illegal acts."'4 7 8
The effect of the decisions of Penfield in structuring the "economics of
the area housing market" would not be considered.
Similarly, Rochester taxpayers who contended that Penfield's ex471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

425 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 305-06.
For more critical commentary on Hills, see McGee, supra note 455, at 994.
422 U.S. at 495.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
422 U.S. at 506.
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clusionary practices forced Rochester to spend more on low and moderate income housing, thereby driving up Rochester's taxes, had no
claim against Penfield. Regardless of the effects of Penfield's and other
suburbs' zoning decisions on Rochester's tax base or its social service
needs, Rochester's taxes were held to "result[] only from decisions
' 4 79
made by the appropriate Rochester authorities.
Warth sought to discourage federal judicial review of local zoning
ordinances. The Court observed that "zoning laws and their provisions
.. are peculiarly within the province of state and local legislative authorities ....
[C]itizens dissatisfied with provision.s of such laws need
' 48 0
not overlook the availability of the normal democratic process.
Although the "normal democratic process" might protect the rights of
residents of the zoning community, 48 ' the local democratic process is
inadequate to protect the interests of nonresidents. As the review of
state land use laws indicates, 48 2 state legislatures have not been eager
to vindicate the interests of nonresidents affected by local exclusionary
zoning.

48 3

Warth is the perfect procedural complement to Belle Terre, Arlington
Heights and the other substantive local zoning cases. Local land use
regulations receive the deference normally accorded to government action, and the ordinary means of attacking local zoning will be the political process. Outsiders unable to participate in local politics will usually
lack standing to challenge local zoning in court; even if they do have
standing, they usually will have no substantive claim. In all but the
most egregious cases involving clear racial discrimination or other invidious attacks on established constitutional rights, the locality can exclude. Each locality is treated as a distinct governmental unit; the
cumulative effect of numerous localities in a region adopting such
479. Id. at 509. Warth also considered the standing of area organizations of builders and developers of not-for-profit housing to challenge Penfield's zoning. The builders and developers were found to have standing, but only to challenge the denial of a
building permit or a variance for a specific project, not the totality of Penfield's zoning.
Id. at 515-16. The majority did not address the fact that Penfield's ordinance, by requiring developers to pay for the time and money attendant on protracted administrative and court proceedings, discouraged most projects so that few developers were ever
likely to contest the denial of a permit for a specific project. Id. at 530 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (White & Marshall, JJ., joined in the dissent).
480. Id. at 508 n.18.
481. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 74, at 405-07; Rose, supra note 4, at 863-64.
482. See supra notes 291-301 and accompanying text.
483. Lower federal courts have used Warth as a basis for denying standing in zoning
litigation even in cases involving claims that Warth conceded might still be open, such as
those based on federal housing statutes. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Town of
Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978);
Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 589 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
See generally Sager, supra note 2, at 1392-1400 (1978) (describing broad construction
lower federal courts have given Warth and the manner in which this construction has
caught excluded residents and builders in "a three-legged Catch 22").
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measures adds nothing to the case for standing or on the merits. Localities have the freedom to pursue local self-interest, without any duty to
take into account the effects of local land use regulation on excluded
nonresidents or the economy of the region as a whole. The Supreme
Court's affirmation of localism in land use regulation could not be
stronger.
c. Local Government Formation and Preservation. - The Supreme
Court in recent years has not had cases requiring a constitutional examination of the state laws respecting local incorporation, annexation or
consolidation, 4 84 and the Court has not considered at all the criteria for
the formation of local governments. Nevertheless, in Town ofLockport v.
Citizensfor Community Action at the Local Level, Inc. ,485 the Court provided
some doctrinal support for state laws protecting the continuation of local governments and the preservation of their borders.
Lockport involved a provision of the New York Constitution conceming the structure of county government. New York provides its
counties the option of switching from a traditional "weak county" government to a "strong county" format, which gives the county a new
administrative structure and additional regulatory capacity. 48 6 Such a
change requires the approval in a referendum of concurrent majorities
484. One line of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the voting rules in limited

purpose governments has protected the independence of many local governments. In
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973), and Ball

v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), the Supreme Court effectively held that most special
purpose districts-such as water storage districts, irrigation districts and sewer districts-are not subject to the one person, one vote rule. By permitting the governance
of these districts to be based on landownership or other criteria apart from population,
as most of these districts have historically been governed, the Court assured the continued survival and proliferation of special purpose governments. Special purpose districts
play an important role in maintaining local autonomy generally. This point is discussed
more fully in Part II. Such districts can span a large geographical area but have authority solely for the limited purpose of funding one or a handful of specified services. Special districts enable a large number of small municipalities to pool their resources to
satisfy their infrastructure needs without sacrificing their independence or merging into
a metropolitan general government.
In addition, the Court has given some attention, in cases brought under the Voting
Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1982), to issues of racial discrimination incident to local
government formation and expansion. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States,
479 U.S. 462 (1987); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
485. 430 U.S. 259 (1977).
486. Under a traditional, "weak" or "noncharter" county organization, there is no
provision for independent executive or administrative authority (although the county
can provide itself with limited power). The county is governed by a legislative board of
supervisors. "As long as the functions of county government were relatively few and
simple, such arrangements assured the legislature of direct information about what was
going on in day-to-day county operations." Department of State, State of New York,
Local Government Handbook 71 (3d ed. 1982). To permit a county to provide and
administer more complex programs and functions, the state authorizes counties to
adopt "charters" or "stronger county" organizations, that provide the county with an
executive independent of the legislature. In a strong county government, the county
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of county voters who live in cities and of those who live outside the
cities. A proposed strong county charter for Niagara County twice won
the approval of city voters and of a majority of the total county voters,
but both times was rejected by a majority of the noncity voters and thus
failed to pass. 48 7 The city voters contended that the concurrent majority requirement violated the equal protection clause. 48 8 The Supreme
Court, however, unanimously sustained the concurrent majority
rule.

4 89

The Court likened the county reorganization, which strengthened
the county government and weakened other local units, to "the structural decision to annex or consolidate. ' 4 90 A strong county, like an
annexation or a consolidation, could have a differential impact on the
"separate and potentially opposing interests" of city and noncity voters
within the county. 49 1 The Court readily assumed the constitutionality
of a concurrent majority requirement for annexations and consolidations, with separate veto authority for each of the "constituent units" of
an annexation or consolidation, even though such a rule would permit
492
a smaller group to outvote a larger one.
Lockport's discussion of the separate consents of the constituent
units in an annexation or consolidation is dictum. Nonetheless,
Lockport is consistent with the localism of the law of annexation and
consolidation in most states, which, as previously noted, generally provides that a municipality may not be annexed or consolidated to an493
other without its separate consent.
Lockport's protection of local governments, once created, from forcible annexation or consolidation fits nicely with the Court's general
executive has considerable authority over the budget and administration. See id. at
73-74.
487. 430 U.S. at 262-63.
488. Id. at 263.

489. Id. at 272-73.
490. Id. at 271.

491. Id.
492. Id. ("If that question were posed in the context of annexation proceedings,
the fact that the residents of the annexing city and the residents of the area to be annexed formed sufficiently different constituencies with sufficiently different interests
could be readily perceived. The fact of impending union alone would not so merge
them into one community of interest as constitutionally to require that their votes be
aggregated in any referendum to approve annexation.").
Although Lockport cited Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh on this point, Hunter had sustained
a single majority requirement over the protests of the smaller city that it was being svallowed up without its consent. 207 U.S. 161, 174-79 (1907). Lockport and Hunter may be
reconciled around the doctrine of plenary state power: in both cases the state won, once
with a concurrent majorities rule and once without. But given the propensity of the
states to require separate local consents to annexations and consolidations, plenary state
power in this area usually results in the protection of local independence. See supra
notes 333-338 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 326-343 and accompanying text. Although this rule preserves the political integrity of local units, especially smaller governments likely to be
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approach to local government. As in Milliken and Hills, the Court in

Lockport took seriously the separate existence of distinct local governments and the placement of local borders. Local boundaries are not
"arbitrary lines on a map" 4 9 4 but reflections of "separate and autonomous" political entities. 4 95 More broadly, although the Court has

never found a right to local government, once a state has created a
system of local governments and delegated power to them-as all the

states have-the Court has been supportive of the interests of local
governments. The Court has treated local governments as locally rep-

resentative political institutions; protected local autonomy against
claims that the states must equalize interlocal differences or that the
localities must assume a greater obligation to nonresidents; and vindicated local control over local taxable resources, public education and
land development. The status of local governments in federal constitutional law is far less precarious than is often asserted. Contemporary
federal doctrines of local government law and state-local relations are
highly congruent with the localism that marks most state legal systems.
E. Conclusion: The Power of Local Governments
Are local governments legally powerless, as is often contended, or
are they, in fact, fairly powerful? The answer turns on the meaning of
power 4 96 and on an assessment of the needs of local governments.
If power is defined as a legally enforceable right to existence and
outvoted in a single majority election, it poses a serious obstacle to governmental reorganization in most metropolitan areas.
At New York's 1967 Constitutional Convention, urban reformers had sought to facilitate the adoption of strong county charters by amending the state constitution to
require a single county-wide referendum. Suburban municipalities, particularly on the
north shore of Long Island and in Westchester County, mobilized in opposition to the
proposal. These localities stressed the importance of decentralization, the need for local
control over planning and zoning, and the fear of urbanization. Some upstate mayors,
fearing an erosion of their powers, also opposed the measure. The proposal was defeated. According to one analyst, the defeat "stressed that the basic boundary system of
New York local government was not likely to undergo any major changes in the foreseeable future." D. Shalala, The City and the Constitution: The 1967 New York Convention's Response to the Urban Crisis 81 (1972).
494. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741.
495. Id. at 744.
496. Power, as Steven Lukes has observed, is an "essentially contested" concept;
"its very definition and any given use of it, once defined, are inextricably tied to a given
set of (probably unacknowledged) value-assumptions which predetermine the range of
its empirical application." S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View 26 (1974). The very plasticity of the term is illustrated by the use of such very different concepts as coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation as synonyms for power. See id. at 17. A
rigorous definition of power is beyond the scope of this Article. For examples of differing scholarly views on the nature of power, see Lukes, Introduction in Power 1-17 (S.
Lukes ed. 1986); Bachrach & Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 947,
947-48 (1962). All I seek to do in this section is indicate that local governments have
power under an acceptable, common-sense meaning of the term.
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continuation, to control local resources and regulate local territory and
to prevail in conflicts with higher levels of government, then local governments generally lack power. 49 7 There is no right to local self-government. There is no right of local control over local services, local
schools or local land. States are the legal superiors of their local governments, with the power to invalidate local decisions. The formal theory of local governments as creatures, agents and delegates of the
states still holds.
But if power refers to the actual arrangements for governance at
the local level, then local governments possess considerable power. As
Alvin Goldman has observed, "the central idea in the concept of power
' 49 8
. .is connected with getting what one wants."
In our system, local
governments often get what they want. Local governments exist in
large numbers. They are easy to create and difficult to abolish, and the
decision to create or abolish is usually up to local people who may act
based on local self-interest. In most states, local governments operate
in major policy areas without significant external legislative, administrative orjudicial supervision. Local governments have considerable fiscal
and policy-making responsibility and extensive regulatory authority.
Nor is local power simply a matter of easily revocable delegations
of state power. Most state courts have treated the devolution of state
power to local governments as more than a contingent political arrangement for the local discharge of state responsibilities. State and
federal courts frequently adhere to a localist view of local power, holding local autonomy, particularly local control of the public schools and
land use, to be a legal value potent enough to withstand challenges
based on claims of equality, individual rights and local accountability
for the external effects of local actions.
Local autonomy has taken on an air of permanence. State legislatures and state and federal courts have proven unwilling to limit local
power or alter the structure of state-local relations, even after the effects of local autonomy in promoting interlocal inequality and local parochialism have been demonstrated. The mixed record of the school
*

497. A focus on the power to prevail in cases of observable conflict is consistent
with the views of the pluralist school of political science studies of local government,
exemplified by Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby. See, e.g., R. Dahl, Who Governs? 66
(1961); Polsby, How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative, 22 J. Pol.
474, 483 (1960). Lukes refers to this as the "one-dimensional view" of power. Lukes,
supra note 496, at 11-15.
498. Goldman, Toward a Theory of Social Power, in Power, supra note 496, at 156,
157. Of course, "getting what one wants" is not a sufficient description of power. A
farmer may want rain, and a downpour may ensue, but that does not mean the farmer
has the power to determine whether or not it will rain. Power exists with respect to an
issue only if the powerholder can obtain one of a number of possible outcomes. See id.
at 157-67. With respect to local governments, it is clear that local power in the areas of
zoning, school finance and local government formation and preservation extends over a
range of possible outcomes, thus satisfying Goldman's conditions for power.
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finance reform movement and of the challenges to local exclusionary
zoning, and the limited nature of efforts to regulate local boundary
changes, exemplify the strength of the states' commitment to local autonomy and contribute to the legitimation of local power. In the school
finance and zoning cases, the inequalities and externalities attendant on
local autonomy, ifjoined to the traditional agency theory of local governments, could have led state courts to require state governments as
principals in the state-local relationship to take responsibility for the
fiscal weakness of some local governments and the exclusionary behavior of others. But only a minority of state courts have taken such a
state-centered view. The inequalities and externalities imposed on
nonresidents and other localities, which would be irrational in a statecentered system, were accepted by most courts as a part of the system
of local autonomy. In the absence of direct attacks by state legislatures,
state courts tend to rely on the principle of local autonomy to repel
49 9
challenges to local power.
Moreover, state legislatures make only limited use of their formal
authority to pre-empt local lawmaking in areas of fundamental local
concern. The states have been reluctant to supersede local land use
regulations, redistribute local resources, redraw local boundaries or
control local government formation decisions. In the areas of zoning
and education, state legislative activism has been supportive of local
autonomy. State school finance reforms have generally protected local
spending autonomy. State land use laws have largely been consistent
with the local exclusion of unwanted uses and users. The boundary
review statutes do little to facilitate, let alone compel, the merger of
separate local units.
The state's legal power to prevail in state-local conflicts is less significant than the fact that such conflicts are relatively infrequent. Indeed, it is the paucity of such conflicts that indicates the existence of
considerable local power. As Bardach and Baratz have observed,
power is often found in the institutional arrangements and "nondecisionmaking" practices that result in the avoidance of conflicts and in
the exclusion of certain issues from political debate. 50 0 State governments rarely consider, let alone adopt, measures that directly constrain
local legal authority.
The extent of local power is, perhaps, even greater than these institutional arrangements suggest. Local autonomy is to a considerable extent the result of and reinforced by a systemic belief in the social and
political value of local decision making. As the cases and statutes reviewed in Part I indicate, local control of issues central to local life has
499. See, e.g., Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (invalidating legislature's delegation to state commission, of power to establish
government of local development superseding constituted local government), aff'd, 372
So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).

500. Bachrach & Baratz, supra note 496, at 949.
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repeatedly been treated as desirable, as natural, indeed, as presumptive. State courts and legislatures appear to believe in the value of local
control. It is the ideological strength of localism, its importance in
shaping "perceptions, cognitions and preferences" 5' 0 about the allocation of authority between state and local governments, that accounts
for the success of local governments and indicates the magnitude of
local power. In a political system in which so many participants support
relathe legitimacy of local decision making, local autonomy is "the
5 0°2
tively firm institutionalization of the normative order itself."
As a matter of state-local relations, then, there is considerable local
autonomy emanating from the states' delegation of fiscal and regulatory authority with both the practice of state legislatures of leaving local
governments alone and the tendency of state courts to elevate that
practice to the level of a legally protected interest. Local power may be
tacit or de facto, rather than a product of formal, constitutional ar50 3
rangement, but it is nevertheless very real.

Is this power adequate to meet local needs? That cannot be answered without some determination of what local government needs
are; that, in turn, entails a closer assessment of the enormous variety of
governmental units captured under the general rubric of "local government." Local governments differ significantly in population, area,
wealth, function and fiscal capacity. Some have substantial resources
and relatively few needs, while others have significant needs but are
relatively poor. The same legal authorizations and restrictions may add
up to real power for one set of local entities but provide only the illusion of power for the others. As the review of the school finance and
exclusionary zoning cases and the state incorporation and annexation
laws indicate, the differences in local needs and conflicts among local
interests make the very concept of local power as a general matter, considered apart from the situations of particular local government and
people, inherently ambiguous.
Part II of this Article opens up the formal legal category of "local
government" and examines how different types of local governments
fare under the general structure of local government law. By directing
attention toward the characteristics of local governments as specific
501. S. Lukes, supra note 496, at 24.
502. Parsons, Power and the Social System, in Power, supra note 496, at 94, 113.
503. Local government law's general distribution of power between state and locality satisifies Gordon Clark's definition of local autonomy as "the capacity of local governments to act in terms of their interests without fear of having their every decision
scrutinized, reviewed, and reversed by higher tiers of the state." G. Clark, Judges and
the Cities: Interpreting Local Autonomy 6 (1985). Clark contends that the formal legal
limits on local governments resulting from state constitutions, statutes and judicial decisions deny local autonomy. Id. at 77-8 1. Yet the preceeding review of how state legislatures and courts actually deal with local governments indicates that local governments
acting out of local self-interest have little reason to "fear" that their every decision will
be scrutinized, let alone reversed, by higher levels of government.
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places in the American political and legal landscape, Part II analyzes
the relationship of local legal power to local needs. In addition, the
discussion may illuminate factors that account for the differences in
scholarly perceptions about the scope of local power and suggest how
the pro-local development of local government law is linked to broader
changes in the settlement and institutional patterns of metropolitan
areas.
Further, an understanding of the social and economic differences
among localities and the interaction of these differences with the formal
legal powers local governments enjoy provides a basis for considering
the normative issue raised at the outset of this Article. Local autonomy
is too often promoted in the abstract, with advocates of localism implicitly relying on models of idealized local polities. The sharp differences
among local governments and the concomitant differences in local
needs and abilities render general claims about the value, as well as the
extent, of local autonomy difficult to sustain. Much as local power in
practice extends well beyond the nominal powerlessness of localities,
so, too, once the political and economic setting in which contemporary
local governments function is considered, the normative case for localism becomes considerably less compelling and theoretical generalizations about the appropriate distribution of power between states and
local governments become more difficult to sustain.

